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IV
Putting victims of crime ‘at the heart5 of criminal 
justice: Practice, politics and philosophy
Summary
This thesis examines the pledge made by the New Labour government to put victims of 
crime ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice system in England and Wales. The central 
questions addressed are what it would mean to have a victim-centred criminal justice 
system, what factors have driven this ‘policy’, and what putting victims ‘to the heart’ of 
the system has meant so far in practice.
Drawing on ethnographic techniques -  including courtroom observation, qualitative 
interviews and surveys -  this research is particularly concerned with the place of 
victims in the criminal trial procedure. As such, observations were conducted of trials at 
two magistrates’ courts and one Crown Court centre. These were combined with semi- 
structured interviews with legal practitioners and court personnel. A court users survey 
was also conducted at one of the magistrates’ courts to ascertain the views of victims 
and witnesses on court facilities, service provision, and the experience of giving 
evidence. In addition, interviews were conducted with criminal justice administrators in 
the local area under review and with central policy-makers at the Home Office, Office 
for Criminal Justice Reform and Department for Constitutional Affairs in order to shed 
light on the formation of the victim ‘policy’ and the challenges of its local 
implementation.
Findings from a grounded analysis of this dataset indicate that whilst, practically, much 
has been done to assist victims throughout the criminal justice system, cultural barriers 
and the practices of lawyers, advocates, benches and court staff have not caught up with 
these good intentions. It is further argued that this ‘policy’ is in fact driven by a 
multitude of goals and political pressures, not all of which are conducive to victims’ 
needs. Broadly speaking, this has resulted in central government relinquishing 
responsibility for victims in favour of local implementers, without providing the 
necessary financial backing.
The study concludes by proposing a model of victim-centred criminal justice, which 
emphasises a victim’s ability to make an ‘account’ during the trial process and thereby 
achieve therapeutic outcomes.
v
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION, AIM S AND  
HYPOTHESES
Most writings on victims in criminal justice begin with the premise that, traditionally, 
victims of crime have received very poor treatment at the hands of the criminal justice 
system (CJS). This is not without its touch of irony as, prior to the development of the 
‘new police’ in the 19th century, victims themselves were chiefly responsible for 
bringing charges against alleged offenders and hence formed one of the central pillars to 
the criminal justice process.1 Nevertheless, by general consensus it is now clear that in 
more recent times crime victims have suffered marginalisation at the hands of that 
system and those working within it (Zedner, 2002). In 1985, Shapland et al. articulated 
the discontent felt by many victims of crime in the following terms:
“The [criminal justice] system is not geared to the perspective of the victim. There 
appears to be a mismatch between the victim’s expectation of the system and the 
ignorance of and ignoring of his attitudes and experiences by the professionals 
within the criminal justice system” (1985: p.177).
It is difficult to distinguish the specific reason or reasons behind this rather sorry state of 
affairs. Certainly, as the modem police force developed from Peel’s 1829 Metropolitan 
model, it began taking over the task of pursuing prosecutions on behalf of the state. In 
the years that followed, private prosecutions by individuals became increasingly rare to 
a point where the victim’s leading role had eroded to that of merely reporting the crime 
in the first place and making a witness statement. In addition, the beginning of the 19th 
century saw the blossoming of deterministic notions of criminality, which viewed crime 
as being pre-empted by factors outside the control of individual offenders. Hence, 
sympathies were sometimes with the offenders as themselves the victims of social or 
biological influences (Williams, 2004).
In more modem times, by 1977 Nils Christie was arguing that the criminal justice 
system -  having become over professionalised -  effectively ‘stole’ conflicts from their 
‘rightful owners’, meaning victims and offenders (Christie, 1977). Indeed, it is 
commonly implied that the plight of the modem victim is a product of the near- 1
1 As such, the recent interest in this area is sometimes referred to as the re discovery o f victims 
(Sanders, 2002).
1
universal adoption of the adversarial justice model in the British criminal justice system 
(Ellison, 2001; Jackson, 2003).2 As already noted, under this system alleged offenders 
are bought to court and prosecuted by the state as represented (now in the vast majority 
of cases) by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The core of the system is therefore 
an adversarial contest between the state on the one hand and the defendant on the other.
As such, victims of crime themselves have no formal place or representation in these 
proceedings, save as witnesses called by either side. Furthermore, the fact that 
defendants are ‘alleged’ offenders until proven otherwise suggests that any persons who 
claim to be affected by an offence are only ‘alleged’ victims (Maguire, 1991). Of course 
-  and as will be argued in this thesis -  it is almost certainly an over-simplification to 
ascribe all the woes of the victim as the ‘forgotten man’ (Shapland et al., 1985: p .l) of 
criminal justice to the adversarial system per se. Indeed, Brienen and Hoegen (2000) in 
their sweeping comparison of twenty two European criminal justice systems suggest 
that the inquisitorial mode of justice is not inherently more favourable from a victim 
perspective compared with an adversarial one.
What is certain, however, is that issues related to victims within (and without) the 
criminal justice system have received increasing academic and official attention over 
the last twenty or so years (Home Office, 2002; JUSTICE, 1998; Crawford and Goodey, 
2000; Zedner, 2002). Christie’s 1977 contribution has already been mentioned, but as 
long ago as 1948 von Hentig had challenged the conception of victims as ‘passive 
actors’ (von Hentig, 1948). From the late 1970s onwards, victims of crime have been 
the topic of a fast growing -  now extensive -  literature and the study of victims’ role 
within the criminal justice system, along with their perceptions and experiences of it, 
have become important aspects of Victimology (Joutsen, 1987, 1991). In addition, and 
with particular significance for the present study, recent years have witnessed a growing 
appreciation for so-called ‘secondary victimisation’; the notion that many victims of 
crime are victimised a second time through poor treatment at the hands of the criminal 
justice system (Pointing and Maguire, 1988; Rock, 1998).
An extensive review of the relevant literature follows in Chapter 3. Suffice to say (for 
now) that there has been a marked growth in academic interest in these issues as well as 
a marked acceleration in official action and policy developments which impact upon
2 The singular exception being the inquisitorial proceedings used in coroners’ courts.
2
crime victims and which provide the background for this study. It is hard to know 
whether such official interest sparked academic debate or vice-versa, most likely the 
two fed on each other. This point notwithstanding, what is clear is that the victim issue
remains a dominant factor in government policy, as confirmed in recent press releases((
and the Queen’s speech of 2006:
0
“The overriding and primary aim of this review is to ensure that the Criminal 
Justice System is geared at every stage to protecting the public and putting the 
interests of the law-aiding majority and the victim first” (Home Office, 2006c).
“My government will put victims at the heart of the criminal justice system” 
(Queen’s speech of 15th November 2006).
It is this aim (or claim) of putting the victim ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice system 
that constitutes the primary focus of this research. By way of introduction, this chapter 
will provide a brief overview of the background, methodology, initial hypotheses and 
structural outline of this thesis, all of which will be covered in far grater detail in 
subsequent chapters.
1.1 -  THE POLICY BACKGROUND
In recent years the British government, in common with many other governments 
around the world, has indeed focused unprecedented attention on the needs of victims 
and witnesses in the criminal justice system generally, and specifically when they are 
called to give evidence in court (Maguire and Shapland, 1997; Home Office, 1999, 
2003a, 2005b, 2005f). Such moves have resulted in the development of a great many 
support mechanisms, information sources, service standards and other reforms designed 
to make the criminal justice system more responsive to the needs, problems and 
expectations of victims and witnesses.
Chapter 4 provides a detailed review and critique of these reforms as implemented over 
time. Specific ‘highlights’ of this long succession of developments and official policy 
initiatives3 include an expansion in the availability of both state and court-based 
compensation for victims of crime and, more recently, the proposed creation of a 
‘Victims Fund’ (Brienen and Hoegen, 2000; Wright, 1998; Home Office, 2004a). Since
3 For the sake of brevity, we will proceed here as if these successive developments reflect a 
consistent and unified policy, although later it will be argued that this in fact seems unlikely (see 
Chapter 4).
3
the 1970s, there has also been a marked increase in governmental support for several 
victim assistance organisations; especially Victim Support, which now receives the vast 
majority of its funding from the government (Rock, 1990; Victim Support, 2006; Rape 
Crisis Federation, 2007; Support After Murder and Manslaughter, 2007). Further 
developments have expanded the provision of information and support to victims and 
witnesses prior to coming to court, most recently through the rollout of joint CPS/Police 
‘Witness Care Units’ under the No Witness No Justice scheme (Home Office, 2004g). 
Indeed, policy-makers have also begun to address the problems faced by victims of 
crime outside the confines of the criminal justice system by engaging with housing 
authorities, insurers and healthcare services (Home Office, 2003a).
In the court buildings themselves, numerous improvements have been made to the 
facilities and support systems available; particularly through the expansion of Victim 
Support’s Witness Service (with government funds) to provide ‘front line’ assistance to 
victims and witnesses in all courts (Home Office, 2002). In the courtroom, the statutory 
grounding of so-called ‘Special Measures’ in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 has assisted vulnerable and/or intimated witnesses to give evidence via video­
link and other mediums designed to make the process less daunting (Hamlyn et al., 
2004a, 2004b). Furthermore, the 2001 national rollout of the victim personal statement 
(VPS) scheme now allows victims to convey the impact a crime has had upon them to 
the courts (Home Office, 2001c, 200le).4
More recently, the government has piloted a system of ‘victims’ advocates’, which for 
the first time provides direct representation for victims5 in court. Numerous roles for 
such advocates have been suggested, but the primary focus appears to be on assisting 
victims in communicating the impact of the crime to the court; thus constituting an 
extension of sorts to the VPS6 (Home Office, 2005b; Graham et al., 2004).
Several other developments were introduced under Part 3 of the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 2004. The most significant of these was the substitution of the 
existing Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 1996) with a statutory Victim’s Code of
4 Although -  as we will see in Chapters 3 and 4 -  the exact goals o f this scheme are less than
clear. •
5 At present, these are restricted to the family o f homicide victims, the so-called ‘secondary’ 
victims or ‘survivors’ (Rock, 1990).
6 In Chapter 3 it will be argued that this reform may effectively establish such victims as parties 
in a case.
4
Practice. This obliges criminal justice agencies to provide victims with minimum 
standards of service and hence (it is said) affords victims ‘rights’ for the first time. Also 
under the 2004 Act, the National Victims Advisory Panel (which has existed since 
2003) was given statutory backing with a mandate to:
“[Ajdvise the Home Secretary, Lord Chancellor, and the Attorney General (or 
their representatives) and, through them, other cabinet ministers, of the views of 
victims and witnesses of crime with particular reference to their interaction with 
the criminal justice system” (Victims’ Advisory Panel, 2004: p.6).
Hence, in accordance with growing trends towards governance discussed in Chapter 4 
(Crawford, 1997; Bache, 2003; Jordan et al., 2005), victims are now apparently being 
included within the policy-making process as well as the criminal justice system.7
The 2004 Act also created a new Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses to “promote 
the interests of victims and witnesses”8 and “keep under review the operation of the 
code of practice”.9 If a victim complains to any service provider within the CJS because 
of a perceived breach of the Code of Practice, and the victim is not satisfied with that 
agency’s response, then it is also open for the victim’s MP to address the matter to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, who in turn may direct an 
investigation.10
It is therefore clear that victims of crime are receiving considerably more 
official/govemmental attention now than at any time in the recent past. Indeed, in words 
which appear to summarise policy-makers’ aspirations on this issue, the Labour 
government has pledged:
“[To] put victims more firmly at the heart of our criminal justice system, with a 
victim-centred approach supported across Government” (Home Office, 2004a: 
P-28). '
On face value this seems to be both a highly significant and highly beneficial promise 
from the perspective of crime victims. After all, in recent times victims were not merely 
excluded from the ‘heart’ of the system, but cast to its furthest margins. The
7 See Chapter 4.
8 s.49(l)(a).
9 s.49(l)(c).
10 The outcome o f which may be that the Commissioner suggests the relevant agency pay 
compensation.
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significance of the pledge lies not only in its indication that victims should now expect 
better from the criminal justice system, but also in the clear implication that ‘victims’ 
are now firmly installed as subjects of ‘official policy’. ‘Official policy’ here refers to
the apparent acceptance of a need to provide assistance to ‘victims’ and ‘witnesses’ both((
by the government itself -  and its associated ‘policy-making networks’ (Jordan et al., 
2005) -  and by the ‘inner circle’ of CJS agencies (Rock, 1990). In other words, it would 
appear that victims and witnesses are now being seen as genuine issues to be considered 
and acted upon by these groups (Rock, 1990,1993).
Such was not always the case. As we have seen, in the not-so-distant past the needs of 
the victims in a criminal case were very much a non-issue to almost everyone else 
involved. Indeed, both victims and witnesses were viewed as little more than sources of 
evidence, and what little heed was paid to their perspectives and expectations was 
largely down to individual practitioners (Shapland et al., 1985; Joutsen and Shapland, 
1989; Groenhuijsen, 1998). To policy-makers as well, victims were simply not on the 
agenda. Rock (1990) suggests that the victim’s absence from the policy-making agenda 
in the years leading up to the late 1970’s and early 1980’s was largely down to the 
government’s earlier creation of the costly (but, relative to almost all other countries, 
extremely generous) state compensation scheme in 1964.11 With such a far-reaching 
scheme in place, many of those in policy-making circles took thè view that that they 
were already doing a great deal for crime victims (albeit in the absence of any 
consultation with the victims themselves).
Hence, the promise to put victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice represents a near 
complete reversal of philosophy on the position of victims over the last 20-30 years. 
The broad aim of this research project is to examine the meaning, development and 
implications of this pledge, with particular attention being paid to the criminal trial 
process. •
1.2 -  RAISING QUESTIONS
Using the government’s pledge to put victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice 
system as a starting point, three primary research questions were formulated for this 
project which I shall now set out in short form. 1
11 See also (Miers, 1991) for detailed discussion of this point.
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The first question is “what would it mean to put victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal 
justice system?” This question has many aspects; including what it would mean 
practically, legally, politically and, indeed, philosophically to have a genuinely ‘victim- 
centred’ system and what such a system might look like. As a normative point, this 
issue will greatly inform the investigation of the subsequent two questions.
( 0
The second question is “what is driving this ‘policy’?” That is to say, from the 
government and legislature’s point of view, what has prompted the near complete 
reversal of philosophy on victims described at the end of the last section? The word 
‘policy’ has been placed in inverted commas here because it is not to be assumed that 
the totality of measures and developments relating to victims (and witnesses) actually 
constitute a unified and consistent ‘policy’ at all. In fact, the contrary position is 
hypothesised below. As such, the issue raised in this part of the research is not whether 
victims and witnesses are indeed receiving the ‘better deal’ they have been promised 
(Home Office, 2001b). Instead, my concern will be the position of victims as the 
subjects of official policy interest.
My final question is “what has putting victims ‘at the heart’ of the system meant so far 
in practiceV In real life the criminal justice system faces a whole host of practical and 
organisational difficulties every day. As one solicitor remarked to me during the course 
of this project:
“The wheels of justice do not run smooth. They’re square. And falling o ff’ (a
solicitor appearing at Courts A and B).
Add to this the complicating influence of occupational cultures within the CJS -  
traditionally geared around the exclusion of victims (Shapland et al., 1985; Jackson et 
al., 1991) -  and one is faced with the real possibility that the policy and the practice of 
this ‘victim-centred’ system are two very different things (Rock, 1993).
At this stage, it is important to interject some general points on the intended scope of 
this research. Firstly, notwithstanding the government’s pledge to centralise the victim 
within the criminal justice system as a whole, for the purposes of this project I am 
especially concerned with the operation of criminal trials. Even more specifically, the 
project seeks to examine the role of victims within the substantive trial procedure prior 
to the sentencing stage. The reasons for this are both practical and conceptual. 
Conceptually, it can be argued that it is the trial itself which already stands ‘at the heart’
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of the criminal justice system, as many of the other processes we associate with criminal 
justice are either in anticipation of a trial or the result of one.
As such, in order to understand the government’s pledge, it seems vital to examine the 
implications for victims in criminal trials in specific detail. Practically speaking, there is 
also a growing literature already in existence addressing the victim’s role at the 
sentencing stage (Ashworth, 1993, 1998; Erez, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2004; Sanders et al., 
2001) hence the choice to concentrate on the substantive trial process, on which there is 
a relative lack of up to date (and certainly, first hand) information. Of course this focus 
will not be to the complete exclusion of all other issues relevant to a wider ‘victim- 
centred’ criminal justice system. Rather, the evaluation will simply concentrate more 
attention on points relevant to the criminal trial procedure because it is hoped that the 
conclusions drawn in relation to victims ‘at the heart’ of this process may be expanded 
and applied to the system as a whole.
On a technical point, in this project a ‘trial’ is understood as a criminal proceeding in 
the magistrates’ court or Crown Court that at the outset is intended to determine the 
guilt or innocence of defendants charged (usually by the CPS) with specific criminal 
acts. This would normally involve the giving of evidence by witnesses and would be 
termed an ‘effective’ trial by court personnel. Nevertheless, we will see during the 
course of this project that many such ‘trials’ are ultimately resolved in other ways, 
either because the proceedings cannot take place as planned and have to be postponed 
on the day (known as an ‘ineffective’ trial), or because the case is dropped or the 
defendant decides to. plead guilty at a late stage (known as a ‘cracked’ trial). In these 
situations a different (much shorter) procedure is required to determine how to resolve 
the case or rearrange it for a future date. Such shortened proceedings are also counted as 
‘trials’ for the purposes of this research.12
The second point I wish to raise at the outset is that this thesis should not be read as 
advocating or criticising the notion of ‘victim-centred’ criminal justice, ‘victim rights’ 
or any other related concept per se. Rather, my concern here is to objectively13 evaluate 
the meaning, background and practical implications of this policy and to determine what 
would be required to achieve it.
12 Further discussion o f the definitions used in this research can be found in Chapter 2.
13 At least, to the extent that genuine objectivity is possible for any researcher (Bryman, 2001).
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Finally, I wish to emphasise here that this research is concerned with criminal justice 
rather than restorative justice. Again part of the reason for this choice is simply the 
growing body of other research available on the emerging ‘restorative justice system’.
In addition, however, it will be noted in Chapter 3 that many commentators suggest((
restorative justice models as a solution to the problems faced by victims in criminal 
justice. As a consequence, relatively little work has been done on the notion of 
achieving ‘victim-centredness’ in the existing criminal justice system. Given that the 
vast majority of victims must still deal with the traditional criminal justice model even 
in the light of restorative options, it is felt that we ignore this model at our peril, or 
certainty the peril of victims.14
1.3-HYPOTHESES
In order to provide structure for both reader and author, I will now set out some initial 
points to be explored and (it is my hope) validated through the course of this thesis.
1.3.1 -  What would it mean to put victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice 
system?
For the first of the research questions I hypothesise that, whilst the present system of 
criminal justice is not ‘victim-centred’, it would nonetheless be possible to convert this 
system into one worthy of the label without necessarily resorting to ‘fundamental’ 
reforms. The concept of ‘fundamental’ verses ‘non-fundamental’ reform will be 
discussed and explained in Chapter 3, and hence only a brief introduction will be 
provided here. Essentially it is suggested that the former implies altering the basic tenets 
or aims of the adversarial system, and that politically this is not a feasible option for 
policy-makers. Notwithstanding this (and as noted a moment ago) little attempt has 
been made to assess whether victim-centeredness can be achieved without altering the 
system we have now. I would argue that ‘restorative justice’ must be categorised as
14 Although, in making this claim I by no means exclude the possibility that restorative justice 
principles may ultimately prove the only way to achieve truly victim-centred justice, and indeed 
that this may be the conclusion in Chapter 7. This is not my hypothesis, but it is clear that the 
restorative movement will continue to gather pace and thus become increasingly important to 
crime victims in the future. It is worth pointing out that many advocates o f restorative justice 
retain in their theorising o f such systems a place for more traditional forms o f case disposal, 
although this enters the far wider debates on the role of punishment, which need not concern us 
here (see Dignan, 2002a; Braithwaite, 2002). As such, this thesis adopts the view o f Bottoms 
(2003) who argues in terms o f a separation between the criminal justice and restorative justice 
systems
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fundamental reform, and hence this constitutes another reason why this is not the main 
focus of this study. Affording victims decision making power (in some cases) may also 
constitute fundamental reform but -  as will be argued in Chapter 3 -  consultative
participation in the process and the notion of victims having ‘rights’ and party status
((
within proceedings would not, as these would not vitally alter the existing process or the 
existing roles of those within it. „
With these points in mind, I will argue that a victim-centred trial would have three main 
features that can then be applied to the wider criminal justice system. The first of these 
is that victim-centred trials would be practically set up and organised to respond 
effectively to the needs of victims in terms of facilities, procedures, personnel, and so 
on. Secondly, I will argue in Chapter 5 -  and expand in Chapter 7 -  that a truly victim- 
centred trial process would be one that understands and accommodates victims’ need to 
form accounts of incidents and experiences, and would therefore seek to reduce the 
many instances in the present system where victims are prevented from constructing a 
full account of an incident during a criminal trial, and thus miss out on the possible 
therapeutic benefits of doing so. Whilst this might sound like a fundamental reform of 
evidential precepts, I will argue in Chapters 5 and 7 that trials are in fact already defined 
by narrative and storytelling, and the present adversarial model has already 
accommodated -  in the case of young vulnerable or intimidated witnesses giving 
evidence though pre-recorded examination in chief -  a much less restrictive form of 
evidence-giving without apparent prejudice to the interests of defendants. Finally, and 
linking the other two features described above, a victim-centred trial process would be 
one in which the underlying occupational cultures of those working within it (court 
staff, solicitors, barristers, judges, magistrates and so on) are genuinely receptive, 
understanding and proactive to victims’ needs.
The key to achieving these three components of victim-centeredness - 1 will argue -  is 
to afford victims rights which are justiciable from within the criminal justice system, 
not through separate proceedings but within trials themselves through the proactive 
interjection of judicial actors ensuring such rights are upheld. Given that we have now 
reached the stage where victims are said to have ‘rights’ (through the Victim’s Code of
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Practice) this again is not so much a fundamental reform as a change in the justiciability 
of these existing ‘rights’.15
My wider argument is then that these three components can be applied to the wider 
criminal justice system in order to arrive at a genuinely ‘victim-centred’ system- of 
criminal justice.
1.3.2 -  What is driving this ‘policy’?
In relation to the second research question, it is now manifestly unfeasible to argue 
simply that the needs of victims and witnesses are being ‘ignored’ by policy-makers. 
Questions remain, however, as to the exact nature of this ‘pro-victims and pro­
witnesses’ policy that seems to have developed over recent years. As such, I will be 
attempting to identify the driving force (or forces) behind official actions on victims and 
witnesses and, most importantly, I will be asking whether such actions can be classified 
as a unified ‘strategy’16 or whether in fact this strategy is constituted by a whole range 
of different influences; what Rock has called ‘other politics’ (Rock, 1990).17 This is 
important because policy documents only discuss a limited range of ‘officially 
recognised’ influences. Commentators such as Elias, however, suggest that government 
policies (certainly those relating to victims of crime) may have a deeper, political 
purpose which is less overt (Elias, 1986). It is my contention that the ‘victims policy’ 
has in fact been derived from a wide variety of different pressures, many of which are 
political. As such, I will seek to show that we may be mistaken in thinking of ‘victims’ 
as a single or unified policy at all because, in reality, this ‘policy’ has been driven over 
time by a web of political factors. This means that the reforms which bring benefit to 
victims and witnesses are not necessarily all part of the ‘same thing’. Instead, ‘victims 
and witnesses’ may be an issue on which a whole variety of different policies intersect.
Such debates as to the political underpinnings of these reforms leave us with three 
conceivable interpretations of the victims ‘policy’. Firstly, there is the straightforward 
possibility that all these reforms are in fact part of a consistent and unified strategy to 
assist victims and witnesses. The second possibility is that actions which, incidentally,
15 Although I will argue in Chapter 3 that as legitimate expectation enforceable only from 
without the criminal justice process, at present these are not actually ‘rights’.
16 As has recently been suggested (Home Office, 2003a). ,
17 See below.
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assist victims and witnesses may be grounded in a quite different set of political 
concerns. The third possibility is that, now that victims and witnesses seem to have 
achieved at least rhetorical acceptance in the political system, new policies are being re­
packaged as the continuation of work for these groups but which are in fact intended to 
achieve other aims such as, for example, increasing efficiency. Of these three 
possibilities, it is submitted that a combination of the second and third seems the most 
likely, and this contention will be tested during the course of this thesis.
1.3.3 -  What has putting victims ‘at the heart’ of the system meant so far in 
practice?
In terms of the third research question. I would expect to see marked development since 
most previous empirical work focused around courts in relation to meeting the needs of 
victims and witnesses in criminal trials (Shapland et al., 1985; Jackson et al., 1991; 
Rock, 1993; Tapley, 2002). Relating back to my three-pronged model of a victim- 
centred trial outlined in the above hypotheses, given national policy movements I would 
hypothesis that the practical infrastructure to assist victims would be most developed 
(separate waiting rooms, facilities for video-linked evidence and so on). I also expect 
the culture of criminal justice professionals, courts, and possibly a wider ‘legal’ 
culture18 to be somewhat softened to the plight of victims and witnesses within the 
procedure; although I suspect more traditional views (that victims are ancillary to the 
process) are still rampant. Probably the least developed aspect of a victim-centred trial 
process as I have conceived it will be the inclusion of victims’ full accounts within the 
trial process, and hence I will be paying special attention to mechanisms by which 
victims and other witnesses are prevented from making accounts (by evidential rules, 
working practices, courtroom environment and so on).
Overall, what I am expecting to find from this part of the research is that genuinely 
victim-centred trials are not yet forthcoming. Nevertheless, as noted above, I hope to 
observe within existing procedures the clear potential to make them more victim- 
centred without resorting to truly fundamental reform.
18 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion o f the notion o f ‘cultures’ and how it relates to 
this thesis.
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1 .4-M ETH O D O LO G Y
A full methodological overview can be found in Chapter 2 but, to provide a short 
summary for the purposes of this introductory section, each of the three research 
questions will be addressed via a distinct research technique. ' «
The first question represents very much the normative underpinnings of the evaluation. 
Answering this question calls for some detailed legal and jurisprudential analysis of the 
available literature in order to ascertain what a victim-centred system (trial) might look 
like. The fruits of this exercise can be found in Chapter 3. Ultimately, my aim in is to 
combine these findings with the more ‘practical’ components derived from empirical 
data collection at court (which I will come to in a moment).
The second research question requires an in-depth policy analysis similar in some ways 
to that conducted by Paul Rock (2004)19 but also informed by the other two components 
of the study. This inevitably involves examining policy papers relating to victims, but 
also contacting and conducting qualitative interviews with those involved in the policy­
making process itself. Given that Rock’s (2004) study excluded from its ambit the 
operational execution of victim-related reforms in the working criminal justice system, 
it will be particularly beneficial for this project to ascertain the views of those 
responsible not only for formulating the measures, but also for their implementation. 
Hence, as well as talking to a number of representatives from the Home Office and 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, I will conduct numerous interviews with 
members of the Local Criminal Justice Board in the area local to Courts A, B and C (see 
below) as well as several criminal justice practitioners.
In pursuit of the third research question I will establish links with three local courts -  
two magistrates’ courts (Courts A and B) and one Crown Court centre (Court C) -  and 
conduct extensive periods of in-court observation of criminal trials. Generally speaking 
this is an ethnographic technique, although numerical data will be derived from the 
sessions (albeit these will mainly be indicative, as opposed to statistically significant 
statistics). The observation sessions will be combined with further qualitative interviews 
with representatives of the courts. In addition, an attempt will be made through a short 
survey to sample court users and also witnesses who have given evidence in a criminal
19 See Chapter 3.
13
trial at Court B in order to ascertain their views about facilities and the experience of 
giving evidence.
1.5 -  THESIS STRUCTURE
<r
The rest of this thesis will be split into 7 chapters. Following this section, Chapter 2 will 
provide a far more detailed, overview, discussion and justification of the methodologies 
adopted for this study. Chapter 3 will provide an overview of research and commentary 
on the issue of victims, and in so doing will also begin to tackle the question of what it 
might mean to put victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice. Chapter 4 will review in 
detail the development of policies relating to victims and analyse these policies pursuant 
to the second research question, drawing on interview data from policy-makers and 
document analyses. Chapter 5 will discuss the concept of ‘account-making’, setting out 
my argument for its incorporation within criminal trials. Chapter 6 will present the 
empirical results from courtroom observation sessions. Chapter 7 will discuss all the 
results in light of the three research questions and present an overall model of victim- 
centred criminal justice based on all the evidence gleaned from this study.
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CHAPTER 2: 
METHODOLOGY
One of the chief goals for this research project is to combine a number of research 
methodologies in order to fully explore the three research questions under review. Such 
an approach yields at least two important benefits from the outset. Firstly, there is very 
little previous research in this area that combines methodologies in the manner outlined 
below1, thus improving the credentials of this research as a source of new and 
interesting information. Secondly, wider discussions on research methodologies seem to 
have reached a general consensus that the most robust research draws upon multiple 
research techniques (Kane, 1997; Payne et al., 2004). As such, in the growing spirit of
reflexivity (Bulmer, 2001) this chapter presents those methodologies along with their
*
associated practical and ethical implications. The bulk of this chapter is structured 
around the three research questions, describing and discussing the associated 
methodologies for each in turn.
2.1 -  ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Before we come to this, however, it is worth outlining the main methodological goals 
and characteristics of this project. Fundamentally, this thesis will be an exercise in 
ethnographic research. ‘Ethnography’ is a term sometimes used quite loosely to denote 
research which includes observations and interviews, Bryman however has provided a 
more cogent list of features which characterise genuine ethnographic study:
• Becoming immersed in a social setting for an extended period of time.
• Making regular observations of the behaviour of members of that 
setting.
• Listening and engaging in conversation.
• Interviewing informants.
• Collecting documents about the group.
• Developing an understanding of the culture of the group.
• Writing up a detailed account of that setting.
(adapted from Bryman, 2001)
An important aspect of.Bryman’s conception of ethnographic research is that the 
writing up and presentation of the results is part and parcel of the ethnography. Hence,
1 See Chapter 3.
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for Bryman it is only at the stage of dissemination that the full ethnography is realised. 
The true ethnography is therefore something the researcher constructs as well as a set of 
procedures or methods that he or she follows. Bryman’s list mirrors closely the methods 
of research used in this project. Of course, in this study, the ‘social setting’ under 
investigation is that of the criminal justice system, especially criminal trial proceedings!
r.
Primarily then, this is a qualitative piece of work and -  as will be noted below -  one of 
the key aims aside from the specific topic is to promote discussion and development on 
ethnographic techniques. In doing so I also hope to illustrate the point that ethnography 
can be successfully and profitably combined with more quantitative methodologies, 
especially statistical data derived from courtroom observations.
2.1.1 -  Question 1: What would it mean to put victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal 
justice system?
The methodologies employed to answer this first research question were in themselves 
relatively straightforward but represented a long-term and ongoing effort throughout the 
course of the project. The question represents the normative component of the thesis 
and, therefore, called for some detailed legal and jurisprudential analysis in order to 
ascertain what a victim-centred system might look like. This involved an extensive 
study of literature from many facets of victimology including, in particular, the question 
of victim rights, the provision of support and services to victims, victims within the 
criminal justice system -  and within the trial process specifically -  and the position of 
vulnerable and intimidated victims and witnesses. The review was conducted using a 
broad range of techniques including searches of both legal and medical libraries2 plus 
online academic databases. It also involved following the ‘trail’ of citations from many 
established victimological sources. Official publications also yielded a great deal of 
crucial information for this study.
The sheer volume of literature having direct relevance to the research in question made 
some degree of ‘picking and choosing’ inevitable. In particular, the decision was made 
at an early stage to limit this discussion for the most part to research and literature from 
the UK, albeit the international influences on British policy-making in this area are 
widely covered. More specific international comparisons would of course be useful and 
this is certainly a development area for future research. Nevertheless, the exclusion of
2 The latter provided much of the literature on ‘account-making’ discussed in Chapter 5.
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such details in the present study is justified, I believe, by the distinctiveness of the 
English and Welsh (common law) adversarial justice system compared to continental 
inquisitorial systems and the US civil law model. There is a further complication in the 
British context owing to the lack of a written constitution, making concepts such as 
‘victim rights’ singularly problematic. *
C
Academic literature aside,' another underlying intention for this project was for 
theoretical discussions about victims in criminal justice to be informed as far as possible 
by the more practical, hands on, impressions of criminal justice workers and those 
involved in policy-making. Hence, notions of what a ‘victim-centred system’ might 
look like and how it might operate in practice were greatly informed by ad hoc 
discussions and more formal qualitative interviews with such parties, which will be 
discussed in more detail below. Indeed, in the broader sense it seemed vital to ensure 
that the three research question were not treated as entirely separate projects or entities, 
but rather that they informed each other. This was especially true for this first question, 
which is greatly informed by the methodologies utilised to address the other (more 
empirical) components of the study.
2.1.2 -  Question 2: What is driving this ‘policy’?
The second research question required an in-depth political analysis similar in some 
ways to that of Paul Rock (1993) but nevertheless informed by the other two 
components of the study. Initially this involved examining public policy papers relating 
to victims, mainly available from government departmental websites such as the Home 
Office -  and especially the Office for Criminal Justice Reform located within it -  and 
Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA).
Clearly, however, printed materials intended for public dissemination were insufficient 
to fully establish what processes lay behind the victims policy (or policies, see Chapter 
4). As such, it was necessary to establish contact with those involved in the policy­
making process itself at the Home Office, DCA and Office for Criminal Justice Reform 
(OCJR) in order to conduct qualitative interviews. Gaining such access was not 
especially problematic, and initially involved contacting the Head of the Victims and 
Confidence Unit in the Office for Criminal Justice Reform, who was effectively the 
‘gatekeeper’ for this part of the project (Broadhead and Rist, 1976). As with many later
3 See Chapter 3.
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respondents, arranging a mutually convenient appointment posed a few practical 
difficulties but, once the meeting had been conducted, I employed a form of snowball 
sampling technique (Becker, 1963) to gain contact details for other relevant parties; 
including the heads of the Witness and Victims Branch at the DCA, the Vulnerable, 
Intimidated and Protected Witness Team (OCJR) and Police Reform Unit (Home
Office). Some qualification is needed here because -  as I had preconceived ideas of the
■.» e
kinds of respondents I wished to interview (working in government departments and 
responsible for relevant policy-making) -  this was not true snowball sampling in its 
purest from.
I subsequently met and conducted qualitative interviews with all these parties and was 
also later referred for more interviews to the head of the Courts Innovation Branch 
(DCA) and a representative of Home Office Research and Development Statistics to 
discuss the newly commissioned ‘WAVES’ survey (Witnesses and Victims Experience 
Survey).
In addition to information obtained from the interviews themselves, many respondents 
provided me with documentary information to assist the research. Generally speaking 
these were not ‘private’ documents as such, although some had not actively been made 
public, including e-mails, early versions of reports and timetables for the 
implementation of some measures. Whenever such documents became available to me it 
was important to clarify what use I might make of them in terms of quotation or 
citation, and in most cases no such restrictions were imposed. The interviews 
themselves were qualitative and semi-structured in nature. By this, I mean that although 
a general interview schedule was drawn up for each session -  containing both topics to 
cover and specific questions to be asked -  the questions were wide and I frequently 
explored different avenues of investigation as and when they arose in the conversation. 
The chief benefit of this approach was that it allowed me to ascertain the issues which 
respondents themselves considered important or vital to the policy-making process, thus 
making for more insightful and discerning data (Silverman, 2001). For the same reason,
I avoided ‘leading’ questions. Such methodology allowed me to gather important 
information on issues I myself had not anticipated and also provided clues as to the 
occupational priorities and cultures of respondents, their professions, and the courts at 
which they work. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, usually in the office of the 
respondent or in an available meeting room and were generally recorded on tape with 
respondents’ permission (see British Sociological Association, 2002).
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In the above paragraphs I have made several references to ‘occupational culture’. 
Before proceeding further it may be useful to elaborate on this concept and wider 
notions of ‘cultures’ in greater detail. In criminological writings, occupational culture 
has been most thoroughly explored and evaluated in the context of policing. There, the 
literature is fairly unanimous in the view that the work of police officers is directly 
affected not only by their formalised training but also (and probably more significantly) 
by “a patterned set of understandings that help officers to cope with and adjust to the 
pressures and tensions confronting the police” (Reiner, 2000: p.87). Holdaway (1983) 
refers to the “ways in which...officers construct and preserve their idea of what 
constitutes routine police work” (p.134). In other words, ‘occupational culture’ usually 
refers to often deeply ingrained (sometimes subconscious) working practices passed 
between professionals in a given sphere by those professionals interacting 
(professionally and socially) and swapping stories,'» ideas and strategies. In so doing, 
members of that profession build up a ‘cultural toolkit’ (Chan, 1996) of ready-made 
solutions to specific problems. In the police context the biggest implication of this has 
been the realisation that such culture renders the police ‘institutionally racist’ even when 
individual officers are not actively trying to discriminate on the grounds of race 
(Macpherson, 1999).
At the level of professions we might apply the above definitions to barristers, solicitors, 
court administrators and so on, and investigate how they construct ideas of their roles 
within the criminal justice system, and whether such roles include victim care. This is 
what is meant by ‘occupational culture’ in the present thesis. Nevertheless, ‘culture’ can 
be understood in a number of other ways. In a wider sense, we can also ask whether the 
treatment of victims in the criminal justice system is dictated by a broader ‘legal 
culture’ shared amongst all advocates, judges, and criminal justice personnel. Such 
cultures may differ greatly from the culture of volunteer workers representing Victim 
Support or the Witness Service4. Cultures may also vary at different levels of the 
criminal justice system (magistrates’ courts verses Crown Courts). Similarly, cultural 
working practices may be geographically based, whereby -  in the present study -  victim 
care is highlighted across professions (and by volunteers) at one court to a greater 
extent than another; hence Rock’s (1993) discussion of the ‘social world’ of a (specific) 
English Crown Court. . •
4 See discussions in Chapter 6 and 7.
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In this project, I am seeking to draw on such wider conceptions of ‘cultures’ as an aid to 
understanding the treatment of victims in the criminal justice process. This means 
examining how the different forms of culture discussed above interrelate (or conflict) 
with each other and how they are produced. The notion of ‘culture’ will be applied tq 
criminal justice practitioners and administrators specifically ( ‘occupational culture’), 
and to the individual courts under review (‘court culture’) but I will also be looking for 
evidence of wider ‘legal’ cultures and their respective constituents, conflicts and 
impacts. In particular, an attempt will be made to evaluate the extent to which the 
underlying cultures of these groups, professions, or disciplines are conducive to the goal 
of putting victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice. Indeed, it is being hypothesised that 
practical reforms (funding for the Witness Service, facilities and so on) cannot achieve 
this without adequate cultural change at all levels (see Rock, 1993). It is important to 
distinguish between these different ‘levels’ of cultures in order to identify where the 
barriers lie in relation to the acceptance of victim issues; focusing exclusively on the 
individual ‘occupational cultures’ of barristers, solicitors and so on would therefore 
provide only a blinkered view.
The project will also seek to examine the occupational culture of criminal justice policy­
makers. In this case, it was hoped that the responses of those working in the relevant 
government departments would to some extent be representative of policy-makers as a 
whole, thus also shedding light on wider ‘policy-making’ cultures. In the case of 
criminal justice administrators and practitioners the same was true, although it must be 
admitted that because all such respondents were working in close geographical 
proximity, it is perhaps fairer to say that I was gaining insight into local occupational, 
volunteer, court, and legal cultures and practices, albeit the area under review was not 
especially unusual in any discemable way and therefore it is suggested that the findings 
from this area can be applied more widely. In particular, if indeed there is a widely held 
‘legal culture’5 at work amongst all legal professionals -  a question to be addressed in 
the subsequent analysis -  then a local sample of lawyers should to some extent be 
representative of it.
5 As a law graduate, it is worth pointing out that I myself may be to some extent swayed by a 
general ‘legal’ culture as opposed to the more specific ‘occupational cultures’ of a practicing 
barristers or solicitor.
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2.1.3 -  Questions 3: What has putting victims ‘at the heart’ of the system meant so 
far in practiced
The third research question raised the most significant and complex methodological 
challenges during the course of this research project, as it engendered not one but three 
distinct avenues of investigation. Primarily, in order to understand what putting victims 
of crime ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice system has meant so far in practice I set out 
to examine the operation of criminal trials6 at two magistrates’ courts and one Crown 
Court centre. Secondly, I made several attempts at conducing a survey of victims, 
witnesses and other witnesses just after they had completed evidence in order to 
ascertain their views and experiences. The survey was also distributed to court users 
(members of the public attending court) in general in order to obtain their views on the 
facilities available to them and on service provision. Thirdly, I conducted a separate 
programme of qualitative interviews with legal practitioners and administrators. Each of 
these methods will now be discussed in turn.
2.1.3.1 -  Stage 1: courtroom observation
In order to preserve confidentiality I will label the courts under discussion magistrates’ 
Court A, magistrates’ Court B and Crown Court C. Courts A and B are situated at the 
heart of a large northern city, whereas Court B serves a fairly large town nearby. All the 
courts fall within the remit of a single Local Criminal Justice Board. Given that a great 
deal of empirical work was to be conducted at all three courts, part of their selection 
criteria had to be simple geographic practicality. One early option was to compare the 
two selected magistrates’ courts with a third magistrates’ court in another area.7 
Ultimately, however, practicality drew me to Crown Court C as my comparator. Whilst 
this decision obviously forgoes comparative date between regions, it brought the 
advantage of extending the project into another area of the criminal justice system, thus 
making the research as a whole more applicable to the entire system.
6 As noted in Chapter 1, ‘trials’ here means criminal proceedings originally scheduled to 
determine the guilt or innocence of defendants facing criminal charges, but also includes shorter 
proceedings where the trial must be postponed or the need to establish guilt or innocence is 
removed, usually because the defendant has plead guilty at the last minute.
7 In a future project, I hope to compare the results from this study with data from the newly 
formed specialised domestic violence courts and the courts o f Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
thereby introducing an element o f comparative analysis into the work.
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Access to the magistrates’ courts was secured firstly through the Justices’ Chief 
Executive of what was then the relevant Magistrates’ Court Committee. Having passed 
that ‘gatekeeper’ there followed several meetings with the Clerks to the Justices at the 
two magistrates’ courts.8 It was also necessary to contact the Chairman of the Youth 
Panels at both courts in order to gain permission to enter the usually private Youth
Courts. Written contact was then made with the Court Manager at Court C, who I later
"> c
interviewed and through him received permission from the presiding judge to take notes 
from the public galleries. Gaining access to all three courts was therefore a relatively 
straightforward process. Of course, a large part of what I was suggesting merely 
involved observing court proceedings, for which I had the legal right in most courts. 
Nevertheless, my ease of access might well be ascribed to the development of a ‘public- 
service mentality’ in the criminal justice system (Tapley, 2002; Rock, 2004) which will 
be discussed in Chapter 4.
Trials were selected for observation at all three courts out of the complete list of 
proceedings scheduled (or ‘listed’) for the week. The court list was provided to me on a 
week-by-week basis by the courts’ listings officers, whom I originally contacted 
through the Clerks to the Justices and Court Manager. Trials were selected for 
observation based on the apparent likelihood that they would involve civilian witnesses 
and, most importantly, civilian victims. This was established by examining the 
charge(s) and gathering information before the trial from court ushers, clerks and the 
advocates.9 By ‘involved’ I do not necessarily mean that the victim was expected to 
give evidence, although this was usually the case and generally preferable. 
Nevertheless, this may have simply meant that the charge suggested an identifiable 
civilian victim or victims. The involvement of civilian victims of crime was generally
( J  '
preferred to police victims, as a choice was made at an early stage to concentrate on 
civilians. Principally this is because civilians were likely to be involved in a wider range
8 In March 2005 the Magistrates’ Court Committees were replaced with Local Criminal Justice
Boards (originally formed in April 2003). This foreshadowed the creation o f a ‘unified’ system 
of court administration under Her Majesty’s Courts Service in April. Consequently, the 
equivalent o f the Justices’ Chief Executive is now the Regional Director of Legal Services 
(Justices’ Clerk) whereas the Clerks to the Justices have now been replaced by District Legal 
Directors. Permission to conduct this research at the courts in question was renewed with all 
three o f these new appointees. 1
9 In this thesis ‘advocate’ will be used as a generic term encompassing barristers and solicitors 
representing clients or the CPS before magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts. Technically 
speaking there is a slight inaccuracy in this, in that in England and Wales barristers are known 
as ‘counsel’, and the term ‘advocate’ is reserved for their Scottish equivalents. The term 
‘counsel’ will therefore be employed when speaking about barristers alone.
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of victimisations than police officers in their professional capacity. Furthermore, we 
will see in Chapter 4 that government policy in this area is increasingly focused on the 
wider ‘law-abiding public’ in general.10 12
There was therefore no specific -  or, at least, positivistic -  formula dictating which 
trials were chosen for observation. Basing selection on the apparent likelihood of 
civilian victim involvement meant a lot of "assault trials fell into the study as well as 
matters of criminal damage, theft and some public order offences. Motoring matters 
were largely (although not entirely) effectively omitted from the study because they 
often involved no specifically identifiable victims and no civilian witnesses. The trials 
which make up the study were also (and unfortunately) dependent on my own 
availability to conduct observation sessions and I would occasionally observe a trial 
which on the face of it seemed less suitable for inclusion simply because it was the only 
proceeding corresponding with my own availability. Furthermore, in the event of two 
apparently relevant trials being listed at the same time in different courtrooms (which 
was not uncommon) I would make enquires with lawyers as to which trial was more 
likely to proceed as effective.11
This method of selecting trials may at first glance seem rather unscientific. Practically, 
however, there were few alternatives. To select trials entirely randomly would have 
resulted in a large number of road traffic cases being observed in the magistrates’ courts 
-  many of which are entirely paper-based (that is, no live witnesses and without victim 
attendance) -  and would yield little data directly relevant to victims. A similar technique 
in the Crown Court would have produced a sample comprising mainly of drug offences 
where, once again, there are considerably less data to be derived regarding victims per 
se.n  Furthermore, given that the majority of trials at all three courts were ineffective or 
cracked, a random selection would have made it impossible to gather enough data on 
effective trials in the available timeframe. Finally, as my results will later indicate, the 
status of many listed cases can change very suddenly at short notice prior to the
10 Although it would be interesting to have some research conducted purely on police victims in 
the CJS and compare it with results obtained from civilians.
11 This would have almost certainly increased the effective trial rates presented in Chapter 6. 
That said, given the unpredictability o f whether a trial will proceed (see below), this effect may 
not have been so great as it first seems. In many cases I received assurances that trials would 
proceed only to have them crack or become ineffective a few minutes later.
12 Here I will forestall the considerable debate as to whether or not drug use is a ‘victimless’ 
crime (see Meier and Geis, 1997).
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expected trial date or the expected time of commencement. Hence, trials that are
thought to be proceeding one day can be dropped the next whilst cases which seemed
certain to proceed at 09:55 could crack by 10:10, the varying reasons for this will be
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Consequently, even if such sensitive (and probably
unrealistic) access to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) or solicitors’ and barristers’*
work schedules could have been arranged, there would still be no guarantees that the
, «
proceedings I arranged to observe in advance would have ultimately been useful for the 
study.
It is necessary at this stage for me to elaborate on what precisely I mean by the term 
‘victim’. Victims for the purpose of these observation sessions included primary and 
secondary victims; that is to say, the persons directly affected by the crime (for 
example, the person who is assaulted) but also any other people affected by the wider 
implications of the crime (friends and family for example). Further discussions on the 
meaning(s) of ‘victimhood’ can be found in Chapter 3. Victims were often referred to 
by criminal justice practitioners as ‘complainants’. However, my definition of victims 
went beyond the generally employed meaning of this term. For example, often in public 
order matters there is no specific ‘complainant’ because it is argued that any one of a 
number of people, often in a crowd, were likely to be caused harassment, alarm or 
distress (taking s.5 of the Public Order Act as an example). Nevertheless, the present 
research would usually count the people in that crowd as victims. Clearly this does 
involve some subjective judgment from case to case. It is again unfortunate that I was 
unable practically to identify the specific nature of an offence to be tried or identify the 
victims, and particularly any secondary victims, before attending court.
On the issue of definitions, a ‘witness’ for the purposes of this study is any person 
called to give evidence in a criminal trial, whether or not they are victims. This includes 
defendants, police officers and specialist ‘expert’ witnesses.
Data were recorded before and during the listed trials via ethnographic techniques. By 
this, I mean I was immersing myself in the social setting of the courts by attending court 
every day, observing procedures, engaging with practitioners and court staff and 
attempting to understand their individual and professional practices and cultures as well 
any underlying ‘court’ culture, ‘legal’ culture or ‘localised’ culture. Notes were made by 
hand during the observation sessions from the courtroom’s public gallery both during 
the proceedings themselves and during adjournments when most of the lay
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participants/parties were out of the room. Initially I was intending to sit in the 
press/probation seats (for which I gained permission) but later discovered that in the 
magistrates’ courts and Crown Court there was no real advantage to doing so, and that 
one is in fact disadvantaged in terms of space.
((
The courtroom environment, with its prohibition on recording devices, proved 
particularly challenging forThe purposes of recording information for analysis. I was 
clearly looking for signs of victim involvement in the proceedings but -  to an even 
greater extent - 1 tried to ascertain the reactions of victims and other witnesses to giving 
evidence and other parts of the process as well as the expressed or implicit attitudes of 
criminal justice workers in relation to victims. It became clear from fairly early on that 
the richness of this information made standardised or ‘tick-box’ observational 
approaches redundant. This is also testament to the fact that gathering this information 
through observing interactions at court first hand was the most effective method 
available to me. I therefore had to develop systems of combining pre-printed forms and 
categories (see Appendix 1) with my own unstructured observations. Over time most of 
the lawyers and staff working at Courts A, B and C come to recognise me and I would 
endeavour to introduce myself to any new practitioners I encountered. This was 
particularly important in the Youth Court where I required the permission of both 
parties and the bench before engaging in observation. The latter was usually (and 
universally) achieved by asking the court’s legal adviser (previously known as ‘court 
clerks’) to inform the magistrates or district judge.
On a similar point, despite my regular appearances in the public gallery at Crown Court 
C, the ushers and Court Clerks still preferred me to obtain permission (through them) 
from the judge in every session. This became quite laborious, firstly because it 
precluded me swapping between courts when it appeared a case would not be useful -  
as I was able to do at the magistrates’ -  but also because on a number of occasions the 
court staff failed to pass on my request to the judge. The consequence was that I was 
asked by the ushers in these cases to stop taking notes and -  on one particularly 
unfortunate occasion -  a circuit judge looked up to the public gallery and asked me 
directly what I was doing. This was despite having received the permission of the 
presiding judge through the Court Manager. Generally speaking, access arrangements in
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the Crown Court centre were sometimes more problematic than at the magistrates’ court
13and the lines of communication less smooth.
The general purpose of these sessions was of course to record observations that 
reflected on the victim’s place in the proceedings. So, for example, it was important to
<t
note how many witnesses attended court to give evidence, how many of them were 
victims and how long they had to wait before being called or released. More 
specifically, the timing of events was important. Notes were also made on the extent to 
which the impact of a crime on a victim was brought out at different stages. To this end, 
the use of and reference to any victim personal statements was also noted.
Sitting in the courtroom often allowed me to speak informally with advocates and legal 
advisers and I would occasionally ask permission to anonymously include something 
imparted to me in this study. The same was occasionally true with witnesses and victims 
who choose to sit in the public gallery, however I always waited for these actors to 
approach me.
In terms of witnesses giving evidence (victims and non victims, police and other 
civilians) a number of factors were recorded. Once again, particular attention was paid 
to how long the different elements of giving evidence took (examination in chief, cross- 
examination, re-examination and questioning by bench): A record was kept of whether 
the bench spoke to the witnesses, what was said to them and whether they were, for 
example, invited to sit down at the start or thanked at the end. I also noted how prepared 
the witness appeared to answer the questions, how hostile the questioning became and 
the apparent benefits or drawbacks of any ‘special measures’ intended to assist them in 
giving evidence. Further notes were made on how frequently the witness was 
interrupted whilst speaking and whether or not it appeared that they were allowed to say 
everything they wished. To this end, a stopwatch was also employed to time precisely 
how long witnesses actually spoke during examination in chief and cross-examination. I 
then calculated the relevant percentage of the time giving evidence, of the main sections 
of evidence and of the whole trial.13 4 Averages derived from these percentages will be
13 Indeed, in Chapter 6, we will see that similar observations were made regarding 
communication with victims and witnesses.
14 In the earlier observation sessions the percentages were estimated without the aid o f a 
stopwatch. This method proved too imprecise and all witnesses were timed from observation 
session 30 onwards. Ultimately, the methodologies used to observe witnesses before this point 
were judged to be so different from subsequent observations that they have been excluded from
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the subject of t-test analysis in Chapter 6, in order to establish any statistically 
significant difference in the contribution of victims and other witnesses, and between 
those who give evidence with and without special measures.
Another important aspect of the observation of witnesses was their emotional reactions
6
to questioning. Hence, I noted down specific emotions the witness seemed to be 
displaying. This was achieved by watching witnesses giving evidence and recording 
apparent changes in emotional state or any new reactions as they appeared, with 
multiple reactions allowed at each ‘checkpoint’. From an analytical point of view the 
subsequent data produced are admittedly difficult to deal with using quantitative 
methodologies, because reactions were recorded as and when they appeared to change 
for each witness and not at standard time intervals. Nevertheless, given that all 
witnesses react slightly differently to giving evidence, it was felt that a more 
standardised approach would have produced misleading data. Thus, the underlying 
semi-structured and ethnographic approach taken to this project won out.
Commentators would be justified in pointing out that much of this methodology is 
rather subjective, especially in relation to the judgement of the emotional reactions of 
witnesses and whether they said everything they wanted to say. Note however that this 
research only claims to identify how witnesses appeared to feel and whether they 
appeared to be prepared or to say all they wanted to. Method-wise there was little 
alternative because interviewing all the witnesses observed would be impossible, 
practically and ethically. Nevertheless, the need to gain more data from victims and 
witnesses themselves is one of the main reasons my research design supplements the 
observation sessions with a court users survey, discussed below.
v
This may also be an appropriate point for me to comment on ethnographic research in 
general. In recent years there has been a great deal of development in criminological 
study utilising large scale surveying techniques. This may have been prompted by the 
development and output from the British Crime Survey (Maguire and Kynch, 2000), 
leading in the courts context to instruments like the Witness Surveys (Whitehead, 2001; 
Angle et. al., 2002), Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses Surveys (Hamlyn et al., 
2004b) and the new WAVES survey. For its part, the Home Office now favours the use 
of quantitative randomised control trials (RCTs). As such, in the UK there has been a
this study, thus ‘Witness 1’ is in fact the second defence witness in trial 30, when the stopwatch 
was first used.
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relative lack of development over recent years in the use of ethnographic observational 
techniques, and of qualitative methodologies in general (Hall, 2006).15
Nevertheless, ethnography in British criminological study is nothing new. Carlen 
(1976); Shapland et al. (1985); Jackson et al. (1991) and Rock (1993) have all applied 
such techniques in the study of courts specifically. Such methodology has also been 
applied to violent Glasgow gangs (Patrick, 1973); police occupational culture 
(Holdaway, 1982, 1983); drug use (Foster, 1995) and football hooliganism (Giulianotti, 
1995).
It is hoped that this study may contribute to reinvigorating interest in the ethnographic 
technique in the UK. Of course the method does have its drawbacks; it is time 
consuming (and therefore costly), challenging in terms of access, raises multiple ethical 
considerations (discussed below) and is arguably objectionable on the grounds of 
subjectivity. On this last point, I would initially respond by pointing out that all research 
is to some extent subjective, including quantitative (statistical) analysis given that 
figures must always be interpreted by the researcher, who selects the methodology, 
technique and excludable outliers based on individual experience, training and 
subjective opinions as to the rigour of different methods (statistical or otherwise) 
(Sieber, 1998). Nevertheless, if quantitative methodology is thought by some to impart a 
greater level of objectivity to a project (a position this author does not accept) this study 
also aims to demonstrate that quantitative analysis can be combined with ethnography.
More generally, I would argue that the drawbacks of ethnographic methodology are 
more than outweighed by the depth and sheer quantity of data generated,'particularly 
with regards to its observational components. Surveys, for example, are necessarily 
limited by the amount of time respondents are willing to spend on these and their ability 
(or willingness) to comprehend and consider the questions. Good survey design can 
only negate these problems to a limited extent. The same is true when conducting 
interviews and both methods are naturally limited by the respondent’s own memory for 
details. It is also important to stress the ‘human element’ of the topic under review in 
this research. Criminal trials are defined by human interactions -  between prosecutor 
and defence lawyer, defendant and bench, victim and defendant and so on -  such that it 
is not always possible or desirable to reduce such complex interactions to standardised
15 Welsh (2005) is one of few limited exceptions.
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variables to be inputted for quantitative analysis, because important aspects of the data 
are lost.16 Breaking with standard thesis orthodoxy for a moment, the words of one 
district judge interviewed for this research concerning trials seems highly relevant:
“It’s a human process, you can’t dehumanise it” (a district judge sitting at Court B).
As ethnographers, however, we are able to record more of this pertinent (but less 
stringently definable) information; such as the ‘atmosphere’ created in the courtroom or 
the ‘attitude’ of lawyers, witnesses and so on. Consequently, an underlying argument to 
this thesis is that such methodologies merit greater attention and development than they 
are currently receiving domestically.
2.1.3.2 -  Stage 2: court users questionnaire
The other main empirical component of my court-based work was a court users 
questionnaire distributed at magistrates’ Court B. This sought to establish the reaction 
of victims and other witnesses to giving evidence and their thoughts about the 
procedure. Trying to attract a meaningful response rate to such a survey proved highly 
challenging and resulted in four separate ‘waves’ of the survey, each with a slightly 
revised methodology.17
The initial plan for conducting this survey was, after further discussion with the Clerk to 
the Justices at Court B, that the survey would be distributed by the court ushers at all 
listed trials and would be given to defendants, civilian witnesses (including victims) and 
anyone coming to support someone from the public gallery or simply attending to watch 
on their arrival at court. Later, the Witness Service co-ordinator at the court also 
volunteered to'distribute the survey to the witnesses with whom they came into 
contact.18 In order to keep track of response rates, a set number of 150 questionnaires 
were produced to be kept at the court. In addition, it was agreed with the listings officer 
at Court B that after the survey was complete I could look through the court records to
16 This is also why the present research utilised semi-structured observational techniques rather 
than standardised ‘tick-box’ approaches.
17 It was these time-consuming difficulties and subsequent revisions o f the methodology that led 
to the eventual abandonment of the original plan to conduct similar surveys at Courts A and C. 
Court B was chosen as the initial venue owing to the particularly wide-ranging access 
arrangements I had secured there. Unfortunately, by the time the surveys had been made to 
produce meaningful data, time constraints prevented taking the survey to the other courts.
18 For the most part, prosecution witnesses.
29
ascertain how many trials had taken place. In relation to cracked and ineffective trials 
these records would include the number of witnesses attending. In regards to effective 
trials, witness numbers would not be recorded but an average number of witnesses per 
trial could be calculated with reference to the length of time a trial was intended to run 
for. Thus, it was expected at this stage that a fairly accurate response rate could be 
ascertained when the survey had run its course.
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This first questionnaire itself was extensive19 and covered such matters as why 
respondents had attended court, whether they had given evidence, their view of the 
facilities and sources of information and (in the case of victims) whether they had made 
a victim personal statement. For those witnesses who gave evidence there were also 
questions related to their experience of doing so and rating satisfaction with the various 
professionals they encountered. If respondents arrived at court to attend a trial that 
cracked or became ineffective they are asked whether they received an explanation, 
from whom, and whether it was satisfactory. The survey began with a clear explanation 
of the research and a warning to respondents to write nothing about specific criminal 
cases, which might have conceivably led to the surveys becoming evidence in appeals.
The ‘first wave’ survey enjoyed limited success. Whilst ushers and Witness Service 
volunteers were distributing it to most court users, few respondents were completing the 
whole questionnaire. Partly this was because of its length but it also seemed to be due to 
respondents being interrupted and leaving the survey unfinished when told they could 
leave, their trial having become cracked or ineffective.20 The number of respondents 
commenting on court facilities was fairly encouraging, however very few indeed were 
commenting on the process of giving evidence. Given that most trials do not go ahead 
on the day they are listed this is perhaps not surprising.
Nevertheless, the methodology itself was also causing problems. It had been decided 
that the ushers and volunteers would distribute the survey as soon as court users arrived 
and then take it back after it had been filled in. The alternative would have been to give 
people the survey as they left the court building with an envelope to post back to me. It 
was felt that the latter method would yield a very low response rate, as it would involve 
respondents coming back to the issues at a later date. The difficulty with the alternative,
19 The surveys are reproduced in Appendix 2.
20 Although, confusingly, quite a few respondents seemed to skip a number of questions but 
then completed the final three on demographics.
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however, was that witnesses who actually gave evidence were, perhaps understandably, 
not returning to finish the surveys after they were released from court. Thus, little 
information was gathered on witnesses’ actual thoughts on giving evidence.
In the light of these problems, the methodology was adapted in two respects. Firstly, the 
remaining questionnaires were replaced with a ‘second wave’, reproduced with clearer 
instructions highlighting (in colour) certain 'questions that many respondents seemed to 
be ‘missing’, probably because they became ‘lost’ on the originally densely worded 
page on a quick read-through. Also, the main questionnaire was supplemented with a 
third, much shorter, take-home questionnaire to be given exclusively to witnesses who 
had actually given evidence. Unlike the main questionnaire, the new questionnaire was 
given to witnesses as they left the court with an envelope to post back. Whilst I did not 
anticipate eliciting many responses this way with the original questionnaire, it was 
hoped that respondents would be more willing to fill in and return a much-shortened 
version.
Once again, however, the response rate to these surveys was negligible. As such, I 
consulted the Witness Service coordinator at Court B on alternative strategies. As a 
result, we agreed that the previous surveys had been too long for most people to fill in 
and thus the fourth and final incarnation of the questionnaire was reduced to just six key 
questions based on the kinds of questions the volunteers would tend to ask in any event. 
Furthermore, the survey ceased to be a self-completion questionnaire and was instead 
administered by the Witness Service volunteers themselves, who asked the questions 
immediately after the witnesses had returned from giving evidence.
The first point to admit regarding all four waves of the survey is that none of them 
produced a sufficient response rate to make them viable for a multivariate quantitative 
analysis. The first wave of the survey produced 65 responses in around three months. 
Given as a percentage of the total number of witnesses attending court to give evidence 
in that period, any derived response rate would be so low as to be practically 
meaningless. The ‘second wave’ of surveys produced only 16 responses in a further 
month, again making for a statistically insignificant response rate. The third wave 
produced just five responses (posted back to me in an envelope). Furthermore, few 21
21 Although this perhaps is a result in itself in that witnesses were clearly not in any mood to 
stay at the court and/or fill in a survey after giving evidence.
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respondents had completely filled in any of the surveys and very few indeed had 
completed the most crucial information regarding experiences of giving evidence.
Once again, the response rate for this final wave of the survey was negligible, 28 
responses in two months; many witnesses having simply left the court after giving 
evidence and not returning to the Witness Service. Nevertheless, I considered this result 
an improvement on the previous incarnations22 because, whilst the statistical response 
rate was low, almost all such responses contained the crucial answers regarding 
witnesses’ thoughts and feelings about the evidence-giving process.'I consequently 
viewed the ‘fourth wave’ survey as a success in that it finally afforded me some first 
hand information from the victims and other witnesses themselves.23
2.1.3.3 -  Stage 3: interviews with criminal justice personnel
Given that Rock’s (1993) study excluded the operational execution of victim-related 
reforms in the working criminal justice system (see Chapter 3), I felt it was particularly 
beneficial for this project to ascertain the views not only of those responsible for 
formulating these measures, but also those charged with administrating them and 
implementing them in practice. As such, the final stage of data collection for my third 
research question was to conduct further qualitative interviews with criminal justice 
personnel.24 Early interviews were conducted with the Justices’ Chief Executive and 
then the Clerks to the Justices at Courts A and B to whom -  as noted above -  I had 
already gained access. From April 2005, the Clerk to the Justices at Court B was 
promoted to Regional Director of Legal Services (Justices’ Clerk) under the new system 
of Local Criminal Justice Boards (Her Majesty’s Courts Service) and I interviewed him 
on two further occasions in that capacity.
22 The low response rate for all four surveys may have been affected at the time by the fact that 
notably fewer trials seemed to be reaching Court B. This reduction had been attributed by staff 
and lawyers to the introduction of ‘CPS Direct’, a telephone line allowing the police to receive 
pre-charge advice from a prosecutor in most cases. This also corresponded with a ‘drought’ of 
effective trials available for observation at the time. In addition, in a later interview with the 
joint police/cps Witness Care Unit co-ordinator I learned that response rates for the newly 
launched national ‘Witness and Victims Experience Survey’ (WAVES) had also been 
particularly low in the area under review. Hence, there may be regional explanations for the low 
response rate associated with these surveys as well as methodological ones.
23 Difficulties gaining access, including data protection issues and privacy concerns o f Victim  
Support and the police, precluded my gaining direct contract with victims themselves for 
interviews or focus groups.
24 These are of course in addition to the interviews with policy-makers under the second 
research question.
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The Regional Director was also a deputy (that is to say, occasional) district judge and -  
as a member of the Local Criminal Justice Board - 1 was able to contact and interview 
other members including representatives from the CPS, probation service, youth 
offending team and a local private prison. I then wrote to his replacement at Court B -  
the newly titled ‘District Legal Director’ -  and subsequently conducted an interview. At 
the same time, the District Legal Director at Court A was also a new appointment, who 
again I wrote to and then interviewed. Hence, despite numerous changes in the 
administrative organisations of the courts and the Courts Service over this period I was 
able to periodically update the information gained from chief administrators. I also 
spoke to parties with other administrative roles at all three courts; including the listings 
officers and case progression officers.25 Gaining access to the courts also allowed me to 
conduct interviews with the professional co-ordinators of the Witness Service at Courts 
B and C. °
It was also important to gather information from those responsible for running 
courtrooms and conducting trials on a day-to-day basis. With the permission of the 
District Legal Directors and Court Manager at the three courts I approached Legal 
Advisers (magistrates’ courts) and Court Clerks (Crown Courts) to request interviews 
and also spoke with district judges from both magistrates’ courts.26 In terms of trial 
operation I also interviewed a number of barristers and solicitor advocates, who were 
usually approached directly at the start or end of a trial, where I was also able to engage 
in less formal conversation and gain information.27 To facilitate my requests for 
interviews in general I took to carrying around a standard explanation letter during all 
court visits.
Methodologically, I employed almost identical techniques for these interviews as I had 
done when interviewing policy-makers under the second research question. Interviews
25 The latter being a relatively new position created under the Effective Trial Management 
Programme with the purpose of reducing the number o f ineffective trials through keeping in 
contact with the various agencies involved, see Chapter 6.
26 It was felt that the lay magistracy would not provide particularly vital information for the
purposes of this project, as few sit on the bench more than a couple o f times per month. Indeed, 
in broaching the subject with the District Legal Directors some reluctance was detectable on 
their part which can probably be attributed to a worry that some magistrates would say 
‘inappropriate’ things. . •
27 At Court B such conversations were often facilitated by the presence o f a large supermarket 
situated across the road from the court, and the long checkout queues one encountered when the 
courts rose for lunch.
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with court staff were generally carried out during the court lunch break in the 
respondents’ office or in a convenient unoccupied consultation room. I also visited 
several solicitors’ offices, barristers’ chambers and the local headquarters of the 
agencies represented on the Local Criminal Justice Board.
2.2 -  ETHICS AND REFLEXIVITY
The above methodologies clearly raise a whole host of ethical issues, as well as the need 
for the researcher to ensure reflexivity with regard to the merits of. the project as a 
whole.
2.2.1 -  Observations
Some of the clearest ethical issues arose as a result of my court observations, many of 
which are grounded in the unusual contradiction ■ that sees criminal trials as public 
proceedings in which personal information is routinely aired. The main difficulty in this 
respect relates to informed consent. This was less of an issue for courtroom 
professionals -  who could be approached beforehand and given an explanation of the 
project -  although as courts are open to the public, some might have felt unable to 
object to my presence. Lay participants, however, were rarely approached beforehand; 
including defendants, witnesses and victims themselves. As Homan (1991) notes, in 
ethnographic research it is often practically impossible to gain informed consent from 
everyone. Here this was not because I was conducting ‘covert observation’ (Fielding, 
1982; Holdaway, 1982) but rather because witnesses and victims were usually kept 
‘isolated’ from the public areas of the court, hence approaching them was often 
impossible. Furthermore, introducing the project on the morning of a trial may well 
have added to an already confusing situation for them. The same is true for defendants, 
who might also view the presence of a researcher ‘looking at victims’ as suggesting 
bias. Hence, direct informed consent was not forthcoming from all participants.
The only real means of addressing this problem was to go through the lawyers, 
explaining the project to them (gaining their informed consent) then reacting 
appropriately to any concerns forwarded through them by defendants or prosecution 
witnesses. As it happened, such concerns were rare and I was only asked to vacate a 
courtroom once. In that case (of indecent assault) it was felt that the victim would be 
extremely upset and would not want anyone who did not have to be there present whilst
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she gave evidence, I of course obliged.28 In addition, the Witness Service knew of my 
project and would introduce me to particularly nervous victims and witnesses during 
pre-trial court visits. Furthermore, at one of the magistrates’ courts, most witnesses were 
given copies of my survey (see below) before giving evidence, and this contained
details of my project. All notes were kept anonymous and free of identifying
((
characteristics or features.
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Another ethical concern was that my presence might increase the fear and intimidation 
felt by witnesses when giving evidence. Essentially, addressing such problems was 
largely a matter of extending courtesy. For example, if witnesses became particularly 
upset I would often cease writing. Also, whilst it was necessary for me to observe 
witnesses’ reactions to questioning, I avoided ‘staring’ in an intensive manner. I also 
attended court in a suit, partly in an effort to reassure civilians that I was a professional 
and probably not (for example) associated with the defendant or family.29 That said, 
appearing ‘dressed for work’ might well have given victims, witnesses and defendants 
the impression that I was a reporter from the media, and indeed I was asked about this 
quite frequently. Consequently, I would often explain to friends and family in the public 
gallery in order to dissuade this concern and asked lawyers to do the same with the 
witnesses and clients. Indeed, one difficulty inherent with sitting in the public gallery 
was that the relatives and friends of those involved in the trial would sometimes try to 
read what I was recording. This itself caused a degree of ethical conflict because, 
arguably, it was their right to see this information. On the other hand, my own 
(attempted) objectivity in taking such notes combined with what to others would be 
rather cryptic shorthand may have led to offence being taken.
Overall, given that lay participants expected to recount information in front of strangers, 
I do not believe that the presence of an extra person taking notes caused much 
additional upset. In terms of the professionals in the court, as time went on it was often
28 Interestingly it was the defence solicitor who made the request. This was fairly early on in the 
observation programme and left me with the distinct impression that the solicitor in question 
was uncomfortable with me taking notes in any event. Nevertheless, the same solicitor agreed to 
my presence many times after this and it may well be that I had failed to accurately explain my 
goals on this early occasion.
29 In addition, I felt that this mode of dress would usually facilitate increased cooperation from 
court staff and lawyers. Indeed, the suit made me look very much like a lawyer to the extent that 
I was often stopped by members o f the public in the corridors o f the courts and asked for legal 
advice, needless to say I politely refused.
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remarked to me that I had become inconspicuous30 and ‘part of the furniture’.31 Once 
again this would suggest my own presence in the court was not affecting the manner in 
which the trials were being conducted or the way in which witnesses and victims were 
approached. That said, this was fundamentally an overt ethnography as I made no secret 
of my presence and sought informed consent whenever possible, this is similar to what
Gold (1958) has called ‘a participant-as-observer’ or Gans’ (1968) ‘a total researcher’.
> *
Nevertheless, this was not participant observation’ as I was m no way a participant to 
these proceedings.
This does, however, raise the question as to whether I was invading the privacy of 
participants. One might react with the argument that a trial is usually a public event in 
which note-taking is to be expected and that to prevent such ethnography taking place in 
public spaces would invalidate a great deal of existing work which utilises these 
techniques (Whyte, 1955; Giulianotti, 1995). Nevertheless, what seems more important 
is how the data were recorded and stored. This was done entirely anonymously, and the 
real names of the parties were never recorded. Furthermore, the courts themselves, the 
dates of the hearings and the area in which the courts are based are not mentioned in this 
study. It is therefore impossible to associate data with specific individuals.
2.2.2 -  Interviews
Although conducting qualitative interviews is a more standard technique, this aspect of 
the project similarly had ethical implications that must be acknowledged. For example, 
it was clearly important to obtain the informed consent of these respondents both for the 
interview itself and on practical matters like my recording technique and the use to be 
made of quotations (Bryman, 2001). That is to say, respondents needed accurate 
information as to what the project was about, as well as its aims and likely outcomes. 
These issues were initially explained in introductory letters, although informed consent 
is best viewed in this instance as an ongoing process of answering respondents' 
questions (Sieber, 1998). In addition -  certainly in relation to court administrators -
30 In the magistrates’ courts most practitioners were facing away from me, whilst in the Crown 
Court centre most public galleries were high above the rest o f the court or ‘out of the way’ over 
to one side.
31 Although I here recall one early occasion in the Crown Court where I had (clearly unwisely) 
remarked to the barristers before the case began that very few lawyers seem to refer to victims 
of crime as ‘victims’ during a trial, preferring the term ‘complainant’. My impression during the 
subsequent trial was that the barristers were making something o f a ‘game’ o f this, using the 
term ‘victim’ very regularly indeed.
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many interviewees hoped to get something back from this research (in terms of results 
or recommendations) and, as such, it was particularly important to present the work 
realistically and not explicitly or implicitly make promises I could not keep (Denzin, 
1975).
I was particularly aware when carrying out these interviews that most of my 
interviewees were professionals sporting well-established views on victims and, almost 
certainly, their own agendas for agreeing to talk to me. I was therefore wary of 
becoming a mouthpiece for their concerns. In particular, respondents’ opinions tended 
to vary markedly with their exact role in the criminal justice or policy-making process; 
hence defence solicitors tended to have very different ideas about the role and purpose 
of various ‘victim reforms’ compared to court administrators or prosecutors. As in all 
such cases, conflict existed between telling participants absolutely everything about my 
study and alerting them to issues that would influence their responses (Silverman, 
2001). Consent was sought from the interviewees as to my recording technique and a 
copy of the completed research will be sent to them; allowing me to respond to any final 
queries and once again implementing a policy of ongoing informed consent (Sieber, 
1998) in which a dialogue is established and maintained between researcher and 
participant (May, 2001).
2.2.3 -  Court users surveys
Surveying court users (including victims and non victim witnesses) also brings 
numerous ethical challenges. For example, I was especially concerned that asking 
witnesses about the process of giving evidence might upset them further and it was 
partly for this reason that the volunteers were asked to administer the questionnaire. 
Having greeted the witness before the trial in most cases these volunteers would be a 
familiar face and therefore less intimidating.
The questions themselves were formulated after discussion with the volunteers. As with 
the interviewees, it was also important not to deceive respondents as to the goals of the 
project and to achieve informed consent (Denzin, 1975). Initially, the Witness Service 
co-ordinator suggested she put it to witnesses as 'a project that will help witnesses in the 
future', to which I felt obliged to point out that the impact of one Ph.D. thesis might be 
negligible. Turning the data collection over to the Witness Service volunteers brought 
particular problems in this regard. Clearly I did not have direct control over how the
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surveys were administered and I was particularly concerned that volunteers might not 
adequately explain the purposes behind the survey to witnesses and therefore gain their 
informed consent. To address this issue I wrote an explanation of the project on the 
front of all the ‘fourth wave’ surveys (as I had for the previous three waves) and asked 
Witness Service volunteers to show it to respondents or read it to them. Unfortunately,
g
however, I was unable to verify that this had been done. The surveys were anonymous
, j c
and the only personal features included were demographics (age, sex, ethnicity).
2.2.4 -  Reflexivity?
At the beginning of this chapter I noted the importance of the researcher bringing a 
reflexive attitude to the process of gathering data. A textbook interpretation given by 
Bryman (2001) for this concept reads:
“A term used in research methodology to refer to a reflectiveness among social 
researchers about the implications for the knowledge of the social world they 
generate of their methods, values, biases, decisions, and mere presence in the very 
situation they investigate” (p.507).
Reflexivity brings into question the objectivity of any research, because any results are 
the product of methodological decisions made by that researcher which are in turn based 
on underlying personal beliefs about how knowledge in a particular area can or should 
be expanded and improved (Kimmel, 1988). Ham and Hill (1984) note that this is 
especially true when analysing policy-making. Hence, this research clearly takes a 
qualitative approach because I feel the subject matter cannot adequately be described, 
discussed or disseminated by reducing it to the objective measurements that are the 
hallmark of the physical sciences and more ‘positivistic school’.
As such, whilst I have noted a number of times in this chapter that my presence 
(especially in court) was not influencing the data I collected32 3, those data were certainly 
affected by my own opinions, methods, background (academic and otherwise) and p re - . 
existing impressions of the criminal justice system, lawyers and criminal 
victimisation. In addition, a particular question raised by ethnographic research is how 
involved the researcher becomes with those he or she is studying.
32 Although see n.31 above.
33 I have never been the primary or secondary victim o f what the majority o f the population 
would probably consider ‘typical’ crimes such as burglary or violence, although -  like most 
people - 1 have been the victim o f more ‘invisible’ crimes such as tax fraud and pollution. Had
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In modem social research -  being, as previously argued, reflexive -  one must of course 
have regard to the position of those being observed. For example, this project avoids the 
term ‘subject’ in favour or ‘respondent’ or ‘participant’. Striking up an acquaintance 
with gatekeepers and other respondents is not only (in a clinical light) key to the success 
of such research but also entirely unavoidable when one is placed in regular contact 
with such people, itself the hallmark of ethnography. Hence, by the end of the 18 month 
period of data collection (certainly at the courts) I was on a first-name basis with many 
of the people I was there to observe, and engaging in regular ‘office banter’ and jokes or 
general gossip. A practical manifestation of this was the point at which security guards 
at all three courts began waving me through the metal detectors without stopping to 
search my bag. Furthermore, given that most of the court staff knew I was interested in 
observing effective trials, and given that numerically most of these trials failed to go 
ahead as planned, I quickly acquired the title of ‘the Trialcracker’ at both Courts A and 
B; it having become a running joke that whenever I appeared the trials ‘always’ failed to 
go ahead.34
I record this information because it raises significant questions, namely was I becoming 
too involved with the ‘social world’ (Rock, 1993) of the courts and did this have any 
impact on my interpretations of what I was seeing? Had I ‘gone native’? For my part, in 
reviewing the notes I made in court during the 18 month period, in the earlier 
observation sessions I seem to have adopted more of a third-person perspective (“the 
lawyers are waiting for the witness to appear”) whereas in later sessions I have 
associated myself more with the lawyers and court staff (“we are waiting for the witness 
to appear”). Furthermore, the lawyers and I often shared a common frustration when 
trials failed to proceed, given that we were all there for an effective trial. Hence, along 
with the lawyers, I too found myself frustrated when defendants changed their plea at 
the last moment35 or even in cases where victims of domestic violence refused to give
my own profile of experiences been different it is likely I would have approached this research 
with a completely different mindset, which would have had some impact on my interpretations 
(Silverman, 2001).
34 For court staff an effective trial often represents a particularly difficult workday. 
Consequently, at least one legal adviser would often claim to be ‘relying’ on me to crack a trial. 
References to me as ‘the Trialcracker’ would often be accompanied by this particular legal 
adviser humming an improvised theme song.
35 Although, in many cases the frustration was actually mine alone because, as will be discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7, it was often the case that lawyers preferred trials not to proceed.
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evidence, despite my academic and personal appreciation for the complex issues 
involved in such cases.
Genuinely objective research -  whether in the physical or social sciences -  is probably a 
misnomer because, as noted above, the researcher inevitably impacts upon the results of 
the research. As such, in common with Hobbs (1988) when gathering data in East End 
London pubs, it was necessary for me to constantly remind myself that I was conducting 
research, the results of which had to be fair and balanced and as objective as possible 
even though, as Hobbs also admits, the eccentricities of those I was observing (lawyers, 
defendants and victims alike) were often most entertaining. The fact that objectivity 
may be more of an ideal than a realistic goal need not invalidate this or any other 
research, provided that -  as has been attempted in this section -  the implications of this 
are fully and frankly explained and openly admitted, such that the work can be fairly 
compared with other relevant research, all of which probably suffers the same 
shortcomings, to greater or lesser extents, but always to some extent (Silverman, 2001).
2.3 -  OVERVIEW  OF DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS
Briefly, the above methodologies have provided the following dataset:
Table 1: Overview of data
O B S E R V A T IO N  D A T A
N u m b e r  o f  tr ia ls
C o u r t  A
E ffec tiv e  trials 5 0
In effec tiv e  trials 2 6
C racked trials 36
T ota l trials 112 •
C o u r t  B
E ffec tiv e  trials 50
In effectiv e  trials 27
C racked trials 39
T otal trials 116
C o u r t  C
E ffec t iv e  trials 12
In effec tiv e  trials 2
C racked trials - 5
T otal trials 19
C O U R T  U S E R S  S U R V E Y  R E S P O N S E S
N u m b e r  o f  r e sp o n se s
W a v e  1 65
W a v e  2 16
W ave 3 5
W a v e  4 2 8  ■
IN T E R V I E W  D A T A *
N u m b e r  o f  in te r v ie w s
L e g a l p r a c tit io n e r s
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D e fe n c e  so lic itors 2
B arristers 2
S o lic ito r  ad vocates 2
C o u r t  a d m in is tr a to r s
C lerks to  the justices (C ourts A  and B ) 2
D istr ict L eg a l D irector (C ourt B ) 1
J u stices’ C h ie f  E x ecu tiv e 1
C ourt m anager (C ourt C) 1
R eg io n a l D irector o f  L eg a l S erv ice s (J u stices’ C lerk) 
(C ourts A  and B )
1
C o u r t  s t a f f
L eg a l ad v isers (m ag istra tes’ courts) 4
C ourt clerks (C row n Court) 2
C ase  p rogression  o fficer  (C row n Court) 1
L o c a l a g e n c ie s
P robation o fficer  (resp on sib le  for v ictim  contact w ork) 1
C h ie f C row n P rosecutor 1
M anager o f  p o lice /cp s  w itn ess care unit 1
Y outh  o ffen d in g  team  m anager 1
P rivate prison  director 1
P o lic e  c h ie f  in spector 1
V ictim  Support (W itn ess S erv ice) 1
J u d ic ia r y /m a g is tr a c y
D istr ict judges (m agistrates’ court) 2
D ep u ty  d istrict judge (m agistrates’ court) 1
M agistrate 1
P o lic y -m a k e r s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r tm e n ts
O ffic e  for C rim inal Justice R eform 3
R esearch  D ev e lo p m en t S tatistics 1
P o lic e  R eform  U nit 2
D epartm ent for C onstitu tional A ffairs 1
*A1I interviews took place during 2005.
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Of course, this table does not reflect the many less formal conversations conducted with 
personnel from across the criminal justice system and policy-making spheres, especially 
during court observation sessions.
Essentially the evaluation of this dataset was based on three principal schools of 
analysis; quantitative analysis of the statistical components of the observation sessions, 
document analysis of policy documents and other official publications, and qualitative 
analysis of the less structured notes and interview transcripts.
The quantitative analytical components of this study can be dealt with relatively briefly. 
Many of the observations made during this ethnography were numerical in character, 3678
36 Solicitor advocates are generally sole practitioners who work exclusively as representation in 
various trial proceedings, either for their own clients, or often as agents for the CPS or defence 
solicitors. They are not barristers, although they can apply for higher court rights to appear in 
the Crown Court, and therefore the term ‘advocate’ here is accurate and widely utilised.
37 Of the old Magistrates’ Court Committee.
38 Her Majesty’s Courts Service.
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such as the amount of time it took for witnesses to give evidence, the lateness of trials 
and the percentage of time witnesses spoke during the evidential process. In addition, 
there were also the coded results from the four waves of the court users survey. Whilst 
much of this data is not suitable for full multivariate analysis (largely because the 
number of cases are not sufficient to produce statistically significant results, collected as 
they were in a limited time by a single researcher or subject to the low response ratés 
discussed above) general trends can be gleaned and comparisons made from mean 
averages backed by standard deviation figures and confidence intervals. In addition, t- 
test analysis was employed to determine whether the presence or absence of special 
measures (the grouping variable) impacted upon the percentage of time witnesses were 
permitted to actually speak during the evidential process (the test variable).
Clearly then this project does not seek to rely principally on quantitative analysis 
because -  as discussed earlier -  the goal is to employ and proliferate more ethnographic 
methods. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the analyses described above will help illustrate 
the merits of combining both quantitative and qualitative data to produce more robust 
conclusions.
For the most part, however, this is a qualitative project. The overriding technique 
employed here has been to identify and code themes emergent from the various data 
sources in an effort to corroborate or contradict the hypotheses drawn in Chapter 1 and 
to build up an understanding of what is meant by ‘victim-centred criminal justice’. As 
themes39 developed, they were used to guide the ongoing progression of data collection 
and the themes themselves were constantly redefined, making this an iterative process 
in which data collection should not be separated from outcomes.
Like many qualitative studies the project therefore owes much to grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). That said, true grounded theory implies that the data 
collection continues until ‘theoretical saturation’ occurs, whereby categories derived 
from the process which are thought to represent real-world phenomena (in this case 
regarding the place of victims in the criminal trial and the nature of policy-making) are 
no longer developed or refined through the addition of extra data (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). In this case, however, the number of observations and interviews was limited
39 Coded themes from interviews and observation sessions included -  for example -  
‘knowledge o f victims’ needs’, ‘practical limitations of policy’ and ‘acceptance of victims into 
working practices’ among many others.
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more by the time constraints of pursuing a Ph.D. thesis. Whilst this should not 
undermine the results, it does imply that more data could further enhance the categories 
(conclusions drawn regarding victim-centred criminal justice) in Chapter 7. In the case 
of interview transcripts and observation notes, the qualitative software program 
‘NUD*IST’ was used to help identify themes, although manual coding was also used
extensively, especially with the observation notes which were often annotated with
1 Cthemes and other research memos (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) whilst they were being 
taken. Notes and memos were recorded by hand during the trial observations, but were 
later transferred to computer where simple word processor text searches and copying 
and pasting could be used to organise both data and themes.
In the case of official documents, the above principles were applied as qualitative 
document analysis, through which underlying themes were again sought out. That said, 
the reflexive nature of the work may imply a closer similarity with what Altheide 
(1980) has called ‘ethnographic content analysis’; whereby once again the initial 
loosely-defined set of themes were open to revaluation and amendment as the data 
collection process continued. Semiotics (Eco, 1978) was also employed to derive 
underlying meanings from policy documents in an effort to identify political pressures 
and influences. In other words, documents (combined with the interview responses of 
policy-makers and administrators in particular) were treated as text in which signs were 
drawn out. For example, when a document combined measures overtly to assist victims 
with apparently repressive or punitive measures, the latter may have been viewed as a 
signifier that policy-makers were more concerned about repressive policies -  or ‘buying 
support’ for less popular measures -  than with the victims themselves. Semiotic analysis 
was also used to identify underlying occupational cultures displayed in interview 
transcripts.
Clearly this ‘grounded’ approach can be the subject of criticism. In particular, one might 
argue that my identification of themes and categories from the dataset was influenced 
by my hypotheses and my existing academic opinions regarding issues like victim rights 
and effective support mechanisms. In other words, the argument is again that these 
methods lack objectivity compared to more quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, I have 
already argued that quantitative analyses is also subjective, and whilst there has been 
general acceptance in recent years amongst social sciences that truly ‘objective’ 
research is impossible to achieve, the important thing seems to be that this is openly 
admitted from the outset so that readers can judge the merits of the work for themselves.
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Another criticism of grounded theory rests in the process of splitting up data into 
component themes, which some argue prompts unnatural distinctions and detracts from 
the wider context of the issues being studied (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). I would 
certainly agree with such criticisms, but have responded to them in this project by 
constantly bearing in mind the relationships between my three research questions and 
attempting to view the issue of ‘victims in criminal justice’ as a unified whole. As noted 
earlier, one of the strengths of this project is that it combines political analysis with the 
operational reality of the system in practice. Hence, I would argue that wider context of 
the subject matter is kept at the forefront of this thesis.
In the next chapter, I will review the outstanding literature relevant to the topic of this 
research and begin addressing what ‘victim-centred’ criminal justice might look like.
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CHAPTER 3: 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter focuses on the literature pertaining to victims and their role(s) in the 
criminal justice system in order to introduce the debates most pertinent to this research 
and emphasise gaps in the existing research. The chapter will also assess possible 
answers to the first of the research questions. Part one of the review examines the 
development of academic and political interest in victims. Part two examines key 
debates, beginning with a discussion on the issue of ‘fundamental’ criminal justice 
reform before moving on to victim rights, the provision of facilities, support and 
services to victims, and victims in the evidential process. Part three will summarise 
ways forward for this research. As argued in Chapter 2, owing to the distinctiveness of 
the justice and political models employed in England and Wales the bulk of this review 
focuses on the domestic British literature.
3.1 -  PART 1: THE GROWTH OF INTEREST IN CRIME VICTIMS
3.1.1 -  Victimology and conceptions of crime victims
Arguably, the advent of victimology came in two ‘waves’. The origins of the discipline 
trace back to Von Hentig’s (1948) arguments against clear-cut distinctions between 
‘victims’ and ‘offenders’. Von Hentig suggested that individuals could be prone to 
victimisation and precipitate it through lifestyle choices. The term ‘victimology’1 is 
usually attributed to Frederick Wertham (1949) or sometimes to Benjamin Mendelsohn 
(Kirchhoff, 1994). Early victimologists continued these ‘precipitation’ debates 
(Mendelsohn, 1956; Wolfgang, 1958; Amir, 1971; Fattah, 1992). Schneider (1991) 
argues that, following this ‘first wave’ of victimological investigation, victimology was 
set off in two directions; as a discipline concerned with human rights, and also as a 
subdiscipline of criminology concerned specifically with victims of crime.
The second ‘victimological wave’ came from the US in the late 1960s. Pointing and 
Maguire (1988) discuss how the ‘victims movement’ in the US was driven by a host of 
‘strange bedfellows’ concerned with different aspects of victimisation ranging from 
feminists and mental health practitioners to survivors of Nazi concentration camps (see 1
1 The term has been described as “a rather ugly neologism” (Newbum, 1988: p .l).
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Young, 1997).2 Victimology was certainly an international development, and whilst US 
victim surveys provided new details about crime victims (Mawby and Walklate, 1994; 
Dignan, 2005), Heidensohn (1991) also notes the role played by the European women’s 
movement. The United Nations also drew attention to victims (Joutsen, 1987) whilst 
various international meetings were hosted on the topic by the Council of Europe and 
HEUNI throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Mawby and Walklate, 1994). . "
. . i  6
Maguire and Shapland (1997) note how victim groups in the United States adopted 
aggressive, political strategies emphasising victim rights, whilst the European schemes 
emphasised service provision. Certainly in the 1970s there were disputes between those 
victimologists focusing on the provision of services to victims, and those interested in 
broader research-driven victimology (Van Dijk, 1997). Conflict also arose between 
‘penal victimology’ -  focused on criminal victimisation and scientific methods -  and 
‘general victimology’ encompassing wider victimisation, including natural disasters and 
war (Cressey, 1986; Spalek, 2006).
As the view gradually developed that victims of crime were being neglected by the 
criminal justice system -  and perhaps for political reasons (Elias, 1986) -  the study of 
crime victims took centre stage (Maguire, 1991). In a seminal contribution, Nils Christie 
(1977) argued that conflicts had been monopolised by the state:
“[T]he party that is represented by the state, namely the victim, is so thoroughly 
represented that she or he for most of the proceedings is pushed completely out of 
the arena, reduced to the triggerer-off of the whole thing” (p.5).
Such views have led many commentators to propose alternative justice models, often 
based (to varying degrees) around ‘restorative justice’ principles (Dignan and Cavadino, 
1996; Dignan, 2002a, 2002b; Braithwaite and Parker, 1999; Young, 2000). For Dignan 
(2005) this is because policies and practice relating to victims of crime within the 
criminal justice system have led only to their ‘partial enfranchisement’ at best within 
that process. As hypothesised in Chapter 1, it is expected that this thesis will also reveal 
shortcomings in the present justice model that detracts from its ‘victim-centeredness’. 
The difference, however, is that in this study I will be attempting to identify means of
2 Doak (2003) suggests that early victimology was quite punitive. Arguably, however, this is 
more a characteristic o f modem victimology in the climate o f punitive populism (Brownlee, 
1998; Garland, 2001).
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adapting that present system in order to make it victim-centred. On this point, certainly 
one of the key problems faced by restorative justice -  at least as it has been nationally 
applied in England and Wales in the form of Youth Offending Panels and referral orders 
(see Crawford and Newbum, 2003) -  is that it has attracted very little victim 
involvement, despite clear intentions to the contrary (Newbum et al., 2002; Crawford 
and Newbum, 2003). That said, the evidence seems to confirm that when victims do
i C
become involved in restorative processes they draw benefits from doing so, as does the 
restorative enterprise itself (see Dignan, 2005; Shapland et al., 2006).3 As such, this 
thesis will not at any stage deny the ‘restorative’ solution to some of the problems of 
exclusion faced by victims in the traditional criminal justice system, but rather suggest 
other -  arguably untested and under debated -  mechanisms of addressing the issue 
through less fundamental reform of the present system.
Indeed, crucially, few commentators have examined the possibilities of bringing victims 
‘to the heart’ of traditional criminal justice.4 Hence, one of the questions asked in this 
thesis is whether ‘victim-centeredness’ can be achieved through the (probably) less 
costly, more culturally acceptable notion of adapting the present adversarial model to 
make it ‘victim-centred’. Another critique of this literature is that much of it has focused 
on counting victims (penal victimology) rather than addressing their need for support; 
what Van Dijk (1983) calls ‘victimogogy’. Hence, there are still relatively few empirical 
investigations examining service issues, whilst our most recent information in England 
and Wales is based on survey data rather than ethnography.
3.1.1.1 -  Conceiving ‘victimhood’
Christie (1986) argues that only certain stereotypically ‘ideal’ victims achieve ‘victim 
status’ in the public’s eye or the criminal justice system. Characteristics attributed to the 
‘ideal victim’ include; being weak, carrying out a ‘respectable project’, being free of 
blame, and being a stranger to a ‘big and bad’ offender. To be labelled as a bone fide 
victim one must first conform to this ideal and then ‘make your case known’ to the 
justice system. Arguably Christie’s model is incomplete in that he seems to have 
individual victims in mind rather than groups and does not consider the position of
3 Broadly speaking. The goals of the various kinds o f restorative justice intervention are too 
numerous to discuss here in any great length, see Graef (2000); Diganan (2005:. Chapters 4 and 
5) and Raye and Roberts (2007).
4 As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis generally adopts the view taken by Bottoms (2003) o f a 
separation between restorative and criminal justice systems.
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corporate bodies as victims. Nevertheless, the presumption that ‘real victims’ 
necessarily become involved with the justice system seems to have resulted in the 
victim’s role often being shrouded in that of the witness, which we will see in Chapter
4.5
Elias (1983, 1986) and Rock (1990) draw on similar arguments to suggest that society’s 
narrow conception of victimisation is brought about by selective definitions of ‘crime’ 
construed for political purposes. Such ideas may overly simplify the complex 
interaction of social processes leading to activities being labelled as ‘deviant’6 but the 
point remains very significant in the context of the present thesis and its attempt to 
understand the driving forces behind victim policies.
Such arguments led to the development of so-called ‘radical victimology’7 and its 
expanded notions of ‘victimhood’. For example, we now know that there is 
considerable overlap between victims and offenders (Hough, 1986; Dignan, 2005). We 
have also recognised ‘secondary’ victims, including friends and family of the ‘primary’ 
victim and the bereaved survivors of homicide (Rock, 1998). Of particular relevance to 
this thesis has been the recognition of ‘secondary victimisation’, the notion that poor 
treatment by the justice system ‘revictimises’ people (Pointing and Maguire, 1988: 
p .ll) . Hence, recently there have been moves to recast victims as consumers of the 
criminal justice process (Zauberman, 2000; Tapley, 2002).
Whilst much has been written on the ‘ideal victim’ and ‘secondary victimisation’, less 
has been done to establish links between them. The exception is in relation to the police, 
where we know victims of sexual assault or domestic violence were traditionally not 
believed unless they visibly reacted in a manner typical of the ideal victim.8 What is 
missing, however, is an investigation into how the rest of the criminal justice system 
reacts to non-ideal victims, especially during trials. This reflects the criticism of Jackson 
(2004) that much of the ‘victim policy’ at present is actually focused on a relatively 
small group of (mainly vulnerable and intimidated) witnesses rather than victims per se.
5 Which is very problematic given that the majority o f crime probably goes unreported 
(Maguire, 2002).
6 What Mawby and Walklate (1994) c a l l‘critical victimology’.
7 See below.
8 Crying, distraught, and so on (Jordan, 2004).
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Research-driven ‘penal’ victimology characterised much of the early work of 
victimologists. Whilst in more recent years concern about victims’ need for services and 
support has galvanised debate on this issue, the present thesis will address the lack of 
research (other than survey data) on this point. f
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As notions of victimhood are clearly expanding, a wide body of potential ‘victims’ must 
be considered by this thesis (see Rock, 2002). Presently we do not know whether ‘ideal’ 
victims are afforded different levels of support compared with other victims. This 
research will therefore examine whether non-stereotypical victims figure greatly in the 
trial process and in the minds of criminal justice personnel.
Finally, whilst much of the existing work tends to draw on restorative justice as a way 
of facilitating victims, this research will ask how the present criminal justice process 
can become ‘victim-centred’ without resorting to such ‘fundamental reform’; a concept 
introduced in Chapter 2 and expanded upon below.
3.1.2 -  Victims as state policy
Several attempts have been made to identify driving forces behind the renewed policy 
interest in victims of crime. In an early examination, Van Dijk (1983) categorises 
reforms intended to ‘do something’ for victims into four ‘victimogogic ideologies’. The 
label ‘victimogogic’ distinguished such measures from victimology’s wider goals of 
counting and gathering information on crime victims.
According to Van Dijk (1983), victimogogic measures can be based firstly on a ‘care 
ideology’, emphasising welfare principles. Policies can also fall under a ‘resocialisation 
or rehabilitation’ banner, with offender-based goals. The third victimogogic ideology is 
the ‘retributive or criminal justice’ model; stressing ‘just desserts’. Finally, the ‘radical 
or anti-criminal justice’ ideology involves resolving problems without resorting to the 
formal criminal justice system. Van Dijk also notes two broad dimensions to 
victimogogic measures, which remain valid in the recent policy context. The first is the 
extent to which victims’ problems are incorporated as factors to consider within the 
criminal justice process. The second dimension is the extent to which victims’ interests 
are goals in their own right, or whether they are intended to ‘feed back’ into decision 
making regarding offenders.
3.1.1.2- The way forward: victimology and conceptions o f crime victims
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Examining why victims have become issues of policy clearly affords insight into the 
limits of such policies. Nevertheless, Van Dijk’s construction is restricted to an 
examination of political ideologies. As such, he does not discuss the wider network of 
factors -  including international influences or social issues like race and secularisation -  
that may lead to different policies being put into operation.9 t
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Robert Elias argues that victimogogic policies in the US were actually a tool to facilitate 
state control:
“[V ictim s may function to bolster state legitimacy, to gain political mileage, and 
to enhance social control” (Elias, 1986: 231).
The argument is that politicians use victims as political ammunition in elections and to 
insist on more punitive measures. Hence, Fattah (1992) characterises victimogogic 
measures as “political and judicial placebos” (p.xii).
Elias and Fattah therefore look more closely at the driving force(s) behind such 
ideologies. This takes our understanding forward, but the concentration on 
‘punitiveness’ may distract attention from a still wider range of influences, from which 
we might understand why political mileage can be gained through the appearance of 
supporting crime victims in the first place, say if confidence in the criminal justice 
system is lacking (Garland, 2001).
In a series of publications Paul Rock charts the development of victim initiatives in 
Britain and Canada (Rock, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2004). A consistent theme running 
throughout these studies is the lack of any unified or consistent ‘policy’. Rather, says 
Rock, the appearance of a unified ‘victims strategy’ only develops retrospectively:
“[Pjolicies for victims sometimes seemed to have little directly to do with the 
expressed needs of victims themselves and more to do with other politics. And 
they attain meaning only within the larger framework which those politics set” 
(Rock, 1990: p.38).
In a recent instalment, Rock (2004) examines the pressures leading to the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Bill.10 A number of influencing factors are discussed, 
including: ‘consumer-orientated’ thinking; human rights issues; international
9 See Chapter 4.
10 See Chapter 4.
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developments; vulnerable and intimidated witnesses; the development of reparation 
processes11 and the Macpherson Report. In Rock’s view, whilst making victims a party 
to criminal proceedings was ruled out by 2003, such influences assured that “notions of 
victims’ rights never disappeared” (Rock, 2004: p.570). To escape this impasse, Rock 
argues that politicians and policy-makers compromised by proposing statutory service 
standards for victims1 2 and witnesses and also the creation of the Victims’, and 
Witnesses’ Ombudsman and complaints procedures through the Parliamentary 
Commissioner:
“[T]hey [victims] were never to be recognized fully as formal participants in 
criminal proceedings, their eventual standing was to be resolved by a clever 
finesse of the problem of rights that was to be floated as the possible kernel of 
new legislation” (Rock, 2004: p.xvii, emphasis in original).
Despite its extremely detailed analysis, the key drawback of Rock’s methodology is his 
tight focus on specific institutions (such as the Home Office). As such, there is no 
consideration of how victim policies link to wider social trends. Also, whilst Rock has 
studied the policy background and the implementation of such measures (Rock, 1993), 
these analyses are not combined. As such, it is difficult to draw links in Rock’s work 
between the creation and development of policies and their actual implementation.
3.1.2.1- Adding the ‘macro ’element
As a means of addressing such problems, victim policies can also be understood as 
products of broader social trends. Boutellier (2003) argues that in our post-modem 
society of secularised morality, the moral legitimacy of the criminal law is no longer 
self-evident. Nevertheless, for Boutellier a public morality survives secularisation 
through the awareness people retain for each other’s suffering. This leaves us with a 
negative frame of reference for morality, as whilst there is no consensus on what 
constitutes ‘the good life’ there is agreement enough to acknowledge the suffering of 
others. This renders the victims of suffering a ‘focal point’ for establishing the moral 
legitimacy of criminal law. Hence, the criminal law becomes the “basal negative point 
of reference for a pluralistic morality” (p.65). The pain suffered by crime victims 
becomes a metaphor for wrongful conduct, replacing metaphors of community or 
collective consciousness. Boutellier calls this the ‘victimalization of morality’.
11 Which, rightly or wrongly, Rock associates with restorative justice.
12 Now found under the Victim’s Code o f Practice (Home Office, 2005f).
51
In recent years victims have indeed become more prominent in criminal justice policy 
with particular reference to those whose suffering seems to be greatest; including 
survivors of homicide, the victims of domestic violence and childhood victims of sexual 
abuse. This might however suggest that the policy of ‘putting victims to the heart of the 
system’ will be limited to those victims whose suffering is readily acknowledged by 
society, meaning ‘ideal victims’. «
Garland (2001) also explains the emergence of victim policies through broader social 
change. As with Boutellier, Garland’s argument is that victims in late-modern society 
(in America and the UK) are one of the core benchmarks for determining the success of 
criminal justice. For Garland, this development is grounded in the collapse of support 
for penal-welfarism in the 1970s, constituted by a loss of faith in the rehabilitative ideal. 
This heralded a ‘fundamental disenchantment’ with the criminal justice system and in 
its ability to control crime. Consequently, we have seen a shift in focus away from the 
causes of crime onto its consequences, including victimisation. Victims then become 
central to criminal justice policy for two reasons. Firstly, governments faced with such 
problems will redefine what it means to have a ‘successful’ criminal justice system by 
portraying crime as something the state has little control over. The government 
therefore focuses on the management of criminal justice and the provision of service 
standards which leads to victims -  as the new ‘customers’ of the system -  being 
afforded increased participation in the process.
Secondly, under these conditions, victims become agents of ‘punitive segregation’. In 
the face of growing concern that little can be done about crime, Garland argues that 
governments deny their failure by turning to ever more punitive policies, such as 
mandatory minimum sentences and ‘three strikes’ legislation. Victims are used to 
justify such measures by governments appealing to their ‘need’ to be protected and have 
their voices heard.
Garland’s view clearly corroborates the suggestion that victim policies are grounded in 
wider political concerns; specifically the need to give the criminal justice system a 
politically popular goal that is also achievable. Indeed, Garland’s tone is one of 
criticism for governments who ‘exploit’ victims to these ends. Boutellier seems less 
disapproving in that the victimalization of morality seems to transcend politics.
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One final point to make in this section is to draw attention to the connections between 
victim policy and the development of governance. This will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 4 but, suffice to say, aspects of this policy seem to reflect the features 
of decentralised service provision and wider consultation strategies associated with 
governance. Several authors have drawn links between various aspects of criminal 
justice policy and the emergence of governance (Crawford, 1997; Loader and Sparks,
r
2002). Governance is also i  key aspect of Garland’s (2001) position given above.
3.1.2.2-T he way forward: victims as state policy
The work of Paul Rock and others clearly provides a key starting point for any 
discussion of victims as state policy in England and Wales and beyond. Nevertheless, 
developments have continued to increase in pace since Rock’s latest review. 
Furthermore, Rock in particular focuses on the work of individual organisations without 
incorporating wider ‘macro’ trends like those just described. This thesis will examine 
the implications of Garland and Boutellier’s arguments for the operational practice of 
criminal trials; especially the question of ideal versus non-ideal victims. The literature is 
also lacking many attempts to bring together the policy and practical implications of 
victim reform. By doing so, this thesis will contribute a discussion on whether the 
underlying ‘politics’ influencing victim policies are connected to the present state of 
‘victim-centeredness’ in the criminal justice system.
3.2 -  PART 2: KEY ISSUES RELATED TO CRIM E VICTIMS
3.2.1 -  ‘Fundam ental reform ’?
As noted previously, this thesis will examine whether or not governments must resort to 
‘fundamental reform’ of the present system in order to produce victim-centred justice. 
Before continuing with the review I will elaborate further on this issue. To some extent 
this section may seem ill placed, as it partly relies on evidence discussed in Chapter 4 
and the issue cannot be resolved satisfactorily until we come to analyse the results of 
this research in Chapters 6 and 7. In addition, this section will raise some very major 
issues to be addressed in far greater detail later in the review. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to establish at this point the distinction drawn between fundamental and non­
fundamental reform, as this will inform the analysis of existing literature.. At this point I 
am only seeking to establish the distinctions between the two concepts; argument as to
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whether different fundamental reforms would be ‘better’ or ‘worse’ for victims than 
non-fundamental reforms will be made in the remaining sections of the review.
Primarily, the emphasis of this thesis is on testing the validity of the government’s 
pledge to put victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice. In Chapter 4 it will be argued that 
the government’s strategy to deliver this pledge is characterised by a reluctance to 
fundamentally alter the nature of the present system.13 The point is made by Ellison 
(2001) when she characterises special measures14 as an ‘accommodation approach’ 
preserving the tenets of the existing evidential system.15 In the same vein, we have 
already noted Rock’s view that the government compromised in the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Bill rather than accepting victims as ‘parties’ in criminal trials.
This suggests that there are clear limits of reform beyond which governments and 
policy-makers are unwilling to go to achieve a ‘victim-centred’ justice system. Some of 
the reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter. From the outset, however, this 
observation implies that the question is not just whether victims are being put to the 
heart of criminal justice, but whether this is achievable through finesse (Rock, 2004: 
p.571) and accommodation rather than more ‘fundamental reform’.16
Fundamental reform is difficult to define. Nevertheless, it is possible to establish static 
norms that essentially characterise criminal justice in England and Wales. The 
distinction to be drawn, I believe, is between reforms that change this adversarial 
system in itself and alter the roles of those within it (fundamental) and reforms that 
adapt the manner in which this existing system operates and how its participants 
perform existing roles (non-fundamental). Moving towards an inquisitorial system, for 
example, would require fundamental change in the practices of all involved. Moves 
towards restorative justice would also be fundamental, and necessitate changing the goal 
of the process from conviction to restitution, as well as many changes in the process 
itself.17 It would also be a fundamental change to alter the basic system of evidence.
13 Interview data is also cited in Chapter 4 to support this, see pages 114-115.
14 Facilities such as video-links and screens to assist vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to 
give evidence under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
15 We will return to Ellison’s (2001) discussion below.
16 Although we will see in Chapter 4 that the present reform agenda is even more restricted than 
the notion of ‘non-fundamental reform’ would imply.
17 Whilst the government has o f course invested heavily in investigating the merits of restorative 
justice programmes (Shapland et al, 2004), these have grown up in parallel to the ‘main’
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One of the key debates in this area is whether victims should become decision makers in 
the criminal justice process. Using our distinction between changing the system and 
adapting its operation we can see that some decision making on the part of victims 
might constitute ‘fundamental’ reform. If victims were given the power to decide 
whether or not to pursue a prosecution, for example, this would constitute an essential 
shift in the role of the Crown Prosecution Service, and therefore a fundamental 
change.18 The same would be true if victims selected sentences, as this would usurp the 
role of judges and magistrates.19
Nevertheless, official resistance to fundamental reform does not preclude the victim 
from making any decisions in the process, and certainly not from having opinions 
canvassed and weighed up by prosecutors or judges, such that they may have a real 
impact. So, whilst we may rule out victims selecting sentences, in this thesis I will argue 
that a non-fundamental change would allow them to present information on the impact 
of crime -  or even opinions as to sentence -  to the judge and have that information 
considered. This position is grounded on the principle that decision makers within the 
system should base their decisions on all available information, and hence there should 
be mechanisms in place to ensure such information (from all sources, including the 
victims) is made available to such decision makers. Importantly, these are already basic 
principles inherent within the criminal justice process, and hence represent non­
fundamental reforms. In addition, because the same decisions are being made by the 
same people -  but with more information on which to base those decisions -  the system 
itself does not change.
The key questions are whether it is ‘right’ for criminal justice actors to weigh up this 
kind of information -  especially victims’ opinions -  and whether this will adversely
affect the defendant. On the latter point, we will see in this review that commentators
/
like Andrew Ashworth (2000) have been greatly concerned by the prospect of victim
adversarial system, and are arguably diversionary processes (Dignan, 1992; Young and Goold, 
1999). As such, the argument remains valid that the government is as yet unwilling to 
contemplate substantially doing away with the existing criminal justice system in favour of 
restorative justice.
18 Discussion o f the negative connotations this might have for victims will be presented in the
review below. .
19 Again, the purpose o f this section is to draw the distinction between fundamental and non­
fundamental reform without becoming distracted by the considerable debates surrounding these 
issues, discussed below.
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rights adversely affecting defendants. Nevertheless, it should be noted that if 
information from victims exists (including their opinions) and judges or magistrates are 
required to take all existing information into account when making decisions then, as 
such principles are already part of the existing system (non-fundamental reform), it may 
not matter whether that information adversely impacted upon defendants. This 
notwithstanding, another, more practical, difficulty will lie in fostering real belief
(I.
amongst practitioners that victims’ views are worthy of genuine consideration. 
Empirical evidence gathered for this research will later shed light on this issue.
Whilst victims making decisions on sentence and prosecution must be seen as 
‘fundamental reforms’, it might be a non-fundamental reform to allow them the 
discretion to choose whether they give evidence in the first place. In England and Wales 
the system is already based on the voluntary provision of evidence. Indeed, as there is 
no legal duty to report crime, evidence will always be partial. Hence it would be a non­
fundamental reform to minimise the exceptions to this rule (courts’ discretion to 
summon witnesses). This is particularly relevant in domestic violence cases, where 
victims are often unwilling to give evidence (see Cretney and Davis, 1997). It might be 
argued that this gives victims in cases where there is little evidence other than their own 
the power to end a prosecution (a fundamental reform). Nevertheless, the absence of 
good evidence is an issue already dealt with routinely by police and CPS, hence the 
emphasis remains on the existing system to gather as much evidence as possible and 
provide an environment in which the victim is happy to give evidence.
Providing such an environment is also a non-fundamental reform. For example, 
professional standards can be changed such that prosecutors are expected to speak to 
victims, keep them informed and treat them courteously without impacting on the 
process. Similarly, fostering a change in attitude amongst practitioners to minimise 
inconvenience to victims -  even if this inconveniences professionals and courts -  does 
not remodel the system itself. In the same vein, one could preserve the basic adversarial 
nature of evidence, but adapt practices to allow victims to speak more freely.20
In a moment we will move on to discuss the controversial notion of victim rights. In 
principle, however, it is submitted that ensuring the operation of non-fundamental 
victim reforms by giving victims ‘rights’ would not in itself constitute a fundamental
20 See Chapter 5.
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change in the system. This is especially true if rights are enforced through existing 
features of the process. For example, fostering the expectation that judges will step in if 
victims are interrupted unnecessarily during their evidence (for example) is simply a 
formalisation and extension of an existing (if discretionary) judicial function. This 
means that the enforcement of ‘rights’ and the remedies available to victims when they 
are breached is key, and an important debate to be had in this chapter is whether such 
remedies would include complaints mechanisms internal or external to the criminal 
justice procedure, complaints against judges, or indeed appeals in specific cases.
Another key debate is whether giving victims the status of parties in criminal 
proceedings would constitute fundamental reform. Interestingly, whilst most 
commentators in this area address this issue, there has been little specific discussion of 
what constitutes ‘party status’. The most likely understanding seems to be that a ‘party’ 
has representation in the trial procedure through which their views and (perhaps) 
opinions are presented to the court for the court to take into account. This suggests that 
making victims a ‘party’ to the case need not take us much further than the consultation 
and consideration of the victims’ position already accepted as non-fundamental reform 
above. The key addition here is that the presentation of this position to the court is 
guaranteed through the advent of representation. As such, this again does not seem to 
change the fundamental process of decision making or the respective roles of existing 
parties (defendant and state) and therefore appears to be non-fundamental reform.
Having defined the concept, a crucial debate for this chapter is whether -  in line with 
the relevant hypothesis from Chapter 1 -  ‘non-fundamental reform’ is enough to bring 
victims ‘to the heart’ of criminal justice. As already noted, a fully defensible answer to 
this question will have to wait until after we have considered empirical results in 
Chapter 6. That said, it is clear that our ultimate conclusions will influence the standards 
to which trials (and other procedures) are held if they are to be considered ‘victim- 
centred’. Of course, non-fundamental reforms may be easier to apply in the face of 
deeply engrained occupational practices. Such reform may also suggest changes that are 
not resource-intensive, such as treating victims with courtesy.21 As such, it may be 
argued that ‘putting victims at the heart of criminal justice’ would be a more achievable 
proposition if it could be accomplished without fundamentally altering the criminal
21 Although some victim-centred reform may require significant resources, such as the advent of 
special measures and processes to keep victims informed about their case. See Chapters 6 and 7 
where the concept of ‘practical centrality’ is discussed.
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justice system. That said, we will see in Chapter 4 that from a policy-making 
perspective reforms once dismissed as extremely controversial can later be 
implemented, provided they are based on established rhetoric and/or previous policy 
actions. Hence, what matters here may be that reform is gradual rather than non­
fundamental. In other words ‘fundamental reform’ may be a dynamic rather than a static 
concept.
3.2.2 -  Victim ‘rights’
The concept of victims having ‘rights’ in criminal justice is controversial. Whereas most 
accept the notion of defendant rights -  Ashworth (2000) refers to them as defendants’ 
“ ‘normal’ rights” (p.189) -  both Ashworth and Edwards (2004) object to any ‘common 
sense’ grounding of victim rights.
3.2.2.1 -  Conceptualising ‘rights’
Interestingly, the modem debate on victim ‘rights’ is often less about the content of 
those rights and more about mechanisms for delivery and accountability (JUSTICE, 
1998). Hence, there is general agreement in the literature that victims should receive 
information, courteous treatment and protection from the justice system (Zedner, 2002). 
Nevertheless, this tacit acceptance of a standardised list of ‘service rights’22 is arguably 
a weakness of the literature; one that restricts conceptions of ‘victim rights’ and a 
‘victim-centred’ system and prevents the incorporation of new ideas, including the 
notion of account-making discussed in Chapter 5.23 This also stifles the growing calls 
for “some form of procedural right of participation within the system” (Doak, 2003: p.2, 
2005), as these kinds of rights have proved far more contentious.
3.2.2.2 - ‘Participation’?
Edwards (2004) labels ‘participation’ “a comfortably pleasing platitude” (p.973) which 
is conceptually abstract. In this sense, it may be similar to the vague concept of ‘victim 
empowerment’ popular in South Africa (South African Department of Home Affairs, 
2005). In his discussion, Edwards describes four possible forms of victim participation 
in criminal justice. The most significant casts victims in the role of decision makers, 
such that their preferences are sought and applied by the criminal justice system. Less
22 See below.
231 will argue there that this would not constitute fundamental reform.
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drastic would be consultative participation, where the system seeks out victims’ 
preferences and takes them into account when making decisions. Edwards sees the 
traditional role of victims in terms of information provision, where victims are obliged 
to provide information required by the system. Finally, under expressive participation, 
victims express whatever information they wish, but with no instrumental impact. 
Indeed, Edwards highlights the danger of victims believing participation will affect 
decision making when this is not so.
There is a sense that for Edwards these are ‘all or nothing’ categories and hence he does 
not examine how they might be combined in practice. The fact that some types of 
decision making on the part of victims may be less groundbreaking than others is an 
obvious example, which the fundamental/non-fundamental distinction picks out. Also, 
Edwards does not examine how different forms of participation impact on other actors 
in the process, such as defendants. Overall, however, Edwards’ classifications of 
‘participation’ are a useful tool to be drawn upon in this chapter.
3.2.23-Types of rights?
A common distinction drawn in these debates is that between ‘service rights’ and 
‘procedural rights’. For Ashworth (1993, 1998, 2000) victim participation should not be 
allowed to stray beyond ‘service rights’ into areas of ‘public interest’. Ashworth is 
particularly concerned by victims influencing sentencing, citing the difficulties of 
testing victims’ claims and taking account of unforeseen effects on victims (Ashworth, 
2000). ‘Service rights’ is therefore a more limited concept than that of ‘non­
fundamental’ reform as it excludes victims’ consultative participation and notions of 
allowing victims to give evidence in a less restrictive manner. The rights Ashworth has 
in mind include respectful and sympathetic treatment, support, information, court 
facilities and compensation from the offender or state (Ashworth, 1998: p.34).
Ashworth’s ideas have been highly influential and set out clear distinctions between 
what is and is not of ‘legitimate concern’ to victims. Nevertheless, we might take issue 
with these distinctions, not least because Ashworth’s thought seems to be grounded in 
the defence perspective, incorporating the assumption that there is a ‘zero sum game’ 
between victim and defendant rights. The difficulty with Ashworth’s argument is he 
does not elaborate on why fundamentally victims should not have input into sentencing, 
or be permitted to speak in court, or make decisions. Even if affording victims some
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rights could prejudice the defence, Ashworth offers no mechanisms to resolve such 
conflicts or demonstrate why service rights are acceptable and procedural rights are not. 
Ashworth also assumes the ‘public interest’ cannot be synonymous with victims’ 
concerns. This ignores the possibility implied by Boutellier (2000) and Garland (2001) 
that victim involvement preserves the legitimacy of the justice system, which is surely 
in the public interest.
c
It is also questionable whether the services Ashworth has in mind can accurately be 
labelled as ‘rights’. The enforceability of such rights would not derive from the victim’s 
procedural involvement in the justice process (which Ashworth rejects) but rather from 
external complaints procedures. As discussed below, we might question whether such 
procedures are adequate mechanisms for enforcing rights. In fact there has been little 
debate over the possibility of enforcing victim rights from within the process itself; 
whether through separate hearings (appeals or trials-within-trials) or proactive judicial 
involvement.24 ’
Sanders et al. (2001) classify Ashworth’s argument as a normative defence of the due 
process approach. Sanders and Young (2000) argue that both ‘service’ and ‘procedural’ 
rights fail to cater for the interests of victims, as does the traditional “due process verses 
crime control” dichotomy (p.51). Hence Sanders (2002) suggests an alternative 
‘victims’ rights’ approach, combined with inquisitorial-style systems in the short terms 
and moving towards restorative justice.25
Sanders therefore ignores the possibility of incorporating victim rights within the 
present system of adversarial criminal justice, and instead advocates the more 
fundamental notion, ultimately, of changing the nature and goals of the system. He 
gives little indication, however, as to why inquisitorial or restorative models would be 
‘better’ for victims (see Brienen and Hoegen, 2000). Furthermore, it seems neglectful 
for us to hold this up as a solution and forget the problems faced by the vast majority of 
victims in the still prevailing adversarial system. As such, Sanders’ argument is not 
conclusive. '
Sanders et al. (2001) disagree with Ashworth’s view of ‘service rights’ as a solution to 
victims’ problems because they feel that poorly conceived service rights also
24 The latter being my own preferred mechanism, to be argued in Chapter 7.
25 See below.
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marginalize victims. This is demonstrated by difficulties encountered during the piloting 
of One Stop Shops (Hoyle et al. 1998).26 Cape (2004) also takes up the argument that 
service rights have been poorly implemented, but it is not clear how this invalidates 
Ashworth’s basic view that -  in principle, properly conceived and resourced -  service 
rights could assist victims.
Sanders (2002) rejects victim decision making in their ‘inclusive model’ because:
“[This] would fuel the ‘us’ and ‘them’ non-relationship and therefore social 
exclusion...The aim would be to listen to victims’ information and their views, 
but decision making would be based on clear objective criteria derived from 
inclusive approaches such as the ‘freedom perspective’” (p.218).
Like Edwards, however, the author does not distinguish between different decisions. 
Problems also lie in their assumed existence of ‘clear objective criteria’ of a higher 
‘standard’ than the victim’s own opinion, or decision. Conversely, Erez (1991) argues 
that harm, for example, can never be measured objectively. Sanders et al.’s (2001) view 
also seems to assume a ‘vengeful’ victim, but we will see below that the widespread 
existence of such victims is debatable (Doak and O’Mahony, 2006). In fact, the notion 
of listening but not acting upon victims’ opinions suggests a danger of raising and 
dashing their expectations, the key criticism of the One Stop Shops (Hoyle et al., 1998).
A better argument against victims acting as decision makers was provided by the 
JUSTICE Committee (1998) when they became concerned that domestic violence 
victims were being burdened with prosecution decisions. Police were asking such 
victims whether they would support a prosecution, operating under the presumption that 
they often withdrew such support. The Committee maintained that this practice would 
‘slur’ all domestic violence offences and imply that the state is unwilling to fulfil its 
duty to police and prosecute such crime.
The ‘freedom perspective’ referred to above is an attempt by Sanders and Young (2000) 
to replace the service/procedural rights distinction with a more sophisticated tool. 
Unlike Ashworth, Sanders and Young propose a mechanism whereby the rights of 
victims and defendants are balanced by maximising freedom within the system. Thus, 
says Sanders (2002), providing information to victims increases their freedom without
26 Especially the inability of the police to explain the decisions made by the CPS to victims, 
meaning victims’ expectations were raised by participation in the pilots only to be dashed. See 
also below and Chapter 4.
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reducing the freedom of defendants. Conversely, Sanders and Young (2000) argue that 
if victims’ opinions sway decision making this reduces the freedom of offenders more 
than it increases the freedom of victims27, and hence constitutes an unacceptable ‘right’. 
Consulting victims on the discontinuance of their cases, however, is justified provided 
the final decision is made by the CPS based on an objective evaluation of the ‘balance 
of freedoms’.
. ■) K
Nevertheless, the difficulty inherent in the ‘freedom model’ lies in the notion of 
weighing the ‘balance of freedoms’ between parties. The quantification of ‘freedom’ is 
very problematic. In addition, there will always be disagreement as to the practical 
impact of any measure, and thus how it impacts on ‘freedom levels’. As such, the 
distinctions drawn by Sanders (2002) between ‘acceptable’ and ‘non-acceptable’ victim 
rights are problematic. Furthermore, this model promotes considerable debate as to who 
would be charged with determining net freedom. If this role were to fall to judges, this 
raises the further important question of whether appeals could be made based on the 
argument that freedom during a criminal trial had not been maximised. This then leads 
to the further question of what kinds of redress would be available to such victims. 
Assuming such problems could be resolved, there may be the danger of long drawn out 
hearings (trials within trials) to determine ‘net freedom’ that (like most legal arguments) 
once again exclude the victim from participation.
3.2.2.4 -  Victim rights in sentencing
Edna Erez argues in favour of victim impact statements (VIS) as a means of affording 
victims participation rights in criminal justice (Erez, 2000, 1999, 1994). VIS statements 
developed in the US for victims to communicate information to the court about the 
effects of crime. These were adopted in Britain (nationally in October 2001) as ‘victim 
personal statements’, although the British system excludes judicial consideration of 
comments made by the victim on sentencing (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2001).
Ashworth (2000) argues that involving victims in sentencing has been used as a means 
of legitimising a punitive stance against offenders. For Ashworth, the main difficulties 
with victim impact statements are threefold. First is the effect they have on defendants’ 
rights, as discussed previously. Secondly, Ashworth considers it unjust for
27 It is not clear whether the authors believe this is primarily because such sentencing would be 
excessively punitive or because it would introduce a lack o f consistency into the system 
between like defendants.
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unpredictable or unusual impacts upon victims to affect sentence. Ashworth’s third 
warning again concerns falsely raising victims’ expectations of influencing sentence. 
Ashworth also agrees with Victim Support (1995) that victims should not be burdened 
with decision making responsibilities. This is the argument of the present thesis in 
relation to some decision making (a fundamental reform) as opposed to consultation (a 
non-fundamental reform).
To address Ashworth’s critique, in a system grounded on proportionality, it may be the 
very cases where the impact of crime is unusual where the victim’s input into 
sentencing becomes useful. Again, the above view seems to be based on the defence 
perspective, without addressing the concerns of victims wishing to have ‘a role’ in the 
processes. In line with the JUSTICE committee (1998) I share Ashworth’s concerns on 
burdening victims with decisions, certainly prosecution decisions. Nevertheless, I would 
suggest that consultative participation coupled with proper explanation -  and even 
decision making in terms of choosing whether or not to give evidence -  need not burden 
victims unduly, and as a due process argument Ashworth offers no evidence to the 
contrary. Ashworth’s third difficulty concerning victims wrongly led to believe they 
will be making decisions can again be resolved through providing them with more 
detailed and frank information.
Erez (1999, 2004) also challenges Ashworth’s warnings. She begins by conceding that 
VIS statements have little impact on sentencing (Morgan and Sanders, 1999). 
Nevertheless, for her, this is caused by the resistant cultures of practitioners and the 
widely held view that only ‘normal’ levels of impact should affect sentences (Erez, 
1999). Arguably, Erez is here describing a wide and prevailing legal culture as opposed 
to the individual professional cultures of barristers, legal advisers, solicitors and so on. 
Erez also maintains that exposure to victim impact statements will give practitioners a 
more realistic impression of ‘normal’ levels of impact (Erez and Rogers, 1999; Erez, 
1999). Here Erez’s point extends beyond sentencing. Clearly it is down to practitioners 
to ensure reforms work in practice. Conversely, Sanders et al. (2001) see VPS 
statements as fundamentally flawed because they rarely contain unexpected 
information. 28
28 There is little evidence to suggest victims even want such decision making power (JUSTICE, 
1998; Auld, 2001; Tapley, 2002).
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Erez argues that victims derive therapeutic benefit and vindication from expressing 
information about the impact of crime during the sentencing process, which boosts 
satisfaction with the criminal process and may achieve restorative ends (Erez et al., 
1997; Erez, 2004). In other words, her argument is that normative issues matter to 
victims, which is also the conclusion of Tyler (1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002). On a 
similar point, Shapland (1990) notes that victims seem to draw benefit from the system 
of compensation orders’29 whereby victims receive the recognition of having a judge 
order compensation and receiving payments directly from offenders; thus recognising 
their own pain and suffering or, as Miers (1980) put it, recognition of their ‘victim 
status’.
Whether through compensation orders or wider sentencing, Erez (1999, 2000) argues 
that what little influence VPS statements have is on the proportionality of the sentence. 
In any event, we are talking here about extending the information and opinions afforded 
to sentencers for them to weigh up (non-fundamental reform). Even if this does include 
victims’ opinion as to sentence, this is not giving them the capacity to fix sentences 
based on punitive positions (fundamental reform).
Erez seems to embrace wider notions of consultative participation than Sanders and 
Young (2000). Her position is however limited to participation rights at the sentencing 
stage30. More specifically, Erez’s (1999) conclusions on proportionality have been the 
subject of debate. Her contention is based on studies from America and Australia (Erez 
and Rogers, 1999) and also the British pilot, which seems to confirm that VIS 
statements are generally not used as a vehicle for communicating vindictive opinions to 
the court (Hoyle et ai., 1998).31 As such, she suggests a VIS can influence sentences in 
either direction, such that their overall affect on sentencing is partly hidden in the 
statistical analyses, as the two cases cancel each other out:
“[S]ome changes in [sentencing] outcomes do occur, but they are hidden as in the 
aggregate they offset each other. Without victim input, sentences might well have • 
been too high or too low” (Erez, 1999: p.548).
29 Originally introduced in 1972 (Miers, 1980).
30 Although, overall, this is a far more sweeping notion o f ‘participation’ than that o f Sanders 
and Young (2000), whereas Ashworth o f course dismisses the concept as unjust.
31 Erez claims that this is because they are ‘edited’ by the police and other parties, which we will 
discuss in Chapter 5.
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Nevertheless, Sanders et al. (2001) heavily disputes the notion that VIS statements can 
actually reduce sentence severity (see also Giliberti, 1991). Although here the authors 
are unable to prove statistically that Erez’s argument is incorrect, they advise caution on 
the interpretation of her findings, as there was no comparable finding in the English 
pilot (Morgan and Sanders, 1999)32 or in a study by Davis and Smith (1994). Erez also 
appears to base her conclusion on the word of practitioners and:
. . . i  e
“[W]hat they say and what they do are not always the same” (Sanders et al., 2001:
p.449).33
That said, on the issue of vengefulness Erez’s general point has recently been supported 
by evaluations of restorative justice in Northern Ireland (Doak and O’Mahony, 2006) 
and in Britain (Shapland et al., 2006). These indicate that when given the opportunity to 
speak about sentencing matters victims do not tend to advocate excessively harsh 
punishments but instead suggest resolutions that may reduce the chance of the offender 
reoffending. In addition, the 1998 British Crime Survey indicates generally non- 
punitive attitudes amongst victims and their possible acceptance of restorative 
principles. It also seems that the more informed about the system the general public are, 
the less punitive they become (Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 2000). That said, Sanders 
et al.’s argument is not so much that victims in general are vindictive and punitive, 
“simply that non-punitive victims rarely make a VIS” (2004: 104).
Sanders et al. (2001) also dispute the ‘therapeutic’ benefits of the VPS on the grounds 
that they “add another layer of depersonalised disempowering procedures which do 
little to ease secondary victimisation for many, and add to it for others” (p.450). At the 
pilot stage, Hoyle et al. (1998) and Morgan and Sanders (1999) said that the question of 
whether the VIS increased satisfaction with the criminal justice system remained 
inconclusive. In Hoyle et al.’s study some victims expressed inhibitions to give full 
details because of the dismissive manner in which the police took the statements and the 
limitations of the form itself. Morgan and Sanders (1999) found that only a small 
percentage of victims made victim impact statements and that practitioners usually felt 
they contained no unexpected information.
32 Sanders et al do not attribute this to differences between the UK, American and Australian 
systems.
33 A similar finding is made by this research, see pages 324-326.
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Nevertheless, following Erez (and rejecting Ashworth) none of the data seem to indicate 
that giving victims the right to be consulted over sentencing is fundamentally flawed as 
a concept. We also have no up-to-date study of victim personal statements in England 
and Wales.34
3.2.2.5 -  A zero sum game ? ^
Erez and Sanders and Young agree on the point that a trade off between the rights of 
victims and defendants is not inevitable. For Erez, procedural rights afforded to victims 
through victim impact statements do not unjustly affect defendants, but improve 
sentence accuracy35, whilst Sanders and Young would wish to maximise the ‘freedom’ 
of all sides.36 Although we have seen that both resolutions are subject to critique, the 
rejection of a zero sum game supports the notion that a wider range of non-fundamental 
reforms -  especially consultative participation -  may be legitimate.
Garland (2001) sees the ‘zero sum game’ between victim and defendant rights as the 
product of a punitive ethos espoused by governments in an effort to deny the failure of 
the justice system to reduce crime. The position is summarised by Hickman (2004):
“[Fjaimess to victims is not a zero sum game. It can be achieved without . 
detracting from the rights of the defendant. The fact that this government wishes 
us to think otherwise is a profoundly political matter” (p.52).
Jackson (1990) has remarked on the dominance of ‘balance’ rhetoric within criminal 
justice discourse, in this case the balance between victim and offender rights (Jackson, 
2004). Nevertheless, the above discussion seems to suggest that in this case the zero 
sum game is a product of its time rather than an objective reality.
3.22.6 -  Victim rights: an interim conclusion
Nothing reviewed so far seems to preclude the application of consultative participatory 
rights for victims in criminal justice. Ashworth would disagree, but with objections
34 See Graham et al. (2004) for discussion on how they are taken by police.
35 In terms o f ‘just desserts’.
36 O’Malley (2004) has suggested a similar mechanism o f avoiding zero sum games between 
victim and offenders related to the management o f risk. Instead o f burdening offenders with the 
risk o f suffering injustice -  based on the notion that they created the risk to society in the first 
place -  O’Malley suggests that ways must be found to minimise the net harm to society and thus 
achieve crime prevention and restorative outcomes.
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grounded on a defence-orientated presumption of the existence of a zero sum game that 
he does not substantiate, possibly owing to the normative nature of his argument. This 
ignores the implications of Sanders’ and Erez’s position that victim rights need not lead 
to the detriment of defendants.
Admittedly, both contributors exclude the zero sum game through questionable 
methods. Sanders’ and Young’s ‘balancing of freedoms’ is problematic, whereas Erez’s 
conclusion that VIS statement only impact upon proportionality is not supported by the 
equivalent British research (Morgan and Sanders, 1999; Sanders et al., 2001)37. What 
we can say, however, is that consultative victim participation leaves decision making 
with criminal justice actors, informed by the victim’s opinions along with other factors. 
This might be objectionable if we assume -  like Sanders -  that victims’ views are less 
reliable as the basis of decisions than more ‘objective’ factors. This presumption may 
not be borne out in real life situations, however, firstly because the quest for 
‘objectivity’ is probably fallacious, and secondly if Erez (2004) is correct about the non- 
vindictive impact of victim impact statements or if victims in general are indeed not as 
vindictive as we might suppose. Garland’s analysis also forces us to consider whether 
the very notion of a ‘zero sum game’ is a product of populist punitivism.
Erez and Sanders and Young both accept victim participation in some situations, but 
place artificial limits on their discussion. Erez’s focus is exclusively on participation in 
sentencing. Sanders and Young exclude consultative participation in sentencing but 
accept victims’ information provision relating to prosecution decisions, citing the 
‘balance of freedoms’ as the basis of their distinction, which has already been critiqued.
The present thesis will adopt a wider construction than the above theorists, in which the 
assumption of a zero sum game is rejected and the right to consultative participation is 
accepted as a general principle and specifically in relation to prosecution decisions, 
sentencing, bail decisions and so on. The acceptance of such consultation is based on 
two main arguments. Firstly, it will be noted below that evidence from the JUSTICE 
Committee (1998) and Shapland et al. (1985) amongst others indicates that, whilst 
victims have little desire to run the criminal justice system, they do expect to be 
consulted on various decisions and have their view taken into account. Secondly, we
37 The dispute as to the interpretation o f such data between Erez (1999) and Sanders et al. 
(2001) helps illustrate the difficulties highlighted in Chapter 2 o f claiming true ‘objectivity’ in 
any research, even when dealing with quantitative data.
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have noted that it is already an accepted part of the existing system for judges and 
magistrates to take account of all available information when making a decision. In a 
victim-centred system, this would surely include information from the victims 
themselves.
This implies not only that victims are consulted, but also that there are clear 
mechanisms in place for copimunicating such information to the court and having the 
court communicate its consideration of this information to the victim, as benches are 
already required to give details as to how they have arrive at decisions. In short form, 
this may well mean giving victims party status, which I have argued above constitutes 
non-fundamental reform. Service rights will also be included in this system because -  as 
Sanders et al. (2001) note -  they are almost unanimously unobjectionable and at the 
very least should foster the normative impression that the system takes adequate 
account of victims’ needs. As none of this involves changing the adversarial system or 
its goals per se', this understanding of ‘victim rights’ conforms to our notion of ‘non- 
fundamental’ reform.
Sanders (2002) implies more fundamental change when he suggests moving towards 
inquisitorial and restorative process. Nevertheless, as he offers no discussion as to why 
this is better for victims than an adapted adversarial model -  and Brienen and Hoegen 
(2000) suggest inquisitorial models are no better for victims -  it is difficult to accept 
this solution. Non-fundamental reform implies rejecting Edwards’ ‘decision making 
participation’ in most cases. This is also broadly accepted38, not because of concerns 
that this would lead to injustice for the defendant but because placing such expectations 
and pressures on victims would amount to secondary victimisation and the portioning 
off of responsibilities criminal justice professionals are paid to bear (JUSTICE, 1998). 
That said, it is difficult to know what ‘evidence of injustice to the defendant’ might look 
like if, as argued previously, we accept the notion that benches in a victim-centred 
system should make decisions based on all the available information, including 
information derived from consultation with victims. Punitiveness seems a likely 
candidate, but this would not necessarily be synonymous with defendants being treated 
‘unfairly’ when the decision maker decides that -  on the balance of all the information -  
this is the ‘just’ or ‘proportionate’ outcome.
38 Although later in this chapter it will be argued that the decision to give evidence should 
remain with the victim.
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This section has begun conceptualising the rights afforded to victims in a ‘victim- 
centred’ justice system. The list, however, is incomplete. In particular, we have not yet 
deconstructed ‘service rights’ to decide exactly what rights a victim might enjoy during 
a trial. Rights related to giving evidence and interactions with court professionals are 
obvious possible examples.
3.2.2.7 -  Enforceability? e
True ‘rights’ must have some mechanism for their enforcement. As Jackson (2003) 
notes:
“One of the problems with putting obligations on criminal justice agencies, 
however, is that they are unlikely to be taken seriously unless consequences attach 
to non-compliance” (p.319).
This was a key observation made by Fenwick (1995) about the first ‘Victim’s Charter’ 
issued by the Conservatives (Home Office, 1990). Fenwick’s criticism of the Charter 
was that its subtitle -  ‘a statement of the rights of victims’ -  was “seriously misleading” 
(p.844) in that these ‘rights’ were not backed by enforcement mechanisms.
We might ask whether this class of ‘rights/aims’ is satisfactory in the context of the 
government’s pledge to put victims ‘at the heart of criminal justice’. If enforcement 
comes from without the system -  say through external complaints procedures -  then one 
might argue that the services afforded to victims remain ‘expectations’ (JUSTICE, 
1998; Shapland, 2000) with victim ‘rights’ essentially limited to the right to complain. 
One could argue that such ‘externally enforceable’ rights actually return victims to the 
periphery of the system, because resolution is available only outside the criminal justice 
process.
There is a blind spot in the literature on victim rights enforceable from within the 
criminal justice process ( ‘internally enforceable rights’). We can therefore build on 
Jackson’s (2003) critique by suggesting that rights will be taken far more seriously if 
enforcement comes from within the criminal justice process itself. It seems that the 
critique of Fenwick -  that rights cannot exist without robust enforcement mechanisms -  
has yet to be answered. Ashworth, Sanders and Erez are all largely silent on this issue.
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32.2.8 -  Finding victim rights
We will now examine possible sources for victim rights in order to illustrate why -  in 
this author’s view -  victims in England and Wales still lack true ‘rights’.
Government policy in the UK has fluctuated from the language of ‘rights’ in the first
Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 1990) to ‘service standards’ in the second Charter of
' •» •
1995, and subsequently reverted back to ‘rights’ in the 2002 White Paper Justice for All 
(Home Office, 2002). The use of such terminology in the first Charter replicated the 
language in the preamble to the UN’s 1985 Declaration o f Basic Principles o f Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power -  which the Charter was intended to 
implement -  and which spoke of “measures in order to secure the universal and 
effective recognition of, and respect for, the rights of victims of crime and abuse of 
power” (p.l).
Generally, both the Declaration and the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the 
position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure39 of the same 
year were concerned with ‘service rights’. A few participatory rights were indicated, 
including the weighing up of victims’ injuries and losses by the court when determining 
compensation. Neither document sets out any form of redress if standards are not met. 
That said, at Part A Paragraph 6b, the Declaration refers to allowing victims’ ‘views’ 
and ‘opinions’ to be “presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings 
where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused”. This is 
significant, as it suggests victims’ preferences will be taken into account.
The second (1996) version of the Victim’s Charter does not mention ‘rights’, only 
service standards related to information, support and protection (Home Office, 1996). 
The JUSTICE report (1998) also dropped this language to recommend reforms based on 
victims’ ‘legitimate expectations’. We may persist with labelling these as ‘service 
rights’, although there is an absence within the Charter of enforcement mechanisms. 
other than individual agencies’ complaints procedures. By now victims’ role as 
(voluntary) information providers under the Charter was clearer:
“YOU CAN EXPECT the chance to explain how the crime has affected you and
your interests to be taken into account.
39 Rec.85(ll).
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The police will ask you about your fears about further victimisation and details of 
your loss, damage, injury.
The Police, Crown prosecutor, magistrates, will take this information into account 
when making their decisions” (Home Office, 1996: p.3).40
The ‘interests’ mentioned in the first sentence probably do not include ‘opinions’ or 
stated interests, but rather interests interpreted through information provided on the 
impacts of crime. The same'is probably true in the third paragraph. In other words, this 
does not encompass interests expressed directly by victims themselves.
Nevertheless, the second Charter does foresee victims’ stated opinions influencing 
decision making:
“If you are worried about being attacked or harassed as a result of the court case 
you should tell the police. They will tell you what can be done and tell the CPS so 
that they can let the court know at the time bail is being considered” (p.10).
The ‘worry’ mentioned here would be based on a victim’s beliefs about their overall 
situation. Although there is no emphasis on the system to seek out such beliefs, this 
does suggest consultative participation, as the implication is that bail decisions may be 
influenced.41 The Charter also states that victims’ ‘concerns’ are to be considered before 
releasing offenders on probation from prison. The enforcement potential of any of these 
‘rights’ remains suspect, however, and still originates from complaints procedures 
outside the criminal justice process itself. It is also important to note that in order to be 
useful victim must be aware of their rights. The 2002/03 BCS however indicated that 
only 13% of victims were aware of the Charter, compared with 14% in 2001/02 and 
34% in 1998, when there was still a great deal of publicity being circulated about the 
second Charter of 1996 (Ringham and Salisbury, 2004).
3.2.2.9 -  Later developments: moving towards documented, internally enforceable 
rights?
We may now be moving closer to a stage where ‘victim rights’ are clarified and 
documented within international instruments, statute and case law that also provide 
enforcement mechanisms from within the criminal justice process.
40 Extract reproduced here as it appears in the Charter.
41 Albeit, it is telling that this is not expressly stated.
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Case law developments may indicate that victims have rights under the ECHR, which 
would be enforceable from within the criminal justice process in England and Wales 
though the Human Rights Act 1998. Of particular benefit to victims giving evidence in 
criminal trials are a number of rulings to the effect that keeping witnesses anonymous 
(say, because they are intimidated) does not breach a defendant’s Article 6 right to a fair 
trial, provided the evidence can be challenged (Baegen v. Netherlands42, Doorson v.  ^
Netherlands43 4). Ellison (2003) reports on the case of Sn v. Swedeni4 which confirmed 
that Article 6 does not grant the defence an unlimited right to secure the appearance of 
witnesses in court. This might indicate subtle moves toward allowing witnesses to make 
decisions themselves as to whether they give evidence. The case also maintains that 
witnesses can give evidence through recorded interviews without breaching Article 6. 
Doak (2003) suggests that victims might also find favour under Articles 3 and 8 if they 
are treated in a degrading manner or the state fails to protect their rights to privacy when 
giving evidence during a trial.
The European Court has resisted interpretations of the Convention which afford victims 
more explicit influence over decision making in sentencing (McCourt v. UK45) although 
in T and V v. UK46 47the parents of a young murder victim were allowed to make 
representations to the Court (Rock, 2004 and see Chapter 4). In the domestic case of R 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and another, ex parte Bulger47 the 
Divisional Court held that the family of a murder victim did not have standing to seek 
judicial review of any tariff set in relation to the murder.
Also under domestic case law, judges should seek out the impact of offending on 
victims (Attorney General Reference No.2 of 1995 (R v. S)48) (Shapland, 2002). This 
might suggest that victims have a right to provide such information.49 Furthermore, R v. 
Perks50 indicates that a sentence can be moderated if it aggravates the victim’s distress
42 Application No. 16696/90, 26th October 1995.
43 [1996] 23 EHRR 330.
44 Application No. 34209/96,2nd July 2002.
45 [1993] 13 EHRR 379.
46 [2000] Crim. L.R. 287.
47 [2001] All E.R. 449. .
48 [1995] Crim. L.R. 835.
49 The Victim’s Code of Conduct refers to a victim's ‘right’ to make a victim personal statement.
50 [2000] Crim. L.R. 606.
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or the victim’s forgiveness indicates that his or her psychological or mental suffering 
must be very much less than would normally be the case. Thus, in certain 
circumstances, the victim’s choice to forgive a defendant becomes relevant to 
sentencing (Edwards, 2002).
We now also have the EU Council’s 2001 Framework Decision on victims’ standing in 
criminal proceedings. The decision is steeped in the language of ‘rights’ including the 
right to compensation and damages, the right to provide and receive information, the 
right to be treated with respect for the victim’s dignity, the right to.be protected at 
various stages of the procedure and the right to have allowances made for the 
disadvantages of living in another member state from the one in which the crime was 
committed. Article 2 of the Decision requires member states to ensure victims have “a 
real and appropriate role in criminal proceedings”, which seems to suggest participatory 
rights, albeit not involving victims in decision making roles.
Whilst the Decision makes liberal use of the language of ‘rights’, in its own preamble 
and in Victim Support’s (2002b) explanation of the measures it is described as a set of 
‘minimum standards’. Nevertheless, states are obliged to ensure these standards are met. 
This hint that the standards guaranteed to victims under the Decision must be 
enforceable suggests a step closer to a more robust form of rights.
The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 sought to implement the 
Framework Decision through a statutory Code of Practice (Home Office, 2005f). The 
Code’s basis in statute is significant, although its provisions are not law and failure to 
comply with the Code does not leave anyone liable to legal proceedings. The 
enforceability of the Code therefore remains with the complaints procedures of 
individual criminal justice agencies. If dissatisfied with the outcome of such procedures, 
members of the public can report the matter to their MP who can.refer it to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration for investigation. The new Victims and 
Witnesses Commissioner created under the Act is charged with monitoring the 
operation of the Code, although it has not been said that discontented victims can 
complain directly to him/her. It is envisaged that victims can take their complaints to the 
statutory Victims’ Advisory Panel, but neither the Panel nor the Commissioner have
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powers of investigation or redress51, although the Commissioner is being touted as a 
‘champion’ of victims’ ‘rights’ (Home Office, 2006c).
As such, the test of any ‘rights’ under the Code may again lie in their enforceability, and 
on this we find ourselves in the same position as the Victim’s Charter of 1996. If these 
provisions are rights, it seems they are still only externally enforceable. Indeed -  on this  ^
point -  it is notable that the judiciary are not included as parties with any obligations 
under the Code. The substantive text of the Code refers only to the ‘right’ to make a 
victim personal statement and the right to a review of a decision from the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority. The latter seems to be another ‘service right’, the 
former sounds more participatory. As under the Victim’s Charter, parties within the CJS 
are obliged under the Code to ‘take account’ of a VPS when making decisions; although 
Edwards (2004) argues that it is difficult to clarify exactly what form of participation is 
afforded through the VPS.
Victims are to be consulted under the Code regarding their opinions mainly in relation 
to the release of serious offenders. To this end, the Code requires the probation service 
to seek out and pass on the ‘representations’ made by victims (of mentally disordered 
offenders and road traffic offenders who intended to cause physical injury or damage to 
property) to those responsible for the prisoner’ s/patient’s release. Parole Boards must 
take account of victims’ representations in conditions placed on offenders’ licence and 
supervision. The police are required to record any ‘views’ a victim expresses on 
applying for special measures, although there is no mention of a CPS obligation to 
consider such views. Whilst the Code for Crown Prosecutors (CPS, 2004) maintains 
that victims ‘views’ are relevant when deciding on the public interest test or the 
acceptance of pleas, it is surprising that this was not also spelt out in the statutory Code.
Overall, whilst the Code is grounded in statute, enforcement mechanisms remain largely 
the same as if that were not the case. Furthermore, the Code is still mainly concerned 
with ‘service rights’. The same is true of the proposed Witnesses’ Charter (Home 
Office, 2005g) and the draft CPS Children’s Charter aimed at child victims and 
witnesses (CPS, 2005a). Both abstain from the term ‘rights’ and are modelled around 
legitimate expectations, enforced through complaints procedures external to the criminal
51 The Parliamentary Commissioner can recommend agencies provide redress.
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justice process.52 The Witnesses’ Charter talks of ‘obtaining [victims’] views’ on any 
assistance they require when giving evidence (para.3.10) whilst the Children’s Charter 
ensures the CPS “will listen carefully to children’s views” (para.2.5) and “consult 
victims for their view” (para.3.16) when a defendant offers a guilty plea on the day of 
trial.
A more significant role for the ‘views’ x>f victims was hinted at in the recent 
consultation paper on the introduction of victims’ advocates53 to represent homicide 
survivors directly in court. Whilst on the face of it the advocate is essentially an 
extension to the VPS scheme, the consultation emphasises “the importance of seeking 
the view of victims in prosecution decisions” (Home Office, 2005b: p. 12). It also sees 
the victims’ advocate expressing victims’ ‘views’ to the prosecutor at the pre-trial stage 
“so they can be taken into account”. This seems to imply something closer to giving 
these victims party status because, in-keeping with (he understanding of this concept 
given earlier in this chapter54, victims are not only consulted, but have mechanisms in 
place whereby the fruits of such consultation are clearly presented to the court for the 
court’s consideration.
Examples of issues on which victims may want to express views -  either themselves or 
through their representation -  are given as: bail (and conditions); withdrawal or 
downgrading of charge; discontinuance of criminal proceedings; applications for 
reporting restrictions and trial management matters. This list of issues on which a 
victim’s views might be relevant expands upon any seen previously in official 
publications. It still excludes sentencing -  which we included in our category of ‘non- 
fundamental’ reform -  but this may indicate increased acceptance of a right to more 
consultative participation for victims.
When the possibility of producing a Victim’s Code of Practice was first announced in 
the Justice for All White Paper (Home Office, 2002) Jackson (2003) noted that the 
proposals were far more ambitious in affording victims service rights than procedural 
rights. Jackson’s conclusion was that true ‘justice for all’ would be grounded in a far
52 Although ‘legitimate expectations’ were originally conceived as legal obligations enforceable 
though ombudsmen or judicial actors (JUSTICE, 1998).
53 The term ‘advocate’ is used to describe these lawyers in official documentation, even though 
they will include barristers, see Chapter 2 n.9.
54 See page 57.
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more explicit ‘rights-centred’ approach, which the government was clearly unwilling to 
take. Subsequent developments outlined above seem to support this conclusion.
3.2.2.10 -The way forward: victim rights
The initial point to be made about ‘victim-centred’ criminal justice and victim rights is 
that in the modem climate it seems one can not have one without the other. As Rock 
(2004) notes, the language of rights is not going away. In the last section we saw a 
resurgence of ‘victimogogic’ study on services afforded to victims. Here, we see a 
parallel concentration on service rights including rights to information and respectful 
treatment from criminal justice personnel. We also see that much of the ‘rights’ debate 
has focused on sentencing rather than the criminal trial.
In many cases, the reason for such preoccupation with services and rights outside the 
trial process seems to be the concern that victim rights will prejudice defendants. We 
have seen the counter-argument to the effect that such a ‘zero sum game’ need not exist, 
but this is rarely applied to the trial process other than in relation to service rights. As 
such, this thesis attempts to plug a gap in the literature in that it will problematise the 
content of victim rights beyond service rights to discuss affording victims procedural 
rights within trials.
We might draw a distinction between ‘internally enforceable’ and ‘externally 
enforceable’ rights. Internally enforceable rights would be defended from within the 
criminal justice procedure by judicial actors. These might take the form of separate 
proceedings -  including trials within trials -  but could simply involve judges taking 
responsibility for ensuring victim rights are upheld. The second form of rights are those 
externally enforceable through complaints mechanisms by criminal justice 
administrators or other figures, like the parliamentary commissioner for administration 
or formal complaints submitted to the CPS, the courts service (and individual courts) or 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission. In this author’s view, ‘internally 
enforceable’ rights are most conducive to a truly victim-centred system, because they 
will be more respected and immediate to the work of criminal justice personnel and 
because it means victims do not need to go outside the system to find redress.
The issue of redress is clearly very important here. In the most straightforward cases the 
expectation would be that in a victim-centred system judicial actors would address any 
perceived conflict with victim rights during the course of procedures, the redress being
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the reversal of such conflict. Hence, if a victim were the subject of excessively hostile 
cross-examination (see below) a judge would step in and instruct the questioning lawyer 
to mitigate the approach. Of course real cases are rarely this straightforward, which 
raises the issue of whether such a system would lead to endless trials-within-trials in the 
same way as Sanders’ model of maximising freedom. This also brings with it the 
question of what sort of redress a victim can expect if a trial is not conducted in a  ^
manner conducive to his or her rights; would this lead to an appeal? Or complaints 
against the relevant judge? These are matters to be addressed in Chapter 7 but -  from 
the outset -  it is clear that any such systems are not yet forthcoming and, indeed, 
presently the judiciary are excluded from obligations under the statutory Code, meaning 
there is no emphasis (or pressure) on them to defend the rights of victims in trials or to 
adapt their occupational cultures (at the level of profession) in favour of doing so. As far 
as judicial complaints are concerned, the only mechanism presently available is a direct 
complaint to the Lord Chancellor; which at the moment is a little known procedure that 
lacks user-friendliness and feedback to the victims or other complainants themselves. 
As such, this thesis will contribute an assessment of the possibilities of incorporating 
internally enforceable rights within the trial procedure.
As to the content of those rights, we have concluded that nothing in the literature rules 
out the legitimacy of a general right to consultative participation for victims -  including 
consultation over sentencing -  in addition to less controversial ‘service rights’, which 
we will deconstruct in the next section. As with consultation provisions the same actors 
make the same decisions -  simply basing those decisions on more information/opinion 
-  the system undergoes no fundamental change. Given that the ‘objectivity’ of any 
factor is questionable, there is no reason to assume that the opinions of victims will lead 
to injustice. In fact, we have seen that the very notion of a zero sum game between 
victim and defendant rights may be a political construction.
So far my suggestions have broadly constituted non-fundamental reform, as defined 
earlier in this chapter. In relation to reforms of a more fundamental nature -  including 
giving victims decision making power -  it is almost impossible to drawn conclusions as 
there is a widespread lack of evidence as to whether or not these would be better at 
achieving victim-centeredness.55 This is largely because reforms of a more fundamental 
nature have not been tried within the context of criminal justice. This means we have no
55 Although again we can note Brienen and Hoegen’s (2000) view that converting from an 
adversarial to an inquisitorial system would not necessarily be ‘better’ for victims.
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real indication as to whether, if given widespread decision making power (for 
example)56, victims would enforce punitive or vindictive procedures (when deciding on 
prosecution decisions) or punishments (when deciding on sentencing) on defendants. 
Nevertheless, the work on restorative justice seems to indicate that this might not be the 
case (Shapland et ah, 2006).
I also wish to highlight Erez’s view that the participation in sentencing could bring 
therapeutic benefits to the victim. The therapeutic benefit accrued to victims is also one 
of several ‘competing rationales’ of participation spoken of by Edwards (2004). The 
notion that the criminal justice process should bring therapeutic benefits seems 
consistent with the idea that victims are ‘at the heart’ of this process. Yet there is little 
debate on the therapeutic impact of the substantive trial process57, specifically the 
evidential process. Consequently, Chapter 5 will argue that therapeutically benefiting 
victims by allowing them to give evidence in an unrestricted manner should be a goal of 
a victim-centred system.
3.2.3 -  Facilities, services and support for victims
Arguably, the grievances of victims have less to do with the controversial issue of 
‘participation rights’ and more to do with a lack of basic services afforded to them. This 
section will deconstruct the notion of service rights in order to identify precisely what 
services victims need from the system.
3.2.3.1 -  Early studies
One of the first examinations of victims in the criminal justice system was Maguire and 
Bennett’s (1982) study on burglary victims. Their findings indicate that the majority of 
victims were more concerned with the ‘public relations’ or ‘service provision’ of the 
police than their investigative role, albeit possibly because they could only judge police 
effectiveness by the former. The study is limited to burglary victims and their 
interaction with the police, but does indicate that service, support and understanding 
received from the system are very important to victims. This may indicate that non­
fundamental reform may be sufficient to achieve victim-centeredness. In fact -  despite 
our earlier criticisms -  it suggests that Ashworth’s more restrictive notion of ‘service
56 Beyond the choice o f whether or not to give evidence.
57 Although we will note in Chapter 5 the recent development o f ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ 
(Rottman and Casey, 1999).
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rights’ may be all victims require. Nevertheless, to take such a view is to assume that 
‘victim-centeredness’ is synonymous with ‘victim satisfaction’, whereas the argument 
of this thesis is that putting victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice also necessitates 
decision makers taking account of information and opinions provided by victims, 
guaranteeing them certain rights and remedies and indeed affording them decision 
making power on issues like the choice of whether or not to give evidence.
Similar sentiments were echoed in Shapland et al.’s (1985) Victims in the Criminal 
Justice System. The aim of this study was to follow victims of physical assaults, 
robberies and sexual assaults though the justice system and report on their experiences 
and attitudes. The project indicated that victim satisfaction with the police dropped as 
time went on, owing to a failures to live up to victims’ expectations of being kept 
informed as the case progressed (service rights again). Victims were also dissatisfied 
with the police when there was disagreement between the two as to whether a 
prosecution should be pursued. Victims tended to view the giving of a witness statement 
as a chance to indicate their views on the matter at the time. Officers, though, saw the 
statement as a watershed indicating victims’ support for the prosecution. Victims did 
not expect or wish to make specific decisions on prosecution, but their expectation was 
one of consultative participation on the matter. This goes beyond Ashworth’s ‘service 
rights’ but is a right we have accepted in our earlier discussion.
One of the main conclusions from Shapland et al. was that the expectations of victims 
were not matched by the limited regard paid to them in the criminal justice system. 
Victims desired respect and appreciation but at court no one was available to keep 
victims informed or tell them what to do. The listing system employed by most courts 
“did not seem to be designed for the benefit of lay participants” but was intended to 
minimise inconvenience to the court (Shapland et al., 1985: p.76). This resulted in 
victims waiting around for extended periods in buildings lacking the most basic 
facilities.
As such, it is argued that one aspect of the ‘service rights’ afforded to victims should be 
the right to minimal inconvenience achieved through careful consultation before the 
listing of cases. This remains a non-fundamental reform, because the system of listing 
cases through a central administrative office at each court is preserved58, but becomes
58 See pages 362.
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based around the consultative participation of victims, perhaps to the extent that listings 
officers communicate with victims directly.
The study concluded that a victim-orientated system need not look significantly 
different from the existing one. Victims were not wishing to run the system, or to be 
endowed with decision making power. Rather, victims expressed the desire to be better 
informed, consulted over decisions to drop or vary charges and treated with respect. 
Shapland et al. noted that the changes required to achieve this were more attitudinal 
than structural. This represents a significant endorsement of the idea that victim- 
centeredness can be achieved without fundamentally changing the system, whilst still 
accepting consultative participation. It also indicates that addressing the occupational 
cultures of criminal justice practitioners in particular -  and the wider legal community 
in general -  is crucial.
Of course, we must install the caveat here that this is now a fairly old study that 
predates much of the more recent rhetoric and political action regarding victims. Thus 
we might question whether victims would indeed advocate more fundamental reforms if 
consulted on the matter now. No such studies or consultations are available.
Further light was shed on the position of witnesses attending court by Rock’s (1990) 
detailed analysis on the place of the witness in the social world of a typical English 
Crown Court.59 Rock’s study is limited in that his focus was on witnesses as opposed to 
victims per se and was based on a single court, hence there is little discussion on how 
different parts of the criminal justice system come together and cooperate to assist 
victims. Nevertheless, Rock’s conclusion showed that witnesses were kept at the 
margins of the court’s social community and received little support, because the 
criminal justice professionals were afraid of being professionally compromised:.
“They [witnesses] are confused and confusing, often distressed, a threat to the 
insiders who will not and cannot comfort them” (Rock, 1990: p.283).
Rock’s findings again seem to indicate that adapting the criminal justice system to 
provide support and services to victims is largely a cultural issue.
59 For an examination o f services provided by fledgling victim support schemes outside the 
criminal justice process, see Maguire and Corbett (1987).
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The Shapland et al. project was followed in the late 1980s by a similar study of 
Belfast’s magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court (Jackson et al., 1991). The groups 
under investigation included witnesses, especially those who had been called to give 
evidence as victims of crime. The project also sought to investigate public perceptions 
of court facilities by combining courtroom observations with an interview programme 
and a public opinion survey.
.1 «
Jackson et al. produced similar findings to those of Shapland and her colleagues. 
Victims complained about the lack of information regarding their case, and the court 
procedure. They also expressed unease at having to wait with defendants. Victims 
expressed extra dissatisfaction when called to court in cases where defendants changed 
their plea to guilty. Witnesses generally found the process of giving evidence 
uncomfortable and forbidding.
Jackson et al. concluded with a number of recommendations; including the 
improvement of facilities and the provision of an information desk and what would now 
be recognised as a Witness Service. In the courtrooms, Jackson et al. recommend 
improving the acoustics and dividing witnesses from defendants and their families. It 
was also said that the witness box should not be positioned so the witness had to turn in 
one direction to hear counsel’s questions and in another direction to address the judge. 
The study does not make any indications regarding victims’ participation or 
consultation in the criminal justice process, the changes suggested essentially 
amounting to service rights.
3.2.3.2 -  Later studies •
The report of the JUSTICE Committee (1998) made recommendations concerning 
victims at all stages of the criminal process, based on evidence submitted by various 
organisations and agencies of the criminal justice system and on a survey of all the 
magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts in England and Wales. The survey indicated clear 
cultural separations at the courts as to “what should be provided for victim and witness 
care and what was not necessary” (Shapland and Bell, 1998: p.546). One cultural ‘blind 
spot’ was the need to pass information about victims and witnesses between agencies. 
Generally, courts accepted the benefits of physically separating victims and witnesses, 
but were less savvy when it came to (arguably more basic) human responses to these 
issues; such as preventing intimidation through security and watchfulness (ibid).
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In the main JUSTICE report, the Committee stated:
“[Cjriminal justice will have no integrity if it does not recognise and consider the
role of victims and the services it needs to offer victims” (JUSTICE, 1998: p.22).
Whilst considerable progress in the treatment of victims was noted compared to ten 
years before, in the view o( the Committee, present levels of service and support 
available to victims was still insufficient, whilst the responsibilities placed on victims 
within the system caused inconvenience and stress. As such, the Committee advocated a 
‘service standards’ approach be taken towards victims within the criminal justice 
system, backed by a Code of Practice.
The Committee felt that victims should never be burdened with prosecution decisions, 
which we noted earlier seems an acceptable limit of such reforms. Nevertheless, the 
report recommended that vulnerable victims should be consulted over matters like bail 
and the effects of giving evidence. The decision maker should listen carefully to 
victims, but such consultation may or may not influence decision making and it would 
be important not to raise victims’ expectations. The report maintained there should be 
no duty on the CPS to consult all victims. In particular, however, those making 
prosecution decisions should have access to information about the effects of the offence 
on the victim.
At court, the Committee recommended that -  in line with the Bar Council’s revised 
Code of Conduct -  prosecutors should introduce themselves to witnesses before the 
trial, especially to victim witnesses. The report also called for national minimum 
standards as to the facilities available at court buildings.60 In particular, the report 
recommended that a Witness Service at all courts should be financed from government 
funds and become one of the “core functions of running of courts” (p.73).
Overall, the JUSTICE Committee report spelt out recommendations for a criminal 
justice system based on service standards, backed by national Codes of Practice with a 
statutory Victims Commissioner as the ultimate point of complaint. The Committee was 
clearly in favour of much extended services, support and facilities being offered to 
victims to crime by the court. It is also clear that they entertain the notion of
60 The absence of any nationally published survey on facilities at court buildings in recent years 
is perhaps indicative of their real level of priority in policy-making circles.
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consultative participation -  at least in relation to probation decisions post-sentence -  
and the voluntary provision of information to judges regarding sentence.
Lord Auld discussed victims in his report on the Workings of Criminal Courts (Auld, 
2001). Auld framed his analysis not just in relation to victims, but all members of the 
public. This may betray an important debate; whether instead of just victims we should 
be considering the wider implications of ‘public-orientated’ changes to address an 
overprofessionalised criminal justice system (Christi, 1977) or whether the true focus of 
policy-making in this area is actually the public in general rather than victims in 
particular. These debates will be returned to in the next chapter.
Auld’s report noted that the scheduling task of matching the right High Court judge to 
the right case ‘distorted’ the system in a number of ways “that are unjust and upsetting 
to defendants, witnesses, victims and others involved in the process” (p.239). Similarly, 
Auld cites the “personal strain and burden on everyone else involved, not least the 
defendant, the victim and witnesses” (p.203) as a disadvantage of trying complex fraud 
cases by jury. Auld also concedes that some witnesses at court are forced to wait for 
extended periods and are then ‘bewildered’ at the course a case might take; for example, 
when prosecutors accept a plea to a lesser offence:
“For witnesses who are not victims, it is bad enough;, for those who are -  those 
who rightly consider the process to be in part a vindication of their suffering -  it 
must be worse” (p.498).
Auld argues that such concerns pose a serious risk of alienating the public from the 
criminal justice process,, particularly victims.
As a solution, Auld advocates more robust management and preparation of cases so that 
trials run to a more predictable plan. The report also calls for clear understandings to be 
established at the beginning of a case as to who is responsible for keeping the victim 
informed as to the progress of the case. This may indicate a new (service) right victims 
can expect, that as much as possible will have been done in advance to ensure a case 
runs smoothly.
Nevertheless, Auld dismisses the notion of consulting victims over decisions. In support 
of this position, the report cites arguments that such consultation would place great 
pressure on them, leaving them open to intimidation and raising false expectations. 
Auld also believes that victims lack the necessary objectivity and ‘knowledge or
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experience’ to be consulted in this way and that “at the pre-trial and trial stages of the 
process it has yet to be established that the alleged victim is in truth a victim” (p.500).
To offer a critique, we saw earlier that concerns about placing pressure on victims are 
legitimate, although in this author’s view it is doubtful that merely consulting victims 
would cause undue upset, especially in light of Shapland et al.’s findings that some 
victims want to be consulted, over prosecution decisions. Intimidation is a legitimate 
concern, but one which is dependent on individual (probably unusual, see below) cases. 
We have already critiqued the notion of ‘objective factors’ on which to base decisions, 
whereas it is difficult to see what ‘knowledge or experience’ a victim needs to form an 
opinion as to whether they would like a case to proceed. Finally, surely the return to 
past notions of the ‘alleged victim’ is a step backwards.
Auld’s dismissal of victims’ procedural involvement is based on concerns about their 
‘vindictiveness’ and ‘vengefulness’ and is basically a due process argument. In these 
respects the report takes a rather narrow view, providing no evidence to support this 
characterisation of victims. As such, Auld is once again advocating service rights and 
hinting at the existence of the zero sum game. The report dismisses ‘more radical 
suggestions’ like giving victims party status, which I classify as non-fundamental 
reform. Like Brienen and Hoegen (2000) Auld argues that the continental partie civile 
or auxiliary prosecutor models affords few practical advantages to victims. Unlike the 
‘vengefulness’ points noted above, this latter argument does appear to be made out.
3.2.3.3 -  Victimisation and witness surveys
In recent years, victims’ experiences of support mechanisms have been included in the 
British Crime Survey. The 1998 sweep confirmed that the key factor influencing police 
referral to Victim Support was offence type; with burglary victims and victims of 
violence the most likely to be referred (Maguire and Kynch, 2000a, 2000b). Domestic 
violence cases were referred to Victim Support more frequently than had traditionally 
been the case. Contact with Victim Support was highest amongst victims who said the 
impact of crime had been greatest, and 58% thought such support was helpful or very 
helpful, which rose to 64% in 2002/2003 (Simmons and Dodd, 2003). The 2002/2003 
BCS also shows that most victims (75%) do not want advice or support. Nevertheless, 
only one fifth of victims who reported an incident to the police and wanted more 
information actually received it, mainly cases of burglary and violence. Of the victims
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who reported incidents to the police, 6% recalled contact with Victims Support 
(Ringham and Salisbury, 2004).
The International Crime Victimisation Survey has been carried out in a total of 54 
countries. The latest available data from 1996 reveal that only a small percentage of 
victims of more serious crimes (burglary or violence) received any specialist help or 
support from a specialised agency. Less than 10% had received such help in any 
country, although many such victims would have appreciated it (Van Dijk, 2000).
Two other key sources of information are the Witness Satisfaction Surveys (WSS) 
(Whitehead, 2001; Angle et. al., 2002) and the Vulnerable and Intimidated Witness 
Surveys (Hamlyn et al., 2004a, 2004b).61 The surveys were commissioned as a means of 
measuring the success of recent policy measures. Both surveys employed the method of 
approaching and recruiting witnesses directly at magistrates’ and Crown Courts. These 
witnesses were then interviewed at a later date about their experiences and views.
The 2000 and 2002 Witness Satisfaction Surveys (WSS) revealed high levels of 
satisfaction with the police amongst witnesses, with 88% of those questioned being 
‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with their treatment in 2000 and 89% in 2002. Satisfaction 
tended to be greater when respondents had been told they might be called as witnesses 
in court. Nevertheless, only a minority of these witnesses were kept informed about the 
progress of their case; 26% of victims and 16% of non-victims in 2000 and 19% of all 
witnesses in 2002. As with previous studies, perceptions of courteous treatment by the 
police was strongly linked with witnesses’ overall satisfaction. In 2000 90% of 
witnesses claimed the police had treated them courteously and 92% (93% in 2002) of 
these witnesses felt satisfied. Satisfaction with the police seemed to be linked to 
whether witnesses felt they had been kept informed about the progress of their case.
More recently, the BCS has shown that in cases the police came to know about, victims 
were fairly or very satisfied with their handling of the case in 58% of incidents. 
Witnesses were satisfied with the way the police handled the (most recent) matter in 
59% of incidents in the last 12 months where they had contact with the police (Walker 
et al., 2006). Both these figures remained relatively unchanged from the 2004/05 survey 
(Nicholas et al., 2005) and from 2003/04 (Dodd et al., 2004). In addition, the BCS 
shows that only 32% of victims felt they had been kept well informed about ‘their’ case
61 Discussion of the latter will be saved for our section on the evidential process below.
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by the police in 2004/005 (Allen et al., 2006), a rise from 30% the year before (Allen et 
al, 2005). The BCS also indicates that victim satisfaction with the police is linked to the 
outcome of their investigation, specifically whether an offender is charged and/or 
victims’ property recovered (Allen et al., 2005).
The WSS surveys also found that 35% of victims had contact with Victim Support in 
2000 and 39% in 2002. Such (contact was higher amongst victims of violence, sexual 
crime or (in 2002) harassment compared with other offences. Overall, in the 2000 
survey 88% of victims who had contact with Victim Support were ‘very’ or ‘fairly 
satisfied’ with the service they received. This dropped slightly to 83% in 2002.
At court, 80% of prosecution witnesses and 72% of defence witnesses remembered 
receiving some information about the process beforehand in the 2000 WSS, mainly 
through leaflets. Receiving information about court visits had a significant impact on 
witnesses’ overall satisfaction. Information for all witnesses was lacking in relation to 
how long the whole visit to court would take and what to bring to court.
Between the 2000 and 2002 WSS the number of witnesses having contact with the 
Witness Service went from 51% in the first survey to 81% in the second. This can be 
explained by the establishment during the intervening period of a Witness Service at all 
magistrates’ courts. The surveys also showed that 10% of witnesses had a pre-court 
familiarisation visit before the day of the trial in both 2000 and 2002 (12% of victims in 
2000). On the day itself, the 2002 survey shows that a further 57% of witnesses had the 
opportunity to look around the court before proceedings. Child witnesses and victims 
were more likely to have a pre-trial familiarisation visit compared to other witnesses.
Overall, in the 2000 sweep, 17% of witnesses had to wait more than four hours to give 
evidence (9% of victims) although most waited only up to one hour (31%). Forty three 
percent of victims had to wait up to one hour and 28% waited up to two hours in 2000. 
The 2002 survey suggested that waiting times had increased slightly. In 2000, 73% of 
prosecution and defence witness were put in separate waiting rooms, which rose to 83% 
in 2002. Again, waiting times were linked with witness satisfaction.
The Witness Satisfaction Surveys are perhaps of greater use to us in the present thesis 
than the BCS, as they cover support provided to victims at courts themselves. 
Furthermore, the methodological drawbacks of surveys like the BCS are well known 
(see Maguire, 2002; Criminal Statistics Review Group, 2006). We might be particularly
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concerned about the accuracy of respondents’ memory, especially if they were having 
multiple visits by various people at the time, as the affect may be to underestimate or 
indeed possibly overestimate victims’ need for support. Crime surveys may also 
underestimate violent crime, especially domestic violence. Of course, if crime is being 
underestimated, then again we are also likely to underestimate the demand for services 
and support for such victims. In the case of the WSS, one obvious concern is that this is  ^
aimed only at witnesses, not 'victims. As such, this survey does not tell us whether 
victims are coming to court other than as witnesses -  say to observe proceedings -  and 
whether they are then being afforded services. The survey also cannot identify services 
offered to victims prior to the date of trial -  such as pre-trial court visits -  in cases 
where a victim’s evidence is ultimately not required. It remains to be seen how the new 
Witnesses and Victims Experience Survey (WAVES) will address these problems.
As noted earlier, one of the goals of this research is to apply ethnographic techniques to 
victims in criminal justice, because these methods provide a depth and subtlety of 
information missed by wide-ranging surveying techniques on which we have had to rely 
(certainly in England and Wales) for nearly a decade.
3.2.3.4 -  A seachange in victim support mechanisms?
Within the UK, Maguire and Shapland (1997) note that support and assistance for 
victims has traditionally been provided by generalist voluntary organisations. 
Nevertheless, with Victim Support achieving greater official attention and acceptance 
(Rock, 1990) such organisations in general have become more institutionalised (Van 
Dijk, 1988). Maguire and Shapland 1997 argue that this brings the benefits of increased 
training and resources but may trade away the advantages of a ‘hands on’ voluntary 
spirit. In addition the No Witness No Justice report from the Inter-Agency Working 
Group on Witnesses (2003) galvanised moves to ensure agencies within and beyond the 
criminal justice system began working together to support victims; the so-called multi­
agency approach.
Most recently, the government’s consultation on proposed reform to state compensation 
(Home Office, 2005d) has advocated the removal of small payments to victims of 
violence receiving injuries which are not ‘serious’ and instead providing them with the 
immediate practical and emotional assistance (no further details are given) we are told
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the BCS suggests they require.62 The consultation proposes the creation of ‘Victim Care 
Units’, which would operate either as a government funded expansion of the services 
currently provided by the voluntary sector, a police-voluntary sector partnership or as a 
new system of police-led units. These reforms could represent quite significant changes 
in the way victims receive support and information in this country.
3.23.5 -  The way forward: providing facilities, services and support to victims of crime
The above literature demonstrates victims’ need for a range of services and information 
during the criminal justice process, albeit even the more recent investigations continue 
to maintain that these needs are not being met (Shapland, 2003). Above all, victims 
appear to appreciate basic courteous treatment63, which is a matter of occupational 
culture amongst individual criminal justice professions, the local culture of individual 
courts and, in a wider sense, instilling such treatment within the wider legal culture64, 
which is also of great relevance to the issue of victims’ consultative participation in 
decision making.
Hence, providing for the needs of many victims may be a case of practicality and 
funding in the provision of facilities, and of adapting cultures at multiple levels. Both 
issues fall under the banner of non-fundamental reform which -  following our previous 
section -  would be backed by ‘service rights’. Unlike most existing literature, this thesis 
will examine the cultures of the criminal justice work force and the practical 
resourcing/operation of victim services and how they relate to the trial process. In any 
case, it seems that some potential ‘service rights’ have not received specific attention or 
analysis, such as a right not to be inconvenienced.
Whilst some commentators avoid going further, others make a case for victims’ 
participation; especially consultative participation on various issues, including 
prosecution and probation decisions. Whilst restorative justice is not the solution being 
discussed in this thesis, the support for (fundamental) reforms of this nature at the very 
least indicate a need to go beyond service rights if victim-centeredness is to be achieved 
in the existing criminal justice system (see Dignan, 2005). As such, it is submitted that
62 Although, as the BCS never asked victims whether they would prefer receiving such support 
to small amounts of compensation, this is a questionable conclusion. •
63 Albeit satisfaction with the police is related to outcomes of investigation (Allen et al., 2005).
64 Chapters 6 and 7 will offer discussions of how these different cultures may be related.
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the true victim-centred system must go further than Ashworth’s ‘service rights’ to 
embrace the wider range of ‘non-fundamental reforms’. The Auld report in particular is 
against this course of action, but bases its argument on an unsubstantiated ‘vengeful’ 
view of the victim. That said, we can agree with the report to the extent that it provides 
sound argument for why some fundamental reform may not assist victims; including the
provision of widespread decision making power.
. j *
That said, perhaps in drawing such conclusions we miss an important opportunity. In 
direct contrast to Auld, it may be that truly putting victims at the heart of the criminal 
justice system means asking the victims themselves whether they need or want ‘service 
rights’, ‘non-fundamental reform’, ‘fundamental reform’, or some combination of the 
three, we have seen that this has not been done at all recently. Of course the difficulty 
with this position -  as indeed with all victim decision making or consultation -  is that it 
leaves victims open to intimidation. It also means that defendants in similar positions 
may be treated differently, although again if this system is to be grounded in the notion 
that decision makers should base all their decisions on all available information, this is 
not necessarily an affront to due process.
What we can say is that much of our recent knowledge concerning victim services and 
support derives from quantitative surveying techniques. Almost all the information we 
have since the widespread extension of support mechanisms like the Witness Service 
comes from these sources. Once exception is a doctoral thesis by Tapley (2002) that 
followed victims through the criminal justice system and broadly concluded that they 
were now generally seen as consumers of that process, albeit the services offered to 
them were still limited in a number of respects. This notwithstanding, our general 
reliance on the Witness Satisfaction and other surveys is problematic, not least because 
the WSS concentrates on witnesses, some of whom are victims (see Jackson, 2004). 
This thesis is concerned with the position of victims in their own rights’ when giving 
evidence.
As such, there seems to be considerable scope for more ethnographic examination of 
these issues. This will be amongst the first ethnographic studies to examine the support 
afforded to victims at court in the increasingly professional, multi-agency, context.
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3.2.4 -  Victims giving evidence and vulnerable and intimidated victims and 
witnesses in criminal justice and in court
As previously argued, victims’ ‘rights’ relating to evidence are seldom debated, and 
hence in this section it is hoped to identify specific needs to be addressed in a victim- 
centred system.
.) e
3.2.4.1 -  Identifying the problem
Giving evidence can often be a difficult and perplexing experience. A courtroom is an 
unfamiliar environment for most people (Hamlyn et al., 2004a, 2004b). The evidence is 
often elicited in an unnatural manner; with witnesses told to present their answers 
towards the bench or jury whilst simultaneously receiving questions from another 
direction (Rock, 1993) and often having their answers directed for them by the manner 
and content of those questions (Danet et al., 1980;1 Luchjenbroers, 199665; Ellison, 
2002). Witnesses are also required to present the information at an unnatural speed and 
volume; persistently being interrupted in their flow and asked to slow down or speed up 
or raise their voice (Shapland et al., 1985). In addition, victims are asked to cope with 
unfamiliar concepts, like hearsay.
Many of these practices reflect conventions steeped in the traditions of advocacy. 
Carlen (1976) notes how judicial proceedings in the magistrates’ courts are facilitated 
by “the systematic manipulation of temporal, spatial and linguistic conventions” by 
professionals (p.128). The assumption that victims may be interrupted whilst giving 
evidence but lawyers should not be interrupted, the notion that victims should face the 
bench and the idea that there is a ‘correct speed’ at which to give evidence are therefore 
all deeply engrained cultural working practices. Crucially to the present argument, 
however, they are not fundamental to adversarial evidence, certainly not in terms of 
written rules of procedure, conduct, or laws.
Some victims find this process especially difficult. This may occur when a case 
involves extremely personal or sensitive information, or members of the victim’s 
family. The victim may be afraid and intimidated by the defendant or supporters in the 
court’s public gallery. In serious cases (or even not so serious cases) victims may 
simply find it upsetting to recount their experiences in public. Also, characteristics of
65 Luchjenbroers’s analysis is based on a single trial, but provides a fascinating insight into how 
lawyers can use their questions to elicit specific information.
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specific victims might make them vulnerable; because they are disabled or have speech 
or learning difficulties, because they are young or just especially nervous individuals.
Rape victims were amongst the first witnesses to be recognised as facing particular 
challenges whilst giving evidence (Holmstrom and Burgess, 1978). Temkin (1987) 
suggests that giving evidence may be the most traumatic element of being a victim aside 
from the actual offence, a point echoed by Lees (2002). Temkin (1999) showed that 
reaching the trial stage might itself be difficult for these victims because of the poor 
response by police.
Victims of domestic abuse may also be especially vulnerable or intimidated whilst 
giving evidence. Cretney and Davis (1997) give the example of Linda Roberts, who 
attended magistrates’ court committal proceedings only to be left alone in a waiting 
room, fearful that the defendant would find her. At the subsequent trial, Roberts found 
herself unable to go through with her evidence.
Like Temkin, Cretney and Davis criticise the attitude taken by the police (and 
prosecutors and sentencers) towards such victims. Their argument is that police are 
unable to look beyond the relationship that exists (or existed) between complainant and 
accused and assume the complainant victim will withdraw support. Whilst this is true of 
many domestic violence victims, the authors argue that this ‘blaming’ of victims 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, bom of a negative and disinterested police attitude.
Temkin (1987) and Cretney and Davis (1997) therefore emphasise the role of 
occupational cultures as a key prerequisite to victims’ discomfort in giving evidence. 
This is another key argument of this chapter, that often the problems faced by victims 
and witnesses are not based on the adversarial model per se, but on the attitudes of those 
within it -  especially the advocates who elicit evidence -  and which may reflect 
enshrined principles of a wider legal culture on one end of the scale, but also localised 
‘court’ or CPS office culture at the other extreme.
In 1998 the Speaking Up for Justice report responded to growing calls for something to 
be done to assist vulnerable and intimidated witnesses giving evidence. Appended to the 
report was a review compiled by Elliott of the relevant literature. The review discussed 
the difficulties inherent in'defining ‘vulnerable and intimidated witnesses’. Based on 
distinctions drawn from Healey (1995) a ‘combined’ approach was advocated for such 
definitions. Witnesses could be ‘vulnerable’ by reason of personal characteristics
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(disability, mental and physical disorders) but also for wider circumstantial reasons 
(being related to or involved with the defendant). The report concluded that witness 
‘intimidation’ could occur in two ways, through specific victims being intimidated in 
individual cases -  with a view to preventing them from giving evidence -  or through a 
general atmosphere of intimidation created to dissuade residents in wider communities 
from involving themselves with the authorities.
Elliott’s review suggests that victim intimidation is more widespread than the 
intimidation of non-victim witnesses. Women were more at risk from intimidation than 
men and intimidation is more likely when the witness knows the offender, who in most 
cases perpetrates the intimidation. Intimidation was especially prevalent in cases of 
rape, domestic violence, racial harassment and crimes against sexual minorities.66 A 
review of the 1994 British Crime Survey suggested that verbal abuse and threats were 
the most common forms of intimidation. A Police Research Group Study (Maynard, 
1994) further indicated that the two most likely times for a witness to be intimidated 
were soon after the offence and at the time the witness appears to give evidence.
The 1998 British Crime Survey has also shed light on victim and witness intimidation 
(Tarling et al., 2000). This confirmed that female victims were especially prone to 
intimidation, as were victims of violence. In the majority of cases it was the original 
offenders or their friends and family perpetrating the intimidation. Three quarters of 
reported incidents of intimidation were verbal and only 8% were -  in the victim’s view 
-  intended to prevent him/her giving evidence. Overall, 8% of victims had suffered 
some form of intimidation, 15% when the victim knew the offender.
The 2002 Witness Satisfaction Survey (Angle et. al., 2002) indicated that 26% of 
witnesses feel intimidated by an individual and 21% by giving evidence. Intimidation 
by individuals was especially prominent among victims (27%), women (26%) and child 
witnesses (30%). Overall, 42% of all witnesses and 51% of victims were intimidated by 
either the process or an individual. 56% of witnesses were intimidated by defendants 
and 35% by ‘official sources’, including lawyers, police, court staff, judges and 
magistrates.
The JUSTICE (1998) report identified a class of ‘vulnerable victims or victims with 
specific needs’ including: victims of domestic violence; sexual assault; racial abuse;
66 The review could not encompass all research on the vulnerability of children.
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victims with learning or mental disabilities; victims who had suffered intimidation and 
the relatives of victims of homicide. During evidence, the Committee thought it strange 
that criminal justice practitioners considered it necessity to see the witnesses ‘live’ in 
the witness box, where they might be intimidated by the defendant. Again, this is a 
cultural convention rather than a necessity. As such, the report was in favour of 
screening off adult and child victims or the giving of evidence via video-link. The 
Committee also concluded that the level of intimidation and upset experienced by some 
witnesses was against the interests of justice.
3.2.4.2 -  Finding solutions: fundamental reform?
Intimidatory cross-examination also concerns Louise Ellison (1998, 2001, 2002). 
Whilst Ellison welcomes restrictions on the cross-examination of rape victims on their 
past sexual history and the removal of unrepresented defendants’ right to personally 
cross-examine rape victims, she argues that these issues have diverted attention from 
more fundamental concerns. For Ellison, the difficulties faced by rape and other victims 
during cross-examination are grounded firstly in the inadequate regulation of the 
process and, secondly, in the combative features of the adversarial system. Traditional 
mechanisms of restricting inappropriate cross-examination through the discretionary 
intervention of the judge are insufficient, because this may conflict with a judge’s duty 
to ensure fair proceedings. Similarly, argues Ellison, the adversarial nature of criminal 
justice in England and Wales means advocates approach their task in a combative 
mindset.
Ellison (2001) states that reforms under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999 -  especially the introduction of special measures -  did not go far enough because 
they reflected an ‘accommodation approach’ preserving the traditional adversarial 
model and the orality67 principle (Ellison, 2002). According to Ellison, measures which 
deviate least from the traditional adversarial model are also least effective in alleviating 
stress and securing the best possible evidence.68 Hence, Ellison concludes:
“The ultimate test of the government’s declared commitment to meeting the needs 
and interests of victims of crime and of witnesses more generally will be a 
preparedness to move beyond the straight)acket of established trial procedure in 
the search for solutions” (Ellison, 2001: p.160).
67 The notion that evidence is usually spoken out loud.
68 For further arguments in favour of re-evaluating the adversarial model see Jackson (2003).
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In the same vein, Victim Support (2002b) calls for more comparisons with inquisitorial 
criminal justice to temper the excesses of cross-examination.
The broad suggestion being made here is that the best means of assisting vulnerable and 
intimidated victims during evidence is to alter the character of the adversarial process; a 
fundamental reform. Arguably, however, these problems are more dependent on the 
attitude of lawyers and the manner in which questions are asked than on the specific 
adversarial nature of the system. This would imply that what is needed is not a 
fundamental alternation of the system, but rather its civilisation. This implies treating 
victims with courtesy -  as people rather than sources of evidence -  and installing 
professional aversions to interrupting victims giving their evidence or resorting to 
aggressive questioning styles. Such rules of civility are common in other professions 
that promote conjecture, including academia.
In support of this view, we will note in a moment the findings of witness surveys that 
seem to indicate special measures are having a beneficial impact on witnesses giving 
evidence in the existing system. In addition, Brienen and Hoegen (2000) note that 
although the process of cross-examination has remained largely unchanged the ‘rough 
edges’ have been taken off by recent reforms. This is not to say that such measures have 
matured to a point where the problems faced by victims giving evidence are nullified. 
Birch (2000) notes how ‘poorly served’ witnesses with learning difficulties will be by 
the 1999 reforms and labels the Act “a somewhat hurried piece of work, enacted to fulfil 
election promises” (p.223). Crucially, however, Birch’s underlying view is not that 
refined special measures would be fundamentally incapable of assisting victims in an 
adversarial system, but that their impact will be minimal whilst practitioners remain 
sceptical of the measures.
In another example, the impact of restricting the cross-examination of rape victims on 
their sexual histories -  originally under the 1976 Sexual Offences Amendment Act -  
has been questionable because judges seem quick to allow such questioning under their 
preserved discretion to do so (Temkin, 1987).69 Nevertheless, this limitation is again 
dependent on the working practices of judges, not the adversarial model or the
69 Now under s.41(2) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
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limitations of the measure itself.70 Indeed, Ellison’s suggestion that judges are incapable 
of safeguarding victim rights due to conflicts with their duty to ensure fair proceedings 
is simply a reprisal of the due-process argument, assuming a conflict between victim 
and defendant rights. In its place I would argue that as judges become accustomed to the 
concept of victim rights (amounting to non-fundamental reform) and a generally more 
‘civilised’ attitude taken to victims and evidence in general, then the cultural impression  ^
that ‘due process’ is being colnpromised will fade. Of course this is easier said than 
done, for despite the impression that judges may already be taking on such roles in 
some cases (see Chapter 6) it will require training and -  perhaps more importantly -  
cultural change on the part of judges themselves.
3.2.43 -  Pre-recorded examination in chief
Possibly the most significant of the special measures is the capacity for vulnerable child 
witnesses to give evidence via pre-record examination in chief. Such evidence is 
adduced by specially trained police officers in suites designed to reduce intimidation. 
The interview is recorded on video to be played in court. Prior to 2001, guidance for 
practitioners conducting such interviews was found under a Home Office Memorandum 
(Home Office and Department of Health, 1992). In a review of research on the 
application of the Memorandum, Davies and Westcott (1999) confirmed the 
vulnerability of very young witnesses and the need to present questions in a way they 
could understand. Children were shown to require support throughout the process, 
which included adequately preparing them for the interview and giving them proper 
closure. The language used and the conduct of the interviewer were essential not only in 
terms of supporting the child but also to avoid children simply ‘going along’ with 
implications or suggestive questioning.71
The report drew its findings principally from empirical field studies of children giving 
evidence in England and Wales (including observations of pre-recorded examinations) 
and also from laboratory experiments conducted on school children in the US. Clearly 
the latter data in particular are questionable in terms of applicability in the British
70 Although in R v. A ([2001] 1 W.L.R. 789) it was held that s.41 restricted the admissibility of 
pertinent evidence.
71 Bull and Corran (2002) suggest that the manner in which an interviewer speaks to a child may 
be as influential as the words used.
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context, and the authors admit that these studies reflect ‘American concerns’. 
Nevertheless, it also argued that:
“These experiments do, however, enable researchers to study a single issue with a 
precision rarely possible in field studies” (p.6).
Overall, the authors advocate a flexible approach to interviewing child witnesses, 
allowing scope for open-ended questions ancl the child’s ‘free narrative’ responses. 
Davies and Westcott (1999) and Welboume (2002) -  who analysed a sample of pre­
recorded examination in chief tapes recorded under the Memorandum -  agree that the 
foci of the Memorandum on evidentially building a case and preparing young witnesses 
for court were insufficient to meet the needs of vulnerable children.
The 1992 Memorandum was then replaced with new guidelines (Home Office, 2001a). 
These emphasised the importance of preparing witnesses for the interview and for the 
interviewer to have regard to the interviewees’ specific circumstance; including their 
race and level of cognitive understanding/disability. The guidelines also set out the 
benefits of establishing rapport with interviewees in order to reassure them and assess 
their level of understanding. The document emphasises the interview’s progression from 
rapport to open questions -  eliciting a ‘free narrative’ -  to more specific queries.
The potential of pre-recorded examination in chief is discussed in Chapter 7. For now, it 
will suffice to say that the operation of this measures hints that the adversarial model is 
capable of incorporating a wider form of evidence, which may be beneficial to victims. 
The existence of such evidence already in the system also implies that it would be not 
be a fundamental reform to expand its application to more victims and witnesses, just as 
video-links, screens and so on were extended to adult witnesses as ‘special measures’ in 
1999.
3.2.4A -  Witness surveys
Witness Surveys have provided some indication as to the impact of special measures 
and other reforms intended to assist vulnerable and intimidated witnesses.
Results from the 2002 Witness Satisfaction Survey (Angle et al., 2003) revealed a 
number of improvements m witness satisfaction compared to the baseline survey 
(Whitehead, 2001). Seventy eight percent of witnesses were satisfied with their 
experience of the criminal justice system, an increase of 2% from 2000. Satisfaction .
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amongst victim witnesses had increased by 4%, meaning 71% of all victim witnesses 
were satisfied overall. Eighty six percent of victim witnesses reported being satisfied 
with the conduct of the prosecution lawyer in their case and 92% were satisfied with the 
conduct of the judge. Nearly all (96%) of witnesses thought they were treated 
courteously by the lawyer on ‘their side’. Witness who were treated courteously by 
lawyers on both sides and were given the opportunity to say everything they wanted  ^
were much more likely to be satisfied overall compared to other witnesses. Two thirds 
of witnesses (67%) said they would be happy to be witnesses again compared to 61% in 
the baseline survey. It was concluded by the 2002 survey that witnesses feeling they had 
been taken for granted was the strongest predictor of dissatisfaction with and 
unwillingness to be a witness again. Thus, the recommendations were that witnesses 
must feel appreciated and helped to feel less intimidated (Angle et al., 2003b).
These findings indicate that witnesses can still be satisfied with the criminal justice 
system after being subject to the adversarial model of evidence. Regarding evidence, it 
seems that victims and other witnesses want a simple extension of the courteous and 
civilised treatment they require from the rest of the system, along with the opportunity 
to say everything they want. This supports the assertion that the manner in which 
lawyers conduct themselves during evidence is key, not the process itself. It also 
suggests that victims would benefit from less restrictive styles of eliciting evidence that 
resist interrupting them.
The Vulnerable and Intimidated Witness Surveys were generally supportive of special 
measures (Hamlyn et al., 2004b). Overall satisfaction amongst VIWs rose between the 
first and second phases by 5%, although the 69% of VIWs reporting satisfaction was 
lower than the 78% of all witnesses reporting satisfaction in the WSS. Witnesses rated 
special measures facilities highly, with a third reporting they would have been unable or 
unwilling to give evidence without them. Witnesses who used special measures were 
less likely to feel anxiety than those who did not.72 Nevertheless, the report commented 
that “there is still some way to go before the needs of VIWs are met” (Hamlyn et al., 
2004b: p.xv).
72 Early concerns from practitioners and the judiciary regarding the impact of special measures 
on jurors was addressed by Davies (1999) who found that jurors preferred ‘live’ evidence but 
this did not affect their decision making.
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The NSPCC has also commissioned research on video-links, which involved speaking 
with 50 young witnesses who had given evidence (Plotnikoff and Woolfson, 2005). The 
authors suggest that “the essentially compulsory use of TV links for young witnesses in 
cases of sex or violence” (p .ll)  restricts the options available to children. This may go 
against Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1990, which 
requires decision makers to involve children in the decision making process on matters •" 
relevant to their lives. The report suggests that -  given a genuine choice -  some children 
might choose to forgo the TV-link in favour of being screened off from the defendant 
and gallery in the courtroom.
The suggestion that special measures are being forced upon victims is a troubling one.
In the application of special measures provisions under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 -  and following the No Witness No Justice scheme (Home Office, 
2004g) -  ‘vulnerable and intimidated witnesses’ are supposed to be identified as such at 
an early stage by police officers. To this end, police officers taking a witness statement 
on the standard ‘MG11’ form should also submit a ‘MG2 initial witness assessment’. 
This latter form records details of the witnesses’ vulnerability or intimidation and any 
special measure necessary to improve the quality of evidence (Home Office, 2004h).
It is nevertheless difficult to adduce from the police guidelines how exactly the 
assessment of vulnerability is made and the recommendation for special measure 
formulated. The process seems to begin with the question on the MG 11 “does the 
witness require ‘special measures’ as a vulnerable/intimidated witness?” If the officer 
answers ‘yes’ then he or she is directed to the MG2. No guidelines, however, indicate 
how this initial assessment is to be made. Following this, the MG2 does contain a 
section where officers must “give the views of the witness as to why the [special] 
measures sought are required”. This implies consultative participation on the issue of 
special measures, an interpretation supported to some extent by the accompanying 
guidance:
“It is essential that the witness be asked to give his/her views, since any court 
considering granting a measure must consider all circumstances, and in particular 
the views of witnesses when deciding where the interest of justice lies” (Home 
Office, 2004h: p.42).
That said, there is no indication in the guidelines or the police forms themselves as to 
how a witnesses who does not want to give evidence via special measures (even if they
98
might be entitled to them) would make this view known. The Home Office guidance 
document for witnesses -  Witness in Court (Home Office, 2003h) -  gives the following 
indication:
“The court will decide if you qualify for special measures. They will get advice 
from the police, the Crown Prosecution Service or the defence lawyer, and take 
account of your views on whether you want to apply for special measures” (p.21).
j c
That said, the guidance is also clear that children under 17 in cases of sexual offences or 
violence, neglect or abduction will be considered “in need of special protection and 
“benefit from strong presumptions” that their evidence will be given by pre-recorded 
examination in chief and video-link “unless the court considers the measures will not 
maximise the quality of evidence”. The MG2 form itself is even more prescribed in this 
regard:
“If either a) [sexual offences] or b) [offences involving violence, cruelty or 
abduction] apply, then the child witness is ‘in need of special protection’ and the 
admission of a visually recorded interview, if available, is mandatory and any 
other evidence must be given by a live link” (Home Office, 2004h: p.39).
This is an interpretation of s.21 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, 
which sets out the special protection to be afforded to witnesses under 17 years of age. 
Here, s.21(3) confirms that the “primary rule” is that any pre-recorded evidence in chief 
is admissible, and that all other evidence should be given via live video-link. 
Nevertheless, a court can depart from this principle if it believes that such facilities will 
not maximise the quality of a witness’ evidence (s.21(4)(c)). Crucially, s.l9(3)(a) of the 
Act requires courts to take account of any views expressed by the witness when 
determining whether the quality of evidence will be maximised through special 
measures. This subsection also applies to all other witness, including those who do not 
fall under s.21, but are still ‘automatically’ eligible for special measures because they 
are under 17 years of age (s.l6(l)(a)) or a complainant in respect of a sexual offence 
(s.17(4)). Thus, in most cases, it seems unlikely that young witnesses will be compelled 
to give evidence via special measures against their will. This includes most young 
witnesses falling under s.21, as in most cases this surely would not maximise the quality 
of the evidence. In a similar example, whilst adult complaints of sexual offences are 
automatically entitled to special measures under s.7(4), the Act clearly states that such 
victims can give up this automatic ‘right’ under this subsection.
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Of course, this is all dependent on victims and witnesses being clearly informed that 
they are not obliged to give evidence through special measures. In Chapter 6, however, 
we will see that witnesses are not always presented with the alternatives. This 
effectively means such victims are compelled to use the special measures facilities. Of 
particularly concern on this point is the position of child witnesses giving evidence in 
sexual offences or offences of violence abuse or abduction, so-called ‘witnesses in need ■" 
of special protection’. The above extract from the MG2 form interprets the 1999 Act as 
requiring the mandatory admission of pre-recorded evidence, if such evidence is 
available for such witnesses. The form also suggests that all their other evidence ‘must’ 
be given via video-link. Again this is based on s.21, which states at s.21(5) that, in the 
case of witnesses in need of special protection, the court does not need to be satisfied 
that the use of special measures will maximise the quality of the child’s evidence. This 
excludes the need to consider the child’s view under s.l9(3)(a).
Hence, this does raise the concern that at least some children may be afforded little 
choice over whether they give evidence through special measures.73 4 Essentially the 
difficulty seems to be that the Act, and the resulting guidance documents (Home Office, 
2004h), apparently do not account for witnesses who are automatically eligible for 
special measures, but for whatever reason do not wish to give their evidence in this 
way.75 Of course, it is open for prosecution advocates not to make an application for 
special measures, but s.l9(l)(b) of the Act gives the court a discretion to make a special 
measures direction of its own accord; which it seems it may be compelled to do, at least 
for children ‘in need of special protection’.
This poses considerable questions as to what input victims in general have over the 
manner in which they give evidence. This is something we will return to in Chapter 6 
but -  at the outset -  the implications of our earlier discussion above, coupled with the 
NSPCC’s findings, suggests that victims should not only be given decision making 
power in relation to whether they give evidence, but also the discretion to choose how 
that evidence will be given. Arguably, compelling witnesses to give evidence through 
special measures is contrary to the spirit -  if not the letter -  of the 1999 Act. It is also
73 See page 296.
74 There appears to be no case law to assist us with our interpretations of s.21 on this point.
75 Apparent disadvantages to witnesses of giving evidence via video-link in particular are 
discussed in Chapter 6.
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contrary to the principle of consultative participation that may underlie victim-centred 
criminal justice.
3.2.4.5 -  The way forward: vulnerable and intimidated witnesses in criminal justice and 
at court
Victims face significant difficulties giving evidence in the justice system of England
> •) c
and Wales. The reasons for this are multifaceted, incorporating the design of 
courtrooms, the lack of facilities, lack of information and preparation beforehand, and 
the occupational practices of lawyers. In recent years, attempts have been made to 
address these issues (for the most vulnerable) through the provision of special measures 
which distance the witness from the adversarial process, but do not change it 
fundamentally. The question is whether this is sufficient to achieve victim-centred 
criminal justice.
I would suggest that there is no reason to suppose that the adversarial model of evidence 
cannot be adapted to improve the experience of victims without fundamentally altering 
its character. The fact that this has not yet been achieved -  I would argue -  is 
attributable to the resistant attitudes of professionals accustomed to evidential 
conventions that include a presumption that lawyers dictate what a victim says and how 
they say it.
Witness surveys indicate that special measures can assist victims, but what is really 
needed is a change in lawyers’ expectations of the procedure. I therefore agree with 
Elision that the 1999 reforms are not enough. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the 
basic process of examination and adversarial cross-examination need not be altered (a 
fundamental reform), evidence to support this contention will be presented in Chapter 6. 
Rather, the notion of ‘service rights’ must be extended to victims giving evidence. We 
have already argued in favour of a right for victims ‘not to be inconvenienced’. In 
evidence this may extend to an expectation that victims will not be unduly interrupted, 
or will not be the subject of excessively hostile questioning. In other words, the 
suggestion here is that evidence becomes a civilised process whereby the victim is 
treated as a fellow human being -  or perhaps a customer (Zauberman, 2000; Tapley, 
2002) -  rather than a source of evidence. Fundamentally, the survey data indicates this 
is what the victims themselves value. Victim-centred justice also implies that all victims 
are given the right to choose how they give evidence -  minimising apprehension and
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intimidation -  and will certainly not have special measures enforced upon them. Of 
course, in keeping with the previous discussion, the suggestion is that such expectations 
be backed by rights and that such rights are enforceable, which again leads us to 
questions of whether this means appeals, complaints against judges or separate trials 
within trials, to be addressed in full in Chapter 7.
Contrary to Ellison (2001), I would argue that judges are in the best position to enforce 
such rights through proactive intervention. To suggest that this would prejudice the 
defendant is to presume a zero sum game. The real barrier is cultural, and so it may be 
that as advocates and judges grow accustomed to dealing with victims courteously, it 
will become less acceptable for lawyers to resort to intimidating methods. This 
hypothesis will be tested later in the thesis.
By preserving the existing evidential process, we again avoid fundamental reform. 
Moves to treat victims in a civilised manner -  and to cease interrupting and dictating 
how they give their evidence -  would result in a style of evidence more closely akin to 
that employed now for children under pre-recorded examination in chief. Even this, I 
would argue, is not a fundamental change in the evidential system, although the full 
argument must be saved for Chapters 4 and 7.
On the place of this research, it is again apparent that little observational or 
ethnographic data has been gathered on the issue of evidence-giving for some time. 
There are also no up to date first hand data available on lawyers’ questioning strategies 
or on the reaction of judges and magistrates to vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, or 
support offered from the bench. In this latter case, the two exceptions are the article 
from Plotnikoff and Woolfson (2005) and a recent discussion on situating video-link 
rooms outside the court building by Applegate (2006). The first authors cite an extract 
from a Judicial Studies Board Bench Book (a judicial training instrument) which 
suggest that, in the case of children giving evidence thorough special measures, Crown 
Court judges should guard against ‘over-rigorous’ cross-examination and should ensure 
the language used is suitable to the child’s age and that the child has the opportunity to 
answer questions. Based on interview data, Appelgate (2006) notes that judges do 
indeed seem to be stopping overly harsh questioning by barristers in video-link cases. 
This lends weight to the notion that judicial involvement in safeguarding victim rights 
may simply constitute an extension of an existing judicial function.
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There has been no attempt to compare evidence given through special measures directly 
with other evidence and there are no recent data on the cultural attitudes of practitioners 
regarding special measures. In addition, I have said previously that a major benefit of 
ethnographic methodology is that it captures the ‘human element’ that so characterise 
criminal trials. This seems particularly relevant in the case of victims giving evidence, 
where problems may principally lie in the ‘attitude’ of lawyers and the ‘atmosphere’  ^
created in the courtroom. ’ e
3.3 -  PART 3: ASSESSING WAYS FORWARD
In asking “what does it mean to put victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice 
system?” we can appreciate that this question is grounded in the ‘narrower’ form of 
‘penal’ victimology concerned with victims of crime (Van Dijk, 1983). Academic 
impressions of what it means to be a ‘victim of crime’ are certainly expanding. Hence, a 
genuinely victim-centred system must accommodate the needs of a wide variety of 
victims; including secondary victims, victims who do not bring their case to the 
criminal justice system -  or do not wish to be labelled as victims -  or do not conform to 
stereotypical notions of victimhood. On this last point, we need to know whether levels 
of service, support and courtesy extended to victims during trials differs depending on 
whether victims conform to stereotypical ideals, something this thesis will attempt to 
shed light on. As far as I am aware, there have been no studies conducted specifically on 
non-stereotypical victims in court.
In the modem climate, any victim-centred justice system would need to afford victims 
genuine and enforceable ‘rights’. Whilst initially we might be concerned that this will 
unfairly affect the rights of defendants, we have seen numerous suggestions that a ‘zero 
sum game’ need not exist. When looking for evidence of rights in recent policy 
documents, we can note the general restriction to so-called ‘service rights’. Indeed, 
whilst a lot of attention seems to have been paid to victims’ right to services -  and also 
their ‘rights’ in relation to sentencing -  relatively little work has been done on victim 
rights during the criminal trial procedure itself. At the same time, we can also argue that 
such ‘rights’ as have been afforded to victims are enforceable only through complaint 
procedures external to the criminal justice process. As such, this thesis will contribute 
by examining whether victims may be afforded procedural rights in the trial -  
amounting to ‘non-fundamental reform’ -  and enforceable from within the criminal 
procedure (especially through the proactive involvement of the judiciary). From the
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above discussion, such rights will arguably include a right to consultative participation 
(including consultation on prosecution and sentencing), a right not be inconvenienced, 
and a right to choose whether or not to give evidence and how it will be given.
This review supports the assertion that our recent information on victims, witnesses and 
vulnerable and intimidated witness at court derives from surveys. My argument remains 
that these figures should be supported by more first hand impressions of victims in 
criminal trials, especially as so much development has occurred since the last in-depth 
ethnographic studies carried out in this area; including more ‘professionalised’ service 
provision, the advent of ‘victim rights’76 and the use of special measures and victim 
personal statements. The surveys also provide few details on the evidential process 
itself; such as the techniques lawyers use to question victims, their views of special 
measures and VPS statements, and the treatment of all witnesses. We also have no up to 
date study on the use or views taken by practitioners of victim personal statements in 
England and Wales.77
In relation to sentencing, there has been some suggestion that participation by the victim 
could be therapeutically beneficial. Such a result however seems potentially conducive 
to a victim-centred system as a whole. As such, this thesis seeks to apply this to 
criminal trials more widely -  especially the evidential process -  by examining the extent 
to which victims might be allowed to give wider accounts (as a right), which would 
include fostering the presumption that they should not be interrupted and generally 
treated in a civilised manner. It will also compare evidence with and without special 
measures.
As hypothesised in Chapter 1, our review indicates that the government’s interest in 
victims may be bom from many influences. Whilst Paul Rock in particular has written a 
great deal on this relatively recently, the pace of change is such that these developments 
are now ripe for reassessment. In addition, Rock does not consider ‘macro’ theories or 
combine political analysis with an analysis of policy implication. This thesis will bring 
together both political and practical aspects of the ‘victim’ issue to reach overarching 
conclusions on the nature of ‘victim-centred’ criminal justice and address whether the 
policy-making background has influenced the application of such reforms. It is to the 
policy-making process that we next turn our attention.
76 Although the author does not consider this an accurate label given their external 
enforceability.
77 But see Graham et al. (2004) for discussions on how they are taken by police.
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CHAPTER 4:
VICTIMS OF CRIME: A POLICY
CHAIN?
This chapter seeks to identify whether there are specific driving forces behind the
. j c
progression of official actions on crime victims and asks whether such actions can be 
classified as a unified ‘strategy’.1 This is important, because relevant policy documents 
tend only to discuss a limited range of influences. Commentators such as Elias, 
however, have suggested that victim policies may have less overt, political purposes 
(Elias, 1986). As noted in Chapter 2, the conclusions and observations made in this 
chapter are based on a grounded analysis of policy documents and responses to 
qualitative interviews conducted with policy-makers and local criminal justice actors. In 
other words, themes were identified and coded from the data, producing ‘categories’ 
which are argued to represent the real world of policy-making. Documents and 
interviews were also the subject of semiotic analysis (discussed in Chapter 2) whereby 
each text was evaluated to identify underlying meanings. As Rock (1990, 1998, 2004) 
has covered preceding developments in great detail, the primary focus of this chapter is 
on developments from the advent of the New Labour government in 1997, and 
especially developments from 2004 onwards.
My contention is that ‘victim policies’ are indeed derived from a wide variety of 
different political pressures and areas of political activity, not all of them conducive to 
victims’ needs. This will be demonstrated at the end of the Chapter, where the policies 
as a whole will be critiqued. As such, we may be mistaken in thinking of ‘victims’ as a 
single or unified ‘policy’. Such pressures/areas include: the nature of policy-making; the 
mechanisms by which national strategies are implemented locally; developed 
understandings of ‘victimhood’; greater distinctions drawn between ‘victims’ and 
‘witnesses’; the work of victim assistance groups; wider reform agendas (financial 
concerns, efficiency, a ‘target culture’, the multi-agency approach); so-called ‘populist 
punitiveness’; international influences; the development of ‘rights discourse’ and macro 
influences (by which I mean wide scale social and political changes which appear to be 
transnational, certainly in the developed world). These then are the ‘categories’ derived
1 As has recently been suggested (Home Office, 2003a).
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from the analytical techniques described above and in Chapter 2. Throughout the 
chapter, links will be drawn with the more general literature on policy-making to 
illustrate how the characteristics of reform in this field may be far from unique, 
reflecting broader political trends, especially in relation to ‘governance’ (Crawford, 
1997; Jordan et al., 2005).
4.1 -  THREE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
This leaves us.with three possible interpretations of government action on victims, 
which were introduced in Chapter 1. Firstly, there is the possibility that all such actions 
are part of a consistent and unified strategy to assist victims and witnesses. The second 
possibility is that actions that, incidentally, assist victims and witnesses may be 
grounded in a different set of political concerns. This is certainly what Rock found 
when studying the politics of victims relating to the development of Victim Support in 
the mid 1980s and early 1990’s:
“In a sense, reparation proved to be the Trojan horse which carried victims 
support schemes to political prominence. Victims support schemes were to be part 
of the package that were approved by ministers in March 1984 as a ‘submission 
on reparation’, and they were to be carried piggy-back thereafter” (Rock, 1990: 
p.345-346, emphasis added).
The third possibility is that -  now that victims and witnesses have achieved at least 
rhetorical acceptance in policy-making (ibid) -  new policies are being packaged as the 
continuation of work for these groups but are in fact intended to achieve other aims such 
as, for example, increasing efficiency in the criminal justice system or, to repeat Elias’ 
argument:
“[Vjictims may function to bolster state legitimacy, to gain political mileage, and 
to enhance social control” (Elias, 1986: p.231).
Of course, all three possibilities can probably be applied to some aspects of the 
government’s work on victims, especially the Victim’s Charters. The central question, 
however, is whether this work is all part of the ‘same thing’ or instead reflects many 
different politics.
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4.2 -  VICTIMS AND WITNESSES: SHAPING THE ‘POLICY’
In July 2003 the Home Office published a national strategy to deliver improved services 
for victims of crime and witnesses called to give evidence in court. Titled a new deal for 
victims and witnesses, the strategy represented a clear indication of the government’s 
understanding of the needs of victims and witnesses (Home Office, 2003a). It also 
presented the government’s views on the changes that had already been made, the gaps 
that had been left and plans for future improvement. By closely examining such 
documents one might construct the government’s underlying views of what it means to 
be ‘a victim’ or ‘a witness’ and whom it is they are trying to help. Indeed, the new deal 
itself includes working definitions for ‘victim’ and ‘witness’.
In sum, the new deal is a document that pulls together the various strands of 
government action relating to victim and witnesses -  compensation, information 
provision, support for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, funding for the Witness 
Service and so on -  and presents them as a unified strategy.2 This is achieved within the 
broader context of a multi-agency approach and standards articulated through the 
government’s Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets. So, the new deal not only sets 
out future measures, it also provides a clear example of a ‘strategic approach’ to policy­
making on victims and witnesses, which has also been employed in other areas of 
policy-making like health (Greener, 2004) and education (Selwyn and Fitz, 2001). As 
such, the deal may also be misleading if we are right that ‘victims and witnesses’ is not 
a unified or consistent ‘policy’ at all. The difficulty with the new deal -  and most other 
policy documents relating to victims and witnesses -  is that fundamentally it suggests a 
clarity and consistency of purpose (internally and in relation to all past measures) that 
may not reflect the complexities and practicalities of actual policy-making.
In fact, this chapter will seek to demonstrate that the occasional publication of ‘review’ 
documents like the new deal is merely the latest product of an ongoing process of 
policy-making characterised by complex interactions between government departments, 
the parliamentary and political process and ideological movements domestically and 
abroad. As such, this is an example of what is now popularly termed ‘governance’ 
which Crawford -  in his discussion on the localisation of crime control -  views as:
2 The explanatory notes accompanying the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill called 
the new deal “the first national strategy for victims and witnesses” (Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 2003: p.4).
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“[A] pattern of shifting relations which involve: the fusion of, and changing 
relations between, the state, the market, and civil society; a move from ‘social’ to 
‘community’; greater individual and group responsibility for the management of 
local risk and security; and the emergence of new forms of management of public 
services and structures for policy formation and implementation” (1997: p.6).
We will see in this chapter that much of the development in policy-making and > 
implementation in this area of reform seems to reflect these changes. This is also true 
across other areas of policy-making. For example, in the context of education policy, 
Bache (2003) defines governance as:
“[T]he increased role of non-government actors in policy-making...The term 
‘governance’ implies an increasingly complex set of state-society relationships in 
which networks rather than hierarchies dominate policy-making” (p.301).
The concept of ‘policy networks’ and still wider ‘policy communities’ (Jordan et al., 
2005) is key here, as an important argument of this chapter is that the ‘victim’s policy’ 
has derived from multiple sources rather than a simple decision on the part of 
hierarchical policy-makers to address the issue of crime victims.
Consequently, the ‘snapshot’ provided by the deal tells us little about the underlying 
forces or actors driving the policy (if they exist), or the origins of such policies. Thus, 
even when examining the most recent policy documents -  such as the consultations on a 
new Witnesses’ Charter (Home Office, 2005g) and Convicting Rapists and Protecting 
Victims (Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2006) -  these only provide us with static 
impressions of a dynamic process.
To achieve a more intricate understanding of official policy regarding victims and 
witnesses, we must place such documents in the context of wider and preceding 
developments. This is clearly illustrated by Rock:
“[P]olicies for victims sometimes seemed to have little directly to do with the 
expressed needs of victims themselves and more to do with other politics. And 
they attain meaning only within the larger framework which those politics set” 
(1990: p.34).
Hence, whilst the ‘larger framework’ set by politics suggests a unified ‘strategy’, those 
politics may not individually be aimed at assisting ‘victims themselves’.
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4.2.1 -  A policy chain?
The impression derived from documents like the new deal and more recent publications 
is that past and present actions related to victims and witnesses are indeed part of some 
consistent strategy to improve their lot. If we are right in arguing that the ‘policy’ 
actually originates from a whole range of different sources, then how are we given this 
impression? The answer may lie in the fact that policy-makers inevitably link a 
government’s recent actions to a succession of previous actions. Looking at the various 
official policy documents one quickly appreciates how they are linked together in a 
chronological chain of policy-making, which stretches backwards through New 
Labour’s 1997 election manifesto to encompass measures taken by previous 
governments. By this, I mean that each new document generally refers to the last in a 
manner reminiscent of citing legal precedent.
o
The 2003 new deal itself is a particularly good illustration, devoting three pages to 
recounting the government’s record on victims and witnesses. Indeed the title ‘new 
deal’ echoes the 2002 chapter a better deal for victims and witnesses from the White 
Paper Justice For All, a title also used for a chapter in the government’s criminal justice 
review of the year before (Home Office, 2001b, 2002). Similarly, the 2003 Inter- 
Agency Working Group on Witnesses’ report No Witness - No Justice and its 
accompanying Ministerial Response both open with a reference to Labour’s pledge to 
‘put victims and witnesses at the heart of the criminal justice system’, also found in 
Justice for All. The chapter a better deal for victims and witnesses itself began by 
recounting the government’s earlier work in assisting Victim Support and the expansion 
of the Witness Service (Rock, 1990).
That this should be the case is not at all surprising because, as Rock (1986, 1990) 
observed in England and Canada, policy-making often requires the ‘latest’ innovations 
to be packaged as a continuation of work that has already been done and has therefore 
already met with political acceptance:
“Policy innovations would have been made to seem not only the inevitable result 
of all that had gone before but the natural precursor of what was to come” (Rock, 
1990: p.253).
“[Y]ou don’t say you’re launching a new initiative. You say you are simply 
escalating, strengthening, responding in some way to public pressure, regarding
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something that’s already been going on and has a long and solid history” (Rock,
1986: p.282).
4.2.2 -  Deconstructing the policy chain
Rock’s observations represented a starting point for the development of the following, 
chapter. Here, I began by ordering the various developments, policy documents and >. 
reforms in chronological order,' and examining' them sequentially. The relevant timeline 
of developments is reproduced in Appendix 3. This preliminary exercise emphasised, in 
particular, the impression that new policy developments are almost always presented as 
the logical extension of previous (established) reform agendas. The timeline of 
chronological developments (or ‘policy chain’) was combined with transcripts of 
interviews conducted with central policy-makers and local administrators in the area 
under review. In accordance with the principles of grounded analyses (see Chapter 2) 
overall themes were thus derived, which were listed above as political pressures and 
areas of political activity.
In this chapter, the goal will be to conduct a thematic analysis of victims ‘policy’ 
documents, reforms, and the views of relevant interviewees. In other words, the data is 
to be analysed not chronologically, but by areas of political activity and pressure. In so 
doing, the chapter aims to deconstruct and debunk the myth of the ‘policy chain’ in 
relation to victims (and perhaps other policy areas), exposing the complex interaction of 
influences that really drive such reforms3. At the same time, it is predicted that such 
analysis we will also reveal the limitations of existing reforms to meet the needs of 
victims.
4.3 -  POLITICS, PRESSURES AND INFLUENCES DRIVING THE ‘POLICY 
CHAIN’
4.3.1 -  The nature of policy-making
Above, I have introduced the argument that policy-making is portrayed as a sequential 
process, all actions being linked to previous developments. One good example relates to 
victim ‘rights’, discussed in Chapter 3. Here we perceive a development of policy from 
the first Victim’s Charter of 1990 -  based on probably fallacious notions of
3 Nevertheless -  and purely for convenience -  the term ‘policy chain’ will be retained as a 
reference to the chronological advent of such developments over time.
110
(unenforceable) rights (Fenwick, 1995) -  to a more refined second Victim’s Charter -  
based on service standards -  to the Victim’s Code of Practice (Home Office, 2005f); a 
compromise of non-fundamental reform and externally enforceable rights. The wheels 
of progress were greased throughout by a succession of reports (Auld, 2001) 
consultations (Home Office, 2005g, Home Office, 2005h) and pilots (Hoyle et al., 1999) 
although -  as argued in Chapter 3 -  it could be said that the end result does not take  ^
victim rights much further owing to the continued reliance on external complaint 
mechanisms.
In another example, the development of special measures to assist vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses give evidence in court -  such as screens and video-links -  can be 
traced back to the initial government funding of the Crown Court Witness Service 
announced in 1991.4 Limited provision for pre-recorded examination in chief (for 
children) then arrived in the Criminal Justice Act 19915 and then -  via the Speaking Up 
for Justice report (Interdepartmental Working Group on the Treatment of Vulnerable or 
Intimidated Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System, 1998) -  came the rollout of 
special measures under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Again, I 
have argued in the last chapter that the outcome of this process may still fail to meet the 
wider needs of victims during the evidential processes, and that special measures remain 
a non-fundamental reform that does not alter the tenets of the existing system.
Such policies then do not appear from nowhere, or at least are not portrayed as such by 
policy-makers. This apparent need to ground reforms on well-established principles also 
means such measures (once initiated) must be consolidated, assessed and refined.6 Thus, 
having introduced practical reforms over the last few years in the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 2004, from 2004 onwards there is a sense that policy-makers are 
trying to win over criminal justice practitioners and administrators to produce 
occupational cultures and practices more conducive to tackling victims’ needs.
4 It was announced in 1996 that all Crown Court centres now had a Witness Service although it 
is debatable whether this was truly accurate. Funding to expand the Service to all magistrates’ 
courts came in 2001 when Victim Support’s grant was increased to £22.7 million.
5 See Chapter 3.
6 Assuming the government does not change. Even if it does, we can note from the history in 
England and Wales that Labour built on the pre 1997 work of the Conservatives -  increasing 
funding to Victim Support and refining the Victim’s Charters -  rather than dropping such 
measures.
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One example of this ‘consolidation’ process has been the general shift towards 
collecting information from victims and witnesses themselves. We saw this 
demonstrated in the last chapter through the Witness Satisfaction Surveys and the 
Vulnerable and Intimidated Witness Survey. More recently there has been the 
introduction of the new Witness and Victim Experience Survey (WAVES). This 
tendency to consolidate reforms with empirical evidence reflects wider trends towards 
‘rational’ or ‘evidence-based’ policy-making (Lawrence, 2006), the emphasis now 
being on ‘what works’ (Shaxson, 2005), albeit Sanderson (2003) notes the frequent 
difficulties experienced in establishing this across many policy areas. In this context the 
Poll Tax in the UK is often cited as an example of the disasters that can befall a 
government if policies are implemented without sufficient evidence as to their likely 
impact (McGrath, 2000).
Consolidation may also reflect what Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) have termed the 
‘principle of circularity’ in policy-making, whereby policy formation feeds into 
implementations which feeds into policy evaluation which then contributes to the 
formation of new or developed policies (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). This model 
also helps explain why victim policies are linked chronologically in documents like the 
new deal, as the implementation of existing policies forms the basis of the next policy 
idea.
Another example of consolidating recent policy changes in this area came in February 
2004, when the Office for Criminal Justice Reform (OCJR) issued ‘Toolkits’ covering 
seven key victims and witnesses priorities. These were intended to assist the Local 
Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs)7 in delivering services and support for victims of 
crime and included: information provision; service provision; emotional and practical 
help; improving the experience of victims and witnesses at court; meeting the needs of 
domestic violence victims and supporting vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. In 
particular, the toolkit on victim personal statements is apparently intended to convince 
LCJBs to take the scheme on board.8
7 Created in April 2003, the 42 Local Criminal Justice Boards were intended to manage the 
system more effectively through local co-ordinators (Home Office, 2003a). Boards are made up 
of high-level (administrative) representatives from different criminal justice agencies in the 
local area.
8 See below.
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From a policy perspective, the recently introduced Prosecutors’ Pledge (CPS, 2005b) 
may be another consolidation exercise; designed to apply the obligations of the CPS as 
a whole under the statutory Victim’s Code of Practice to individual prosecutors on the 
front line. Hence, this ten-point pledge purports to “describe the level of service that 
victims can expect to receive from prosecutors” and is said to be “a further step towards 
the objective of placing victims at the heart of the criminal justice system” (ibid).
This all implies that policy-making is at any given stage restricted by the limits of what 
is presently ‘acceptable’ in political and policy-making terms. So, for example, in the 
2001 review of the Victim’s Charter the idea of creating a minister for victims was 
dismissed on the grounds that victims would be better served as a shared responsibility 
between the Lord Chancellor’s Department (as was), Home Office and Attorney 
General (Home Office, 2001d: para.29). Of course, we might argue that if ‘everyone’ is 
responsible for victims then no one is responsible for victims, or at least no one 
centrally. As such, what we see here is the distribution of the victim issue along a 
horizontal axis of policy-making (linking different department, agencies and interest 
groups) rather than along a vertical axis of hierarchical power relationships in a single 
agency or policy-making organ, this being another feature of governance (Matheson, 
2000).
Interviews conducted for this research confirmed this impression of victims as a 
‘shared’ priority:
“One of the things with victims and witnesses is even though we have got this 
Unit here in OCJR, there’s still a huge amount of work happening across other 
departments, and even across other places in OCJR. So in the DCA there’s the 
victims and witnesses branch, within the Home Office there’s people doing work 
on domestic violence, doing work on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses...and 
even within OCJR there’s other work happening about vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses. All of that work will feed into the confidence [PSA] target and in many 
ways the victims and witnesses satisfaction target as well” (representative of the 
OCJR).
That said, it was suggested with specific reference to the new deal that generalising 
priorities and responsibilities in this way could have negative implications:
“That was a really useful document, but looking at it now we felt it had perhaps 
too many priorities and it wasn’t always clear who was going to be responsible for 
delivering on them, and so over the past year we have felt that we really needed 
quite a tight focus, particularly on the PSA [confidence] target” (representative of 
the OCJR).
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Nevertheless, at this stage, a victims minister was too radical to contemplate, and would 
remain so until the appointment of Fiona Mactaggart to this position in 2005.9 We have 
seen a similar effect in relation to the (confused) implementation of victim personal 
statements (Hoyle et al., 1999; Morgan and Sanders, 1999), which the judiciary and 
magistracy are still under no obligation to refer to. This again indicates that the „ 
government is unwilling to go beyond certain levels of reform to the criminal justice 
procedure. Reforms requiring judges to refer to victim personal statements would depart 
too far from the preceding developments. Interestingly, however, the above quotation 
emphasises the delivery of guaranteed standards (see Home Office, 2005d), something 
which was arguably lacking with the largely unenforceable first Victim’s Charter 
(Fenwick, 1995). This would imply ‘putting victims at the heart’ of criminal justice now 
means more than simply setting down standards and then hoping they will be followed, 
but also involves some method of guaranteeing and enforcing such standards (perhaps 
‘rights’) as I suggested was necessary in the last chapter. On this point, Nakamura and 
Smallwood (1980) have noted the growing importance in modem policy analysis of the 
implementation stage of policy-making, which is reflected by the third research question 
in this study. Indeed, Bache (2003) notes the argument that ‘policies’ are not really 
‘made’ until they are implemented.
Arguably the restrictive views adopted in the Auld report of 200110 set the tone for the 
development of victim policy over the next few years, this being essentially Ellison’s 
(2001) ‘accommodation’ approach discussed in the last chapter. This impression was 
confirmed by policy-makers:
“I think what the thrust of policy has been working with the system that we have 
got, how we can best improve it, and I think you can really clearly see all the 
reforms fitting around that” (representative of the OCJR).
A similar view was echoed by local administrators in the area under review:
9 Which has certainly given the victim issues a sense of permanence, with the minister fronting 
recent developments such as the launch of a recruitment campaign to appoint the first 
Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses (cjsonline, 2006a, 2006d) and the launch of more 
specialist domestic violence courts (cjsonline, 2005b). The minister also announced the new 
compensation consultation (Home Office, 2005d) and Witnesses’ Charter (Home Office, 
2005g).
10 See Chapter 3.
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“It seems to me that any significant further changes will involve a decision being 
taken about whether the court process in England and Wales is about the 
adversarial system...or the more continental idea of the inquisitorial system, 
where the exercise is sort of ‘let’s get to the truth of this’...As I understand it; 
from a philosophical and principle point of view the decision is that we will 
remain with the adversarial system and I think -  given that -  future changes are 
likely to be around the edges” (the Justices’ Chief Executive of the local 
Magistrates’ Court Committee).
This seems to confirm the hypothesis from the last chapter that the government is 
unwilling to implement ‘fundamental reforms’ to change the basic nature of the 
adversarial model. To this end we have also noted the lack of internally enforceable 
rights in the Victim’s Code of Practice and the exclusion of the judiciary from any 
obligations under the Code. On the latter point, whilst the government’s reluctance to 
place obligations on judges is understandable -  and is again consistent with the 
principle of reduced compulsion that often characterises governance (Bache, 2003) -  it 
is perhaps questionable whether the total exclusion of judicial actors from the remit of 
the Code and the Victims and Witnesses’ Commissioner will provide the best results for 
victims themselves. Once again, this points to the continuing reluctance of policy­
makers to venture beyond certain limits of reform to assist victims and witnesses. In this 
case, their concern may rest in upsetting the relationship between Judiciary and 
executive, but more likely the issue is one of prejudicing the defendant’s rights in a zero 
sum game.11
A further example of the limits of the present reform agenda is revealed through the 
Witness Satisfaction Survey (Angle et al., 2003) where, on the issue of intimidation, the 
court felt that increasing the information available was probably the only option 
because:
“Given the formality of the judicial process, particularly in the Crown Court, it 
would be difficult and perhaps not desirable, to make the • process 
unintimidating” (p.57).
Whether or not one agrees, the apparent acceptance of this statement again reflects 
limits as to how far policy-makers will go to satisfy witnesses and victims.
Overall then, themes derived from policy documents and interviews with policy-makers 
clearly indicate that putting victims at the heart of the system does not mean 1
11 I have argued in Chapter 3 that obliging judges to intervene to defend victim rights need not 
infringe the rights of defendants and is actually a non-fundamental reform.
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fundamentally reshaping the system around them, but rather suggests an attempt to 
adapt the existing model to their needs. Ultimately, this ‘straitjacket’ adopted by policy­
makers would lead to Rock’s (2004) ‘finesse’ in which the language of more far- 
reaching reform is employed (‘rights for victims’) but not the operational reality. The 
argument in this thesis is that whilst ‘non-fundamental’ reform may be sufficient to. 
achieve victim-centeredness, one can go a lot further towards granting victims genuine 
rights and participation within the system than has presently been achieved without 
fundamentally changing it.
Another good illustration of the policy-making process is the newly proposed 
Witnesses’ Charter (Home Office, 2005g). It is surprising that -  given the recent 
popularity of ‘rights’ language -  in this document policy-makers reverted to a service 
standards approach, similar to that of the second Victim’s Charter from nearly ten years 
ago. This decision seems to confirm that, in policy terms, policy-makers cannot move 
straight to granting rights (even rights whose true nature is questionable) but must first 
establish an area of reform with less radical measures. As such, we may say that the 
creation of externally enforceable ‘legitimate expectations’ is a necessary first step to 
creating more substantive ‘rights’.
Of course, in this case, whilst the Charter seems to present ‘witness rights’ as a fresh 
idea, in practice many of the ‘rights’ already granted to’ victims only benefit victim 
witnesses; including the right to make a victim personal statement. Ironically then, 
whilst politically the concept of ‘witness rights’ must pay its dues, in reality it can be 
argued that rights for witnesses already have an established history. That said, it is clear 
that the precedent of converting victims’ ‘legitimate expectations’ from the 1996 
Victim’s Charter into ‘rights’ under the 2005 statutory Code will make a similar 
transformation for witnesses easier. Hence, the consultation document (Home Office, 
2005g) predicts that the Charter will later be converted into another statutory Code, or 
form part of a new consolidated Code for victims and witnesses. It seems likely that the 
timescale will be far shorter than the ten years it has taken such a development from the 
second Victim’s Charter.
Another fundamental aspect of policy-making procedure is the need to change and adapt 
policies to suit contemporary situations and -  in particular -  levels of support. So, for 
example, in 2004 a government suggestion that employers and industry foot the bill for 
compensating victims had to be withdrawn (Home Office, 2004a). This seems to have
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followed behind the scenes discussions to the effect that employers and industry 
representatives were unwilling to pay for the new measures. The summary of responses 
to the consultation drew particular attention to the objections of employers and those 
representing employers, especially given the likely rise in cost of employer liability 
insurance (Home Office, 2004b). As such, these proposed measures were apparently, 
never put into force. The reforms eventually appearing in the Domestic Violence, Crime  ^
and Victims Act 2004 were more modest, introducing a surcharge placed on some 
convictions and laying down provisions for the future reclaiming of money paid by the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme from the offender.12 13The episode is therefore 
an interesting example of how policy-making can be limited by a lack of outside 
support. Subsequent consultation suggestions to the effect that narrowing down state 
compensation to those ‘seriously injured’ will reduce administrative costs illustrate how 
governments and policy-makers must adapt their strategies when proposed reforms are 
met unfavourably (Home Office, 2005d).
As well as necessarily following on from previous reforms, measures, or rhetoric, some 
developments in the policy chain have themselves necessitated further actions. This was 
clearly the case after the 1999 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, which 
necessitated a challenge to the long tradition in policy-making in this area of avoiding 
actually gathering information from victims and witnesses themselves concerning their 
needs. For example, the creation of the state Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
was largely based on a presumption that victims wanted it, and might turn to vigilantism 
without it (Rock, 1990). Victims therefore originally surfaced on the policy-scene in a 
most ad-hoc manner, far removed from the modem focus on evidence-based policies we 
saw above. That said, this situation with victims is far from unique. Ellis (2005) for 
example recounts how ‘youth’ became an extremely important policy concern for the 
Conservatives in the 1960s based on what turned out to be a mistaken belief that young 
voters would represent a threat to Conservative values.
It might be argued that the need to assess the impact of the 1999 Act provided the 
government with a political justification for engaging with victims and witnesses more
12 A ‘Victims Fund’ was however established later that year, the government pledging to 
channel £4 million from the proceeds of crime into the fund over the next two years to develop 
services for victims of sexual offending.
13 Which again suggests a somewhat ulterior political motive and a ‘vengeful’ characterisation 
of victims.
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directly. Certainly the introduction of the Witness Satisfaction Survey and the 
Vulnerable and Intimidated Witness Survey was designed to chart how witnesses had 
reacted to the extension of the Witness Service and special measures, and whether 
relevant targets had been met (Kitchen and Elliott, 2001; Whitehead, 2001).14 We have 
also said that this may reflect a need to periodically consolidate major reform agendas.
The need to gather first hand information from victims was well recognised by policy­
makers interviewed for this research. One interviewee from the DCA emphasised that 
reviewing previous research was no longer enough, and that one had to talk to the 
victims themselves; hence the creation of institutions like the Victims’ Advisory Panel 
in 2002 and intended to bring the view of victims directly to ministers (representative of 
the DCA, 2005). That said, the victim members of the Panel are mainly secondary 
victims of homicide, and therefore do not represent the vast majority of victims of less 
serious (mainly property) crime. Nevertheless, the attempt to bring victims into the
o
policy-making process itself has been echoed across wider government policy-making 
in which -  pursuant to New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1997; Leggett, 2000; 
Crawford, 2001) -  attempts have been made to establish wide policy communities in 
many areas.
This is so-called ‘interactive’ policy-making (Mayer et al., 2005) by which we have 
seen stakeholders such as local communities (Pearce and Mawson, 2003; Irvin and 
Stansbury, 2004), the elderly (Priestley, 2002) and children (Tisdall and Davis, 2004) 
given a ‘voice’ in policymaking.15 We have also seen this in relation to victims of 
domestic violence, albeit arguably the relevant forums have not been overly successful 
(Hague, 2005). The wide-ranging purpose of this form of policy-making is that all those 
who will be affected by a policy decision should have some involvement in its 
formation (Cabinet Office, 1999; Williams, 1999).
Another representative of the DCA gave his opinion on gathering first-hand views from 
local courts:
“I’ve always worked in Whitehall...never worked on the front line, been in a 
court dealing with cases -  so very much an ‘ivory towers’ man -  but very keen to 
actually go out there and actually listen to what happens. So I ’ve been along and
14 We will return to the issue of ‘targets’ below.
15 In Australia the exception appears to be in education, where the views of teachers have 
seemingly been excluded from the policy-making process (Thomas, 2005).
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visited fifteen to twenty courts and asked them ‘what are the problems you face on 
the front line?’” (representative of the DCA, courts innovation branch).
Policy-makers therefore seem increasingly willing to gather ‘front line’ information, a 
philosophy also underlying this thesis and supported by local interviewees:
“It’s quite concerning for the people on the ground -  the operational people -  to 
really read into a lot of this (national policy] documentation. That whilst the ideas 
are good, firstly they come from a background of some ignorance in terms of what 
actually happens anyway, and secondly come from a very idealistic stance where 
there’s no concems/issues around the practical implications of what’s being 
suggested” (the District Legal Director at Court A).
It is interesting to note how the manner in which such ‘first hand’ data were gathered 
could influence the overall character of such policies. For example, in the area of police 
reform, policy-makers were concerned with the satisfaction of users of police services 
as a whole, but the performance measures they had available meant victims were 
afforded particularly close attention:
“The wider issue about all contact with the police is important...but, interestingly, 
the performance measures we have at the moment [locally run surveys based on 
the standardised Policing Performance Assessment Framework] are heavily 
weighted towards the satisfaction of the victims, because the user satisfaction 
surveys we have in place at the moment only get feedback from victims” 
(representative of the Police Reform Unit).
The ‘PPAF’ is the primary method of assessing the progress of such reform in local 
areas relating to the police. For the rest of the criminal justice system, the new Witness 
and Victim Experience (WAVES) survey will be utilised (Representative of the OCJR). 
It is not clear whether the WAVES survey will be weighted in favour of obtaining the 
views of witnesses, victims or the public in general. Both of these instruments are new 
constructions developed specifically for this purpose. Their development also 
exemplifies the need for different branches of the policy-making progress to work 
together, in this case to ensure there is not too much overlap between surveys.
By examining the content and the pattern of delivery of victim reforms, one might 
conclude that these have been used to ‘buy’ public support for other, less popular 
measures. For example, it is probably relevant that the Halliday report on sentencing 
was due to be published a' few months after the 2001 review of the criminal justice 
system Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead (Home Office, 2001b). Halliday would 
criticise traditional prison sentences of less than 12 months and suggest a greater role
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for community supervision (Halliday, 2001). The Labour government were by now very 
mindful of appearing ‘soft on crime’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2002). As such, one can 
see the increasing concessions to victims and witnesses made in The Way Ahead as a 
way of securing the political capital to take a more constructive view of offenders and 
their sentencing which was, of course, a practical necessity given the ongoing penal 
crisis but one which the public was not terribly inclined to accept (see Rock, 1986).
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Admittedly, direct evidence for such a proposition could not be adduced from policy­
makers themselves in this research, although recently Walklate (2007) has touched upon 
this point in the context of the UK. Internationally, in Canada Rock (1986) concludes 
that to gain support for the abolition of the death penalty the Federal Government 
included it as part of a wider ‘Peace and Security Package’, which was assembled in a 
rather ad hoc manner and included victimisation surveys (Rock, 1986). Later in this 
chapter, we will note how victim policies are often combined with more punitive 
measures, which may represent a similar effect. The notion of placating the public by 
combining victim reform with more controversial measures introduces the important 
question as to whether this ‘policy chain’ is really concerned with victims at all, or 
instead with wider notions of the ‘general public’ or the ‘normal, law-abiding citizen’ 
(cjsonline, 2006c; Home Office, 2006b).
Overall, It seems likely that the government’s current view of what ‘at the heart of the 
system’ means will depend on contemporary political influences and pressures. Indeed, 
evidence from the policy chain indicates that the government itself sometimes has no 
clear answer to our first research questions, which is illustrated by the implementation 
of the victim personal statement scheme. On this point, Hoyle et al. (1999) reported 
some confusion as to whether victim statements (as they were then called) were 
intended primarily to act as a tool of expression for the victim or whether they were 
intended to assist the system by providing more information on which to base decisions. 
The confusion amongst various criminal justice agencies on this point prompted a 
further report the following year to examine the uses to which victim statements were 
actually being put (Morgan and Sanders, 1999). In that report, the authors concluded 
that the victim statements were seen primarily as an aid to sentencing by criminal 
justice professionals but that in practice they still had little to no impact on most 
sentencing decisions. Again it was suggested that there needed to be further clarification 
as to whether the sole purpose of the scheme was merely cathartic or whether the 
statements were actually intended to have an instrumental purpose in the criminal
1 2 0
justice system.16 If the likely or realistic impact of making a statement were not made 
clear to victims, then the scheme would only raise victims’ hopes unduly.
Edwards (2004) notes that the participatory goals of victim personal statements have 
never been clarified, and could be expressive, consultative or informative. This 
confusion surrounding the purposes of victim personal statements forces us to fall back 
to questioning the existence of any consistent policy at all. The reality may be that ‘at 
the heart of the system’ sometimes means providing information, sometimes means 
consultation, sometimes means both and sometimes means neither, depending on the 
circumstances at the time. As such, it is only when the different policies and 
developments are taken together -  and arranged into a policy chain -  that the impression 
of a consistent purpose is created.
4.3.2 -  Influencing the local context
A major component of our understanding of the policy chain lies in establishing how 
national policies are implemented locally. Of course, certainly in the case of England 
and Wales, it is not only the public that must be ‘won over’ to a new reform agenda, but 
also the local actors charged with implementing those reforms. As noted by one OCJR 
policy-maker:
“We can’t do anything if the Local [Criminal Justice] Boards don’t buy into it; it’s 
a partnership really that they agree that these objectives are the right ones and they 
sign up to it and then they help us deliver it” (representative of the OCJR).
To this end, policy-makers interviewed for this research stressed the need for effective 
communication between the centre and local service providers to get policy 
implemented. For example, one interviewee from the OCJR suggested that the main 
problem with the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was that parts of it 
were not specific enough and open to wide interpretation. In addition, we hâve noted the 
view that documents like the new deal ‘bombarded’ readers with large numbers of 
priorities. The OCJR’s response to this was to produce a ‘delivery plan’ (OCJR, 2005) 
containing the seven key priorities mentioned above for victims and witnesses, which 
were agreed by the National Criminal Justice Board. Nevertheless, even these priorities 
required clarification for local implementers (LCJBs):
16 The possibility that victim statements could achieve both aims simultaneously does not 
appear to have received much attention.
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“I felt that those seven priorities are very very high level and they’re very broad, 
and certainly if I was somebody who worked in a Local Criminal Justice Board 
area I wouldn’t necessarily know what I was supposed to do with that” 
(representative of the OCJR).
So, for example, one policy-maker from the OCJR explained ‘disappointing’ take-up 
rates for victim personal statements in terms of local agencies not really understanding
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their purpose. Priority four is that victims’ views will be sought and used in the criminal 
justice process and, as such, the relevant toolkit spelt out how victim personal 
statements should be collected and used in an effort to boost the implementation of 
existing reforms.
Another mechanism designed to achieve broadly the same ends was the promotion of 
‘victim champions’ in the police and other agencies. The idea was to have designated 
people ( ‘champions’) in each local agency to promote awareness and disseminate good 
practice in relation to victims and witnesses. One interviewee from the DCA was 
particularly enthusiastic about this method of ‘localising’ victim and witness policies, 
although as of Autumn 2005 progress had been slow in finding people willing to act as 
champions (representative of the DCA).
Implementing criminal justice policies like these clearly brings numerous challenges:
“We’re trying to deliver something in an amazingly complex delivery chain” 
(representative of the OCJR).
This is especially the case when dealing with non statutory local bodies -  as the LCJBs 
used to be17 -  who do not have their own finances18 and “in a sense don’t exist”, 
because such bodies are not expressly subject to the authority of central policy-making 
Units (representative of the OCJR). Of course, this also implies a lack of accountability 
(see Crawford, 1997), and perhaps enforceability of victim rights. One way around such 
problems in recent years has been for the OCJR to provide a ‘delivery fund’ of 
£150,000 from which small grants have been awarded to the local agencies making up 
the LCJBs. Of course, this is a very small sum indeed compared to the £25 million 
afforded to Victim Support (2006), itself a tiny proportion of the budget for the entire
17 They became statutory in April 2004.
18 Which largely remains true in the statutory era.
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criminal justice system. This system also ensures that the OCJR retains control of the 
local implementation of relevant measures.
The most common way of applying central policies in local contexts has been for the 
centre to set national minimum standards and then allowing each local area to 
implement these in their own way following individual impact assessments:
■ .1 *
“The messages they [the centre] are giving out is that of a national framework 
with a strategy, but with local discretion and decision-making” (the Regional 
Director of Legal Services (Justices’ Clerk)).
We might be concerned by this remark to the extent that it implies a lack of consistency 
between areas and maybe a postcode lottery of victim services, especially when -  as we 
shall see below -  the national standards may not be difficult to meet.
For the police, such standards went beyond ‘victim and witnesses’ to encompass 
‘citizen-focused’ policing in general. Again, this hints at a wider scope for such 
policies, aimed at the public in general rather than just victims. These standards were 
however formulated with reference to the Victim’s Code of Practice to ensure 
consistency across the spectrum. The Police Reform Unit also organised ‘practitioner 
networking’ events to disseminate best practice (representative of the Police Reform 
Unit). .
Members of the LCJB in the area under review were clear that they did indeed enjoy a 
degree of autonomy from the centre but -  contrary to the above sentiments expressed in 
Whitehall -  they were more inclined to consider themselves ‘accountable’ to the OCJR 
and the National Criminal Justice Board. The local view was thus that national 
standards essentially compelled the Board to take action:
“We believe they [the centre] can [make the LCJB do things]...There are certain 
givens which you have to do and we wouldn’t argue that we shouldn’t 
either...But there are some which are negotiable almost. For 
example...conditional cautioning, they were desperate to get pilots for conditional 
cautioning.. .there was a feeling in CPS and police that we couldn’t take any more 
at this time and we wanted to defer it and we did defer it for a few months, but 
then they came back to us -  sweet talked us -  and they particularly wanted an area 
to pilot it and we have agreed to it. But we were able to deflect it to the long grass 
for a while...There are obviously some key strategic aims and objectives set by 
the government as part of the criminal justice service strategic plan, so it would 
not be incumbent upon us to say ‘no we’re not going to prioritise [such’ areas]’ 
because they are part of the national strategy and it’s our job to deliver those” (the 
Regional Director of Legal Services (Justices’ Clerk)).
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As such, it was not usually a case of the Board or its constitutive agencies specifically 
acquiescing to each new requirement -  which would be more in keeping with notions of 
governance (Bache, 2003) and interactive policy-making (Mayer et al., 2005) -  
although the Board had been successful in deflecting such requirements for limited 
periods.
Take, as an example, the national implementation of the No Witness No Justice scheme, 
designed to promote witness attendance at court (Home Office, 2004g). At the pilot 
stage, the police in the local area under review were given a wide remit to run tailored 
initiatives. Nevertheless, when the national minimum standards were delivered, local 
actors found themselves with less discretion:
“We’ve had to fit the national model, I ’d say 50% of everything we’ve done at the 
pilot had to change. At the pilot we were basically given ‘this is the remit, and we 
want you to increase standards -  hit these targets -  and we don’t particularly care 
how you do it’. Then...suddenly...we went down to London one day...expecting 
to go to a review of the pilot meeting and we walked into the DCA at Whitehall 
and they said ‘oh, the format today has changed, we are now going to set 
minimum standards’ and because all the pilots had come from different size areas 
we found that minimum standards seemed to be ‘bits’ from everything...bashed 
together...and there are one or two issues that have been a thorn in our side ever 
since” (a witness care unit manager).
Indeed, as one police chief noted:
‘Things were moving at a national level, a big scale. These so-called pilots, we 
got the feeling that whatever the outcome they would be implemented” (a police 
chief inspector).
Hence, it is clear that whilst the policy of allowing local implementation of national 
strategies does afford LCJBs some measure of discretion, the reality is that whilst the 
strategies and standards themselves are applied in a broad, untailored manner, local 
agencies have little alternative but to follow the centre’s lead. That said, it was clear that 
local difficulties like those described above have fed back to central policy-makers to 
some extent, which may reflect Rein and Rabinovitz’s (1978) principle of circularity 
noted above:
“Finally I think they are beginning to realise as a corporate voice now [that] if 42 
[police] forces are coming back and only two can actually hit the minimum 
standard then there is something that they ought to be listening to. So there are 
little things now that they’re beginning to tweak” (a witness care unit manager).
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In terms of the influence of the Board itself, it is clear that its members are top 
management figures from each agency, and as such the Board has a lot of influence on 
those agencies:
“[The Board] cannot commit resources of a separate organisation...but it’s 
extremely powerful and persuasive -  at least persuasive -  because the whole point . 
of it is it’s got the chief officers on it, these are people with purse strings, these are 
people with clout” (the Regional Director of Legal Services (Justices’ Clerk)).
Disagreements within the LCJB were apparently rare, but when they occurred members 
would:
“Use our skills of negotiation and persuasion to try and come to a consensus and 
see what support other agencies might be able to give. We try to look for a win- 
win situation” (ibid).
Another interviewee described the LCJB as “a very polite setting” without much robust 
contention or debate (Youth Offending Team Manager, 2005). Indeed, some argued that 
the lack of a genuine power of compulsion was a disadvantage for the LCJB:
“The way that it’s set up it’s all about influencing people rather than having 
control over outcomes...I just think the structure doesn’t allow it to be as 
proactive as it could be” (the director of a private prison).
Nationally, a representative of the Department for Constitutional Affairs (2005) told me 
that her Department had certain ‘levers’, especially to influence the courts. Here, the 
chain of influence stretched from the DCA, which could make recommendations to the 
Courts Service Board, which were then passed on through the regional and area 
directors to the individual court managers and, finally, operational staff on the ground. 
This helps illustrate the ‘complex delivery chain’ referred to above and is an example of 
the vertical axis of policy-making (Matheson, 2000). That said, the DCA can contact the 
courts directly. For example, in 2004 the Courts Innovation Branch of the DCA 
contacted every magistrates’ court to ask whether they wanted to establish a recognised 
specialist domestic violence court.
In this instance the DCA also relied on word of mouth between neighbouring areas to 
disseminate the merits of the specialist courts:
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“What was also quite clear was that a number of them [criminal justice areas] had 
already been talking about this locally with their local partners...quite often 
people locally -  local agencies -  will already be talking about ‘how we tackle 
domestic violence’” (representative of the DCA, courts innovation branch).
In the area under review, there was indeed regular communication between local 
agencies and neighbouring areas, especially to swap ideas on the local implementation 
of national standards: , e
“It’s funny, we received something through from my equivalent in [a 
neighbouring area] the other day saying to us, how are you going to do it?” (a 
police chief inspector).
Hartley and Barrington (2006) in particular have stressed the importance of such inter- 
organisational sharing of information in a wide range of policy-making. In this context, 
it was also clear that local agencies are able to take concerns to the Local Criminal 
Justice Board if they feel national standards are omitting important issues. For example, 
the local Youth Offending Team (YOT) manager expressed frustration at the exclusion 
of young people from the new WAVES survey and was determined to plug this gap:
“One of the things that I think has clearly been excluded from this ‘putting victims 
at the heart of the criminal justice system’ is the notion of young people. They do 
a thing called WAVES...and indeed young people are explicitly excluded from 
that survey.. .This is something I ’ve raised with the Local Criminal Justice 
Board...and the Board have accepted that and I ’ve actually self-delegated the task 
of going away to come up with something we can do locally to try to redress that 
to get the views of young people who are victims in the criminal justice system” 
(a youth offending team manager).
The same interviewee noted that there was little point taking operational-level issues to 
the Board because the Board was comprised of the highest-level representatives of the 
agencies and it was more productive to go straight to lower level representatives.19 The 
YOT manager was keen to emphasise how gaining a place on the LCJB for the YOT 
had been an important breakthrough for the recognition of the service:
‘There is another aspect to it which is one -  from a YOT point of view -  is one of 
kudos actually, and it was a significant achievement by the Youth Justice Board to 
get YOT down as a stand alone member of the Criminal Justice Board in its own 
right” (ibid).
19 Some of the earliest moves in the area under review had been taken forward entirely 
unofficially. For example, waiting rooms and TV links were introduced at Court C on the 
initiative of an usher (interview with a court clerk at Court C).
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This is in contrast to Victim Support and other voluntary organisations, which have no 
place on the Board. On this issue we might question the ability of Local Criminal 
Justice Boards to achieve genuine change for the benefit of victims when they are made 
up of administrators rather than victims or other ‘customers’ of the criminal justice 
system themselves. Clearly, the Boards seem to be examples of the “new forms of 
management of public services and structures for policy formation and implementation”  ^
spoken of by Crawford (1997: p.l). Nevertheless, administrators may be said to have an 
interest in promoting efficiency and reducing costs rather than innovating to provide 
services to victims. This is not to say individual Boards may not become particularly 
enthusiastic about victims20, but as a whole this system relies on the enthusiasm of 
individuals rather than the combined or inherent goals of the body itself.21
4.3.2.1 -  Local funding
As in most areas of policy and administration, funding was an issue of some concern 
amongst local service providers and agencies. Very little central funding had been made 
available for many of the victim and witness initiatives necessary to achieve national 
standards. For example, the probation service in the area under review had been 
required to take money from the local pot to fund its victim contact duties under Multi 
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). The same was true of the YOT 
manager referred to above, who had to personally negotiate the funding of his initiative 
to plug gaps in the WAVES survey, the money being drawn from existing local 
resources. Indeed, the same was true of the Youth Offending Team more generally, 
which contracted out some of its victim contact work to the charity REMEDI:
“My initial view here was that it could be and should be something that the YOT 
workers should be able to do themselves, that they should be professional enough 
to be able [to do that]. It’s not necessarily that I’ve changed my view on that but 
the reality was that the victims weren’t getting the service that was required from 
us by national standards, so I got in touch with REMEDI and we co-fund a post 
here. They pay for half of it and we pay for half of it” (a youth offending team 
manager).
20 As was evident in the area under review.
21 Several members of the Board were highly experienced lawyers. Nevertheless, on this point 
Batten et al. (2006) note that lawyers in high-ranking positions in local government often 
relinquish any claims to specialisation in any particular area of law. As such, they do not use 
their ‘specialist’ knowledge of legal practice to influence local policy-making. It could be 
speculated that a similar effect may occur when a lawyer is appointed to a high-level 
management position and the LCJB in relation to policy implementation.
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Again the YOT had received no central funding for these measures, nor was it to receive 
any money to help meet the standards under the new statutory Code. The local private 
prison also had a MAPPA role to play in contacting victims of very serious offences 
before the release of offenders that prompted no extra funding from the centre:
“We haven’t received any extra resources for that, we’ve had to build those 
resources into what we do. Contractually we could have taken the line that -  
unless there’s some resources with it -  we’re not going to do it. Morally I didn’t 
feel that -  whilst we said we wanted resources for it -  even though we didn’t get 
any, morally I said we still need to be doing this” (the director of a private prison).
The ‘resource issue’ was also a prominent concern in the organisation of the joint 
CPS/Police witness care unit:
“Years ago there was a declaration that [the] CPS were going to be the guardians 
of witnesses in the future22, and really they’ve never really had the resources to do 
that, they’ve always relied on the police to have witness liaison clerical staff...in 
fact it’s still 95% police” (a police chief inspector).
This was despite the fact that the CPS had received central funding for No Witness No 
Justice initiatives, as well as the Effective Trial Management Programme (Chief Crown 
Prosecutor). Nevertheless, it was clearly emphasised that -  certainly as far as the police 
were concerned -  the WCU was competing with completely separate initiatives for 
scarce resources:
“What tends to happen is the Chief will look at the overall budgets and say ‘well,
I want some of that for automatic number plate recognition for counter terrorism 
measures’. So I can’t quite manage my own budget...perhaps naivety compelled 
me to declare what we’d got!” (a police chief inspector).
That said, one court administrator accepted that many of the initiatives necessary to help 
victims and witnesses did not cost a great deal of money:
“There were plenty of excuses over resources, it hasn’t cost us that much to set 
this up at all” (the Clerk to the Justices at Court B).
Some respondents -  especially local administrators -  believed that more funding should 
also be available to help voluntary agencies provide a more professional service:
22 In the Glidewell (1998) Report.
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“All the organisations supporting victims are voluntary originations -  not 
publicly funded -  I think it’s very sad...W e’re not wealthy here but compared to 
[Victim Support] we’re rich people. They’ve got nothing at all, they really are 
struggling” (the Clerk to the Justices at Court A).
“I would put the money not necessarily into statutory organisations, but into 
voluntary organisations so that the follow up and the additional work is there, and 
particularly into services like counselling and mental health help...There is 
differential quality in terms of the volunteers at Victim Support -  and I don’t want 
to detract from the wonderful job, I think they do an absolutely brilliant job, they 
really do. But, you will have some victims that-. One I’m thinking about that 
somebody talked to me about last week, where she had a Victim Support 
volunteer where as soon as she started hearing about the victim’s loss of their son 
who’d been murdered she said ‘well that’s why I came into Victim Support 
because my daughter was murdered’ and proceeded to talk all about her 
experience. The victim found themselves almost counselling the volunteer.. .The 
training and the money needs to go into providing salaries for Victim Support 
workers” (representative of the probation service).
Applying to the Home Office for ever-increased funding has been a permanent 
occupation for Victim Support. Indeed, the Chair of Victim Support’s National Board of 
Trustees has called for a substantial increase of government funding to £60 million 
(Victim Support, 2003b). The charity is sometimes portrayed as a quasi-government 
department on the basis that it has firmly established itself within the ‘inner circle’ of 
CJS organisations (Rock, 1998; Home Office, 2003a). If this were indeed the case, 
however, then the disparity between the amounts being asked for by Victim Support and 
the money being provided by the Home Office is the most striking evidence yet for the 
lack of a unified victims strategy and a reluctance to fully fund this new ‘victim- 
centred’ system centrally.
The government, for its part, has often drawn on its grants to Victim Support to 
illustrate its work in supporting victims and witnesses (Home Office, 2001a, 2003a). 
Once again, however, one might argue that Victim Support’s permanent obligation to 
request increased funds from the Home Office -  and their subsequent need to establish a 
‘reserves policy’ in the event of funding being withdrawn (Victim Support, 2006) -  
suggests an absence of any long-term or fixed strategy on the part of the government.
43.2.2 -  Local responsibility?
From the themes derived'above, it seems clear that the government’s strategy on 
providing support to victims is one of local agencies taking responsibility for delivering 
services -  usually with existing funds -  which meet national targets, distributed through
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the Local Criminal Justice Boards. The advantage to this is that local bodies have the 
discretion to tailor activities to fit their own needs. Nevertheless, a less flattering 
interpretation of this model sees the government portioning out responsibility for 
victims to local actors. Indeed, some links may be drawn here with the government’s 
tendency to ‘depoliticise’ issues, by which government keeps at arms length -  or ‘at one 
remove’ -  the political character of decision-making, as discussed by Burnham (2001)  ^
in the economic sphere. < c
Under this construction, the government’s maintenance of victims as a ‘shared priority’ 
becomes more understandable. Support must be offered (for the most part) through 
existing local funding, meaning the payment for this ‘victim-centred’ system does not 
come from central resources; hence the minuscule sums afforded to Local Criminal 
Justice Boards. Indeed, funding-wise victims couldn’t be any further from the ‘heart’ of 
the system, even if one includes the funding provided to Victim Support and the cost of 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. We have also seen that it is questionable 
whether Local Criminal Justice Boards are the best agencies to coordinate the delivery 
of such local support, as they are not inherently interested in victims per se, but rather in 
meeting targets handed down from the centre. Setting these targets does not however 
fulfil what is arguably the government’s and policy-makers’ role to provide the victim- 
centred model of criminal justice we have been promised23, especially as it is the local 
agencies who are held accountable (certainly in their view) if such policies do not meet 
the required standard.
It should be noted that local implementation did not begin and end with the Local 
Criminal Justice Boards, as several other (multi-agency) groups existed in the area 
under review that discussed victim issues. These included the probation-led ‘Victims 
Network’ which -  like the LCJB -  included representatives of all local agencies and 
was essentially a consultative group. The LCJB itself would form ‘subgroups’ to focus 
on specific targets, including the Victims and Witnesses Subgroup on which Victim 
Support did have representation (the District Legal Director at Court A). As we might 
by now expect, these were essentially local initiatives for which central funding was 
again absent.
23 Nor does publishing reams of informational leaflets and online walkthroughs.
130
4.3.3 -  Growing understandings of ‘victimhood’
Throughout the policy chain and its local implementation we can note development in 
official understandings of ‘victimhood’.24 This is clearly demonstrated by the recently 
proposed (and now piloted) ‘victims’ advocates’ (Home Office, 2005b, Home Office, 
2005c) afforded to secondary victims ( ‘survivors’) of homicide.25 In Chapter 3 we noted 
that this reform may effectively afford party status to this small percentage of victims. 
Such development in official definitions is intricately connected with other factors 
influencing the policy chain, especially the victim assistance groups and international 
influences. The former have been particularly influential in developing an appreciation 
for the needs of victims outside the criminal justice system (Victim Support, 2002a). 
We see this reflected in policy through documents like the new deal, by which time the 
‘official’ definition of ‘victims’ had become quite wide:
“Those who are the direct subject of crime, or of anti-social behaviour, or are the
close family or friends of those bereaved by road traffic accidents” (Home Office,
2003a: p.29).
The deal also emphasises the role of government services outside the criminal justice 
system, especially housing and healthcare services, which links with the development of 
the multi-agency approach discussed below and again seems to be part of a broader 
trends towards governance in this area and ‘horizontal’ policy-making more generally 
(Matheson, 2000; Milboume et al., 2003). In its list of ‘victims with particular needs’ 
the deal referred to several groups that were traditionally sidelined, including bereaved 
families26, victims of human trafficking and victims of domestic violence. It is 
interesting to note that this definition merely requires a person be the subject of crime or 
anti-social behaviour and does not specify any particular harm or loss endured.27 
Technically, the inclusion of victims of anti-social behaviour extends this definition 
beyond victims of crime. A related -  and very interesting point -  was raised by one 
DCA representative, concerning witnesses in these proceedings:
24 See Rock (2002), and for a wider discussion of how policy-makers use definitions see 
Macleavy (2006).
25 See also the Coping with Grief leaflet for survivors (Home Office, 2003b). It is perhaps not 
coincidence that such measures come at the same time as the Victims Advisory Panel is 
dominated by homicide survivors.
26 ‘Survivor’ is becoming the established term to refer to this group (Rock, 1998).
27 Although Elias would argue that it is our social definitions of crime that are to blame for 
excluding many victims (Elias, 1986).
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“[Courts] had a real problem with the fact that anti-social behaviours- because 
they’re civil orders...quite often the kinds of witnesses you get are fairly 
vulnerable, very open to intimidation because you may be living next to the 
person you’re giving evidence against...until recently [special measures were] not 
available in anti-social behaviour order cases, because it’s a civil matter, the terms 
of the legislation is that you can use special measures for criminal proceedings, 
there was a lot of confusion” (representative of the DCA).
. .1 c
On realising this problem the law was changed -  through action by DCA policy-makers 
-  such that special measures are now available in anti-social behaviour order 
proceedings.28 This episode again represents an expansion in our understanding of 
different victims (of intimidation) and their needs, and the reform of services to meet 
those needs.
We might also note here the finding of Tarling et al. (2000) that many intimidated 
British Crime Survey victims and witnesses were not being intimidated with the 
principal intention of preventing them from giving evidence at court, and indeed:
“[I]ntimidation to deter witnesses giving evidence is relatively rare” (p.3).
This is an important breakthrough because it extends our understanding of what it 
means to be a victim of intimidation and separates it from the criminal justice process. 
In other words, intimidation is not simply an issue for the system, but for the victims 
and witnesses themselves in their everyday lives.
We have also seen the development of legal concepts of victimisation in the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, which expanded definitions of ‘sexual victimisation’. This again 
followed long-term arguments from victim groups to the effect that non-consensual oral 
sex was as distressing for the victim as ‘traditional’ rape (see Rape Crisis, 2007).29 As 
such, the Act may be said to reflect more accurately the harm and suffering of those 
experiencing such acts, as opposed to restrictive legalistic definitions that exclude many 
victims.
28 s. 143 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
29 Although the 2003 Act still restricts ‘rape’ to non-consensual penetration by the penis into the 
vagina or anus, this definition has been extended in some parts of America.
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By the time the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill was published in December 
2003 the accompanying explanatory notes suggested that the Bill’s definitions of 
victimhood were:
“[W]ide enough to include victims of offences of which no offence was reported 
to the police or no suspect was charged or convicted...and witnesses who are not 
actually called to give evidence” (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2003: p.3).
>) e .
This perhaps indicates a move away from the often-criticised convention of referring to
‘alleged victims’ in accordance with the defendant’s presumed innocence (Rock,
1993).30 In addition, the government’s 2005 consultation document on creating a
tougher framework for road traffic offences (Home Office, 2005e; Home Office,
2005a) argues that such a framework should accurately reflect the ‘devastating
consequences’ suffered by the victims of such crime. As with the reforms under the
Sexual Offences Act 2003, this seems to indicate a move towards defining victims by
the suffering they experience (initially and in the criminal justice system) rather than
through more exclusionary legal definitions. Consequently, at least one policy-maker
(and several lawyers and practitioners) spoken to for this study said they would always
try to put themselves “in the shoes of the victim” (representative of the DCA).31 We will
return to the expanded definitions of ‘victimhood’ and the notion of ‘finding new
victims’ in our discussion of macro influences.
4.3.4 -  Distinguishing victims and witnesses
Another notable feature of policy-making in this area is that ‘victims’ have rarely been 
distinguished from ‘witnesses’ until quite recently. This is rather ironic, as we have seen 
in the last chapter that victimology was initally far more concerned with victimisation in 
general, and only later narrowed its focus down to victims of crime, and still later to 
victims in criminal justice. In line with Christie’s (1977) notion of the ‘ideal victim’, the 
assumption that ‘real victims’ necessarily become involved with the criminal justice 
system is perhaps responsible for the victim’s role often being combined with that of the 
witness in official policy; hence Jackson’s (2004) argument that much of this policy is 
focused on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses.
30 Although in practice it has been shown that the high percentage of guilty pleas means that in 
many cases CJS professionals presume the opposite (Carlen, 1976).
31 See Chapter 6.
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The eventual separation of ‘victims’ by policy-makers as a group distinct from 
witnesses follows on from the last section as another example of how ‘victims’ are 
being defined more widely and precisely to include, for example, victims outside the 
criminal justice process. Nevertheless, the tendency to consider victims and witnesses at 
the same time, and often in the same breath, seems to have worked its way along much 
of the policy chain right up to the new deal (Home Office, 2003a). It is only recently,  ^
with the advent of a separate Victim’s Code of Practice (Home Office, 2005f) and 
(proposed) Witnesses’ Charter (Home Office, 2005g) that policy-makers now seem to 
be accepting that victims and witnesses can have different (if overlapping) needs.
We can draw many examples from the earlier policy-making agenda where victims and 
witnesses have been truncated into one group. For example, Labour’s initial 1997 
manifesto pledge on ‘victims in rape and serious sexual offence trials’ underwent a 
subtle metamorphosis through the subsequent Speaking up for Justice report written by 
the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Treatment of Vulnerable or Intimidated 
Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System (1998). The first paragraph of that report cites 
the manifesto pledge as the basis for the formation of the Group. Nevertheless, through 
reading the report it becomes apparent that this pledge was now being interpreted not as 
a statement on victims but one about intimidated witnesses, a number of who will be 
victims. Consequently, there was a change in emphasis; for in the wording of the pledge 
it was the victim who was given principal position and the witness who was phrased as 
the ancillary. The change is important, as it implies that neither the pledge nor the report 
viewed victims as victims in their own right, but simply as a special category of witness. 
Whilst the report was clearly presented as a review of the situation relating to witnesses, 
the manifesto pledge certainly implied a more central focus on the victim’s status as a 
victim.
The situation here may have been somewhat akin to Rock’s impression of reparation as 
the ‘Trojan horse’ smuggling victims into politics (Rock, 1990).32 Whilst victims 
unquestionably drew benefits from the outcomes of Speaking up for justice (as some did 
from reparation schemes) the fact remains that such benefits were not the government’s 
primary focus and therefore, in the larger framework, the policy did not indicate any
32 In this study one Youth Offending Team manger told me that victim contact work had 
originally been ‘sold’ to him as something that would benefit offenders.
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seismic governmental shift in favour of victims. The Speaking up for Justice report 
also illustrates how policies affecting ‘victims’ and ‘witnesses’ are influenced not only 
by different concerns external to themselves, but are also influenced by each other. 
Hence, the 1997 pledge and the 1998 report provide a good example of how various 
issues and politics can combine together, making it less clear what this ‘policy’ is really 
about.
The tendency to truncate victims and witnesses into one category appears to have 
continued until around 2000, with the publication of the Occasional Paper Victim and 
Witness Intimidation: Findings from the British Crime Survey (Tarling et al., 2000). 
This document is amongst the first reports collating information from (British Crime 
Survey) victims who were not necessarily witnesses. Increased recognition of victims as 
a separate group is also certainly appreciable in the 2001 review of the criminal justice 
system -  Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead — where reference is made to the problems 
faced by victims outside the criminal justice system (Home Office, 2001b). 
Interestingly, however, in the list of various past schemes and policies we have come to 
expect in such reports, only the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme is identified as 
a measure purely for the benefit of victims without also linking them to witnesses:
It is telling that the writers of the 2001 policy document chose to fall back on CICS as 
an illustration of the work that had been done to provide ‘support for victims’. This 
suggests that CICS (created in 1964) was at this stage still seen by policy-makers as the 
government’s most significant response to the problems faced by victims as a distinct 
group and that many of the more recent developments were still very much concerned 
with ‘victims as witnesses’. This is ironic given that CICS excludes a large proportion 
of victims (Miers, 1991). Indeed, the de facto requirement that successful applicants 
have co-operated with the criminal justice system effectively means CICS is again 
aimed at victims who are witnesses, or are at least willing to become witnesses.
Nevertheless, the beginnings of support for victims outside the CJS suggests that the 
needs of ‘non-witness victims’ were starting to be recognised. Certainly after 2001, 
policy documents seem to distinguish victims from witnesses more specifically and the 
victim personal statement scheme -  launched nationally in October 2001 -  is overtly 3
33 A shift in favour of reparation outcomes may constitute fundamental reform, but not a 
fundamental reform specifically intended to assist victims as Rock argues the goal was one of 
diversion.
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focused at victims in their own right.34 Nevertheless, it is significant that victims will 
only be offered the chance to make a VPS having already submitted a witness 
statement. This point may seem inconsequential, but one might conceive of situations 
where a case is prosecuted on the strength of other witnesses’ evidence and the victims 
themselves wish to communicate the lack of impact to the court.
Nevertheless, by the end of 2005, the publication of a draft ‘Witnesses’ Charter’ seems 
to have cemented this newfound policy distinction between the needs of victims and 
witnesses. This Charter sets out the “standards of care for witnesses in the criminal 
justice system” whether or not they are also victims. It is also worth noting that by the 
time I began interviewing policy-makers for this research in the summer of 2005,1 was 
being asked whether my focus was on victims or witnesses (representative of the Police 
Reform Unit). We might add here the new Prosecutors’ Pledge (CPS, 2005b) which is 
significant in that -  like the statutory Code -  the document is specifically focused on 
victims who may be witnesses rather than witnesses who may be victims.
It seems that this issue of distinguishing victims from witnesses in policy-making helps 
bring together a number of the ‘other politics’ identified by Rock (2004) and the present 
research. In Chapter 3 we noted Garland’s (2001) macro-level argument that, in late 
modem times, governments react to falling confidence in the ability of the system to 
control crime by redefining its success criteria in terms of the efficient management of 
cases and the provision of minimum standards of service to victims. This effectively 
prompts a philosophy of ‘victims as consumers’ of the criminal justice system, which 
Tapley (2002) and Rock (2004) have discussed and which is also now seen in other 
areas, including the National Health Service (Greener, 2004). This new focus on the 
process as experienced by victims rather than the specific outcomes as precipitated by 
participating witnesses necessitates the conceptual separation of these two groups, 
including gathering their separate thoughts and opinions, which we see towards the end 
of the policy chain with the advent of Witness Surveys and questions aimed specifically 
at victims in the British Crime Survey.
4.3.5 -  Victim Support and other victim interest groups
Throughout the policy chain a certain degree of choreography has developed between 
the issues raised by Victim Support and the actions of policy-makers. So, for example, it
34 Notwithstanding the criticisms surrounding its implementation discussed above.
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is notable that many (although not all) of the issues raised in Victim Support’s (2001) 
manifesto were later found in Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead and/or the 2001 review 
of the Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 2001b; Home Office, 2001d). Similarly, when 
Victim Support published its No Justice Beyond Criminal Justice report on the plight of 
victims outside criminal justice (Victim Support, 2002a) this was swiftly followed by 
similar views being expressed in the new deal (Home Office, 2003a). In addition, we 
can note the active involvement of Victim ' Support in drafting the 2001 European 
Framework decision, which the Victim’s Code of Practice is intended to implement 
(Victim Support, 2002b).
Contributions were also made by more specialist victim assistance organisations 
towards widening official definitions of victimhood, including Rape Crisis (Rock, 2004) 
and Support After Murder and Manslaughter. The view of SAMM in particular appears 
to have carried some weight following the recent consultation on victims’ advocates for 
homicide survivors (Home Office, 2005b). Indeed, in announcing the pilot for this 
scheme, the government seems to be following the views of SAMM and other such 
organisations rather than those of the judiciary and lawyers, who mainly opposed the 
pilots (Home Office, 2005c). With the (statutory) establishment of the Victims’ 
Advisory Panel we are told that victims will get the opportunity to feed directly into 
policy-making; the panel comprising of victims of hate crime, burglary and anti-social 
behaviour, although we noted earlier that most are secondary victims of serious violent 
crime, making them atypical victims.
Thus, the policy-making process in this area has frequently involved governments 
reacting to periodic requests or calls for action from a variety of different victim 
assistance groups. With this comes the implication that ‘the policy’ has been driven and 
developed on a much more ad hoc basis than it may first appear. Rock (1998) has 
already described how policy-makers began taking greater account of ‘secondary 
victims’ during the late Conservative era following pressure from organisations like 
Parents of Murdered Children (POMC) and SAMM.
More recently, proposals to amend the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme have 
apparently been spurred on by the dissatisfaction of victims and relatives of victims who 
were injured or killed in the London bombings of July 2005 (Home Office, 2005d: p. 17) 35
35 Which in turn was followed that same day by a statement from Victim Support applauding the 
government for adopting its ideas so quickly.
137
and the comparisons that have been drawn with the operation of the US compensation 
systems after September 11th (BBC, 2006; Walklate, 2007). This interpretation is 
consistent with Harland’s (1978) impression that state compensation programmes are 
often grounded in the contemporary emotional and political climate, created in the wake 
of tragic and dramatic events or victim rallies.
Whilst Victim Support continues to defend its independent, voluntary status, the 
organisation has arguably developed a more political character.36 We have seen this 
through its work on the 2001 Framework Decision, the publication of a ‘manifesto’ 
(Victim Support, 2001) and its inclusion on the list of ‘Criminal Justice System 
Agencies and Partners’ (Home Office, 2001b). It is also included as an organisation 
with obligations under the Victim’s Code of Practice, effectively establishing it as a 
statutory agency (Rock, 2004: p.561). More recently, Victim Support has been involved 
in the organisation of conferences in conjunction with the Office for Criminal Justice 
Reform’s Victim and Confidence Unit and intended to further the consultation exercise 
on proposed changes to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (Home Office, 
2006c).
It therefore seems likely that Victim Support is now being consulted on almost all 
upcoming actions and reports relating to victims and witnesses.37 Given such 
observations, it might be tempting to think of Victim Support as the logical ‘driving 
force’ responsible for pushing government reforms on victims and witnesses. The 
reality, however, is probably far more complicated and -  as this chapter suggests -  
influenced by a wider range of factors.
Fundamentally, we can question the extent to which Victim Support has been afforded 
the political ability to sway policy-making. Indeed, despite adopting a more 
professionalised character in recent years, the charity has still resisted any attempts to 
actively sway opinion on victims by commissioning research or holding independent 
conferences. In fact the role of Victim Support appears to be more consultative. We saw 
in Chapter 3 how victims themselves are now being consulted on various issues by the 
criminal justice system, although their opinions may have little practical impact. Victim
36 See Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) for a discussion of how interest groups adapt their 
strategies in order to retain their influence in policy-making.
37 Indeed, this is made clear though its Annual Reviews (Victim Support, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
Victim support schemes also had representation on the JUSTICE Committee (1998).
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Support may be in a parallel position with regard to policy-making, hence the charity’s 
permanent (usually frustrated) obligation to call for more government finance, despite 
the fact that the services afforded by Victim Support are generally recognised as 
providing good value for money (interview with representative of the OCJR). In 
addition, at the local level we have noted that Victim Support and other voluntary 
organisations are not yet represented -  certainly in the area under review -  on the Local 
Criminal Justice Board, albeit at least one member did hint that this might be possible in 
the future:
“I think it will be something which comes back to the table about actual direct 
involvement by Victim Support at the Board but when the Board was set up it was 
pretty specific what the membership should be and Victim Support were not 
intended to be. They are a local service and they need to be an integral part of 
things like the court user groups and the county performance group and they need 
to be consulted by the group and are, but they do not have a seat round the table -  
it’s arguable that they should have” (the Regional Director of Legal Services 
(Justices’ Clerk)).
Again Victim Support is generally relegated to a consultation role.
What seems to have happened then is that Victim Support has been accepted as what 
Maloney et al. (1994) call a ‘core insider’ to the policy-making network in this area 
(Tisdall and Davis, 2004). Whilst some theories of governance point out a loss of 
control of policy-making by government (Pearce and Mawson, 2003), in fact 
governments can retain significant influence, especially over the composition of the 
policy-network (Richardson, 2000), which seems to be the case here. Indeed, unlike 
other pressure groups (such as the Howard League of Penal Reform) Victim Support 
has failed to establish any platform itself (such as the courting of media interest) 
whereby it can criticise the government when its calls for reform are not heeded. Hence, 
to see Victim Support as the driving force behind reform rather begs the question; for as 
Rock (1990) shows, the acceptance of the charity within the ‘inner circle’ of criminal 
justice agencies was itself part of the ongoing development of victim recognition and 
victim policy. This is not to say that Victim Support has not come to play an important 
role in the development of victim policy. In particular, we may attribute to this and 
other victim assistance organisations the continued proliferation of ‘rights’ language in 
relation to victims -  especially given its contribution to the 2001 European Framework 
Decision (Victim Support, 2002b) -  and, more recently, the acceptance of the concept
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of ‘Victims Voice’ (and with it, victims as parties) has been given new impetus through 
the victims’ advocates pilots proliferated by SAMM.
This last observation may indicate a wider point about policy-making. Whilst we have 
noted before that ‘new’ policies are generally repackaged as the logical extensions of 
existing schemes, it is perhaps sufficient that such policies have some rhetorical 
pedigree, even if the rhetoric is not espoused by policy-makers themselves, but by 
relevant interest groups. Nevertheless, the point I wish to make is that Victim Support is 
unlikely to be the only factor influencing government policy on victims and witnesses 
and is perhaps not even the most significant one.
4.3.6 -  Criminal justice and other non-victim reform
Above, I have noted that one possible explanation for ‘victim reforms’ is that they are 
intended to achieve other ends that have little to do with victims themselves. As noted 
by one interviewee in this research:
“There’s always an awareness in any policy unit, there’s so many ways you can 
cut things -  always so much work that overlaps -  in any policy job that I’ve ever . 
had” (representative of the OCJR).
In this section we will gather together some of the most prominent ends achieved or 
connected with victim reform. These are wide-ranging, encompassing financial 
concerns, system efficiency, a ‘target culture’, the multi-agency approach and other 
goals for the system.
4.3.6.1 -  Financial concerns
At the outset, financial concerns have clearly had a part to play at many stages of the 
policy chain. One obvious example is the persistent attempts to reform the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme in order to stem the tide of ever-growing costs. As such, 
we can be mindful of Harland’s (1978) view:
“The reality of state-funded victim compensation seems to be that it is an 
extremely limited service available to only a minute proportion of those who 
suffer loss or injury as a result of crime. Too often, however, this reality is 
cloaked in a political show of concern for victims, while the underlying fears of 
costs continue to emerge in the form of programme restrictions” (p.213).
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Hence, we might be justified in wondering whether the government’s most recent 
suggestion to cease payments for ‘non-serious’ injury (Home Office, 2005d) has more 
to do with the financial cost of the scheme than with benefiting victims directly. The 
new system is said to reflect the practical and emotional support victims say they need 
in the BCS, although the survey has never actually asked victims whether they would 
prefer such practical support to small amounts of compensation. Also, as the Victim’s 
Charter had already guaranteed victims such services anyway, the government’s 
justification here seems dubious.
We might also here mention the government’s continued development of the system of 
court-based compensation orders, most recently in the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000. We have already noted in Chapter 3 that such orders -  as 
distinct from state compensation -  may represent an especially important symbolic 
recognition of a victim’s suffering (Miers, 1980). To this end, courts have been required 
to state reasons for not making such orders since 1988 (Miers, 1991). The suggestion is 
made in both the 2004 (Home Office, 2004a) and 2005 compensation consultations to 
place more emphasis on reclaiming money from offenders therefore seems a positive 
move. Of course, this would also lift the strain on the state system, as a victim is not 
compensated twice. In court, however, the limitations placed on compensation orders 
seems to be cultural, with judges and magistrates still unwilling to impose the orders as 
a single penalty or to combine them with custodial sentences (Home Office, 2004a). 
Difficulties also lie with the prosecution in that they often do not have enough 
information to know how much they should ask to be paid to the victims via a 
compensation order, which sometimes leads to them asking for such small amounts as 
to be insulting or not asking at all, and in which cases magistrates may be reluctant to 
make awards at their own discretion (Newbum, 1988, Moxon et al., 1992). Of course 
the key solution here seems to be the effective communication of the impact of crime to 
the courts, which I will argue in Chapter 5 is best accomplished through account­
making.
Also in relation to financial concerns, we have already noted the moves to reduce 
ineffective trials through instruments like the No Witness No Justice report (Inter­
agency working group on witnesses, 2003) and the Effective Trial Management 
Programme (Home Office,- 2004d).38 Ineffective trials represent a considerable drain on
38 On which, see below.
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resources for the criminal justice system as a whole. Of course — unlike the various 
schemes implemented through the LCJBs -  this is central funding going to ‘waste’.
At least one solicitor I spoke to during the course of this research believed that trial 
statistics were collected to allow the Legal Aid Board to decide which solicitors’ firms 
were more cost-effective ( ‘user-friendly’) and therefore worthy of franchised criminal 
contracts: .> *
“They’re saying ‘ahhh, you’ve got so many cracked trials you’...so when they 
come to do the franchising, when they come to say who is going to get a criminal 
contract, they’re going to use the people who have toed the line, they’re going to 
use the people who don’t have trials because they’re more user-friendly, they’re 
more cost-effective” (a defence solicitor appearing at Court B).
The same respondent went on to blame cost-cutting priorities for the recent focus on 
ineffective trials:
“No adjournments, no adjournments, that’s the philosophy, and the reason why is 
cost, they don’t want trials, they’re too costly” (a defence solicitor appearing at 
Court B),
Of course, in the wider policy field it has been noted that the economic and social policy 
spheres are being integrated in many areas (Valler and Betteley, 2001), meaning the 
financial influence here may once again reflect wider policy-making trends.
4.3.6.2 -  Increasing efficiency
On a related issue, there are also many indications throughout the policy chain that the 
‘victim’ question is often linked with increasing the efficiency of the criminal justice 
system rather than addressing their needs as a goal in itself. A clear example came in 
October 2003 with the introduction of a consultation paper entitled Securing the 
attendance of witnesses in court (Home Office, 2003d). This document invited 
consultation on the proposed resurrection of witness orders to compel witnesses’ 
attendance at Crown Court and summary trials. These proposals illustrate the fact that -  
whilst improving victim and witness satisfaction and making them feel more at ease 
with their role in the criminal justice system is presented as the ‘headline policy’ -  these 
aims are still connected with the less personal goal of getting witnesses (not victims) to 
come to court and thus improving the operation of the system. The consultation paper 
itself points out the possible conflict of policy:
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“Ensuring that witnesses attend court...is directly relevant to the delivery of the 
Government’s Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets on bringing more 
offences to justice and increasing confidence in the criminal justice system. 
However, it is possible that introducing a greater element of compulsion 
[through witness orders] might have a negative effect on the confidence PSA 
(particularly the witness satisfaction element of this target)” (Home Office, 
2003d: p.3).
The proposed renewal of witness orders now appears to have been dropped. 
Nevertheless, the publication of this consultation suggests that policy-makers were, in 
this instance, willing to trade witness satisfaction for increased efficiency. This indicates 
a very different set of priorities than those implied by the pledge to ‘put victims and 
witnesses at the heart of the criminal justice system’ or the apparent moves from an 
institutional-based to a citizen-based criminal justice system (Tapley, 2002; Goodey, 
2005). Instead, it reminds us that the government is still very concerned with efficiency 
and the associated low public confidence (and costs) in the criminal justice system, and 
that these concerns have a large influence on measures incidentally benefiting victims 
and witnesses. Hence, victims and witnesses were a key issue in the criminal justice 
system Framework Document of July 2003 on improving public satisfaction and 
confidence in the criminal justice system, which is a central Public Service Agreement 
target (Home Office, 2003c).
This drive for efficiency underlying much of the work on victims is also evidenced by 
the fact that many of the proposals for reform appear in the context of wider reports 
aimed at streamlining the criminal justice process. This was certainly the case with the 
Glidewell Report (1998), which recommended that the CPS take over responsibility for 
cases from the point of charge; becoming responsible for providing information about 
case decisions to victims directly and also taking overall charge of witness warning.39 
This report was actually commissioned to review the CPS -  essentially to examine the 
efficiency of one aspect of the criminal justice system -  not to look specifically at the 
quality of information provided to witnesses and victims. The Auld (2001) report 
similarly illustrates how different policy areas can feed into each other. Lord Auld’s 
terms of reference (formulated in December 1999) were as follows:
39 That is, informing them of their need to attend court and giving them the relevant details. 
Witness warning and de-warning was later described as a “multi-agency process involving, in 
particular, the police, CPS, the courts and the Witness Service” (Home Office, 2003g).
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“[To inquire into] the practices and procedures of, and the rules of evidence 
applied by, the criminal courts at every level, with a view to ensuring that they 
deliver justice fairly, by streamlining all their processes, increasing their 
efficiency and strengthening the effectiveness of their relationship with others 
across the whole of the criminal justice system, and having regard to the interests 
of all parties including victims and witnesses, thereby prompting public 
confidence in the rule of law” (Auld, 2001: p.l).
Clearly then this was a report intended to facilitate the smoother and more efficient
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operation of the criminal justice system rather than address the needs of victims and 
witnesses. Hence, providing a ‘better deal’ for victims and witnesses is placed in the 
context of a wider strategy to improve the criminal justice system; it was an aspect of 
this wider strategy but not the strategy itself. The same is also true of policy documents 
like Criminal Justice The Way Ahead (Home Office, 2001b) in which the chapter a 
better deal for victims and witnesses must be seen in its wider context; namely a review 
of the criminal justice system in general. Victims and witnesses were given seven out of 
139 pages despite a pledge to “put the needs of witnesses and victims more at the centre 
of the criminal justice system” (p.8). Hence, victims and witnesses were again just one 
element of a far wider strategy.
Also on the topic of system efficiency, running in parallel to all these developments 
were continued efforts to streamline the management of criminal trials. The Criminal 
Case Management Framework (encompassing the Effective Trial Management 
Programme), for example, is clearly focused on efficiency rather than victims, as 
indicated by the exclusion of youth cases -  which often involve particularly vulnerable, 
young victims -  from the ambit of the companion guide published by the government 
(Home Office, 2004d). It is telling that the prescribed aim for courts is to reduce 
ineffective40 trials rather than cracked trials40 1, which often still involve victims and 
witnesses attending court unnecessarily. As one local administrator put it:
“We’re not monitoring cracked trials [but] they’re as much an evil in terms of the 
process as ineffective trials!...The LCJB aren’t even concerned about cracked 
trials anymore because we’ve not been asked to monitor them! Why? They’re just 
as important as the other ones!” (the District Legal Director at Court A).
40 Trials postponed on the day for a future date. •
41 Trials listed to take place on a given day which are then resolved without going through the 
full trial procedure, usually because the defendant has changed his or her plea to guilty.
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Hence, in some cases, the goal of the scheme appears to be efficiency rather than the 
convenience of victims. Of course, this relates back to a point made earlier concerning 
the local implementation of victim reform through the LCJBs. Again, we might argue 
that as the Boards are comprised of criminal justice administrators rather than members 
with specific interests in victims per se, it is unsurprising that these policies become 
more about efficiency on implementation, even if they are not already weighted in that 
direction. i «
The proposition that ‘efficiency’ goals may be behind a number of victim reforms 
means a conflict arises for policy-makers between providing information to victims on 
the one hand, and ensuring witnesses will actually turn up to give evidence on the other. 
Some elements of government policies therefore bear the hallmark of an aggressive 
advertising campaign. Hence, information sources like the Victim of Crime booklet 
(Home Office. 2003f) and online virtual walkthroughs for victims and witnesses 
(cjsonline, 2006e) highlight the positive aspects of the product -  like the information 
and support available to witnesses and victims, the ability for victims to ‘be heard’ 
through victim personal statements and special measures to counter vulnerability and 
intimidation -  whilst downplaying the less appealing aspects such as intimidatory cross- 
examination, waiting times and the confusing, restrictive evidential process. All this 
suggests certain negative implications to victims’ recasting as ‘consumers’ of this 
product, which interviews confirmed has been a clear goal of policy-makers since at 
least December 2004 (representative of the DCA). One might argue therefore that, if 
victims and witnesses are indeed being brought more to the heart of a criminal justice 
system, this may not be the same criminal justice system as that inhabited by criminal 
justice professionals; the ‘professionals’ CJS’ is the unedited version.
Of course, it may be quite wrong to think of ‘efficiency’ as a separate endeavour to 
supporting victims:
“I think one of the things has been the recognition that the evidence out there 
suggest that these things don’t operate independently of each other...a very large 
proportion of the burglaries [police] solve are solved by victims and by witnesses.
So if you want to achieve [high detection rates] one of the things you’ve got to 
make sure of is that you are providing the right kind of services for victims and 
witnesses” (representative of the Police Reform Unit).
My point, rather, is that if this is indeed what the government is doing (or sometimes 
does) to understand the ‘larger framework’ of policies related to victims and witnesses
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we must also understand the government’s intentions for the CJS and the factors driving 
that policy, especially given the conflicting nature of various criminal justice goals, as 
demonstrated by Elias:
“Like prosecutors and police officers before them, judges seem trapped by 
conflicting penal goals, none of which seems to argue for a very strong victim 
role. For deterrence, judges want certainty and uniformity; for rehabilitation, the 
sentence must be tailored to offender needs; and for retribution, it must be 
orientated to the crime. If judges consider victims, then they must sacrifice either 
uniformity or offender needs or social goals” (Elias, 1986: p.156).
4.3.63 -  Other goals for criminal justice
Elias’ observation leads us to another issue; whether the current ‘social goals’ of the 
CJS are conducive to the needs of victims. In other words, victim policy can sometimes 
be grounded in wider strategies to achieve certain outcomes from the criminal justice 
process. For example, one stated aim of the new deal was to provide victims and 
witnesses with alternative options to the court; including restorative justice and other 
‘problem-solving’ remedies like anti-social behaviour processes and Community Justice 
Centres.42 Naturally, such ‘alternatives’ bring with them questions about whether the 
aim of the policy is to help victims and witnesses or to divert cases away from an 
overstretched criminal justice system (see Dignan, 1992), which could be seen as 
another bid to boost system efficiency.
As another illustration, we can look to the Executive Summary of the Justice for All 
White Paper (Home Office, 2002). This sets out the aims of the reforms as follows:
“Our programme of reform is guided by a single clear priority: to rebalance the 
criminal justice system in favour of the victim and the community so as to reduce 
crime and bring more offenders to justice” (para.0.3).
In this construction, it would appear that reforms in favour of victims are grounded in a 
higher set of priorities to reduce crime and prosecute more offenders; both of which are 
consistently popular as political aims. It also appears that the aims of the reforms go 
beyond victims, to encompass once again the wider community. This is problematic for, 
as Crawford (1997) points out, notions of the ‘community’ are elastic. Indeed for 
Crawford the concern is not that this term is meaningless, but that it is “overflowing 
with meaning” (p.300) and therefore must be problematised. Hence, we are again forced
42 These of course represent massive areas o f study, beyond the scope of the present thesis.
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to consider the possibility that the ‘policy’ of bringing victims to the ‘heart of the 
criminal justice system’ is not actually a policy about victims at all, but is rather -  in 
this instance -  a means to the end of achieving other criminal justice goals.
If the subject of the reform agenda is now ‘the community’ rather than victims in their 
own right, this introduces a whole new set of problems. Aside from the general
elasticity and multi layered nature of the term discussed by Crawford (1997), this may
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reflect some ideal notion of the ‘normal law-abiding citizen’, whom we see referred to 
increasingly in more recent announcements:
“This Government is committed to rebalancing the criminal justice system in 
favour of victims of crime and the law-abiding majority” (cjsonline, 2006d).
“Eight thousand new prison places were announced today as part of a package of 
measures to protect the public and further rebalance the criminal justice system in 
favour of the law-abiding majority” (cjsonline, 2006c).
This wider emphasis on the public in general in relation to victim policy43 was reflected 
in the recent criminal justice review document of 2006; Rebalancing the criminal 
justice system in favour of the law-abiding majority Cutting crime, reducing reoffending 
and protecting the public (Home Office, 2006c). Here then it is the ‘law-abiding 
majority’ being placed at the heart of criminal justice rather than the victims 
themselves44.
We know from Crawford (1997) and Bouterllier (2000) that notions of the ‘community’ 
in the late-modern context is a difficult concept. The ‘law-abiding majority’ may itself 
be a myth given the apparent prevalence of unreported crime, including white-collar 
crime (Nelken, 2002). More importantly, however, reforms intended to please this 
assumed ‘public’ audience will not necessarily be tailored to benefit the crime victims 
themselves, especially as we now know that many actual victims of crime would not 
form part of this ‘law-abiding majority’ (Dignan, 2005). On this point Jackson (2003) 
notes the “dubious symmetry between the interests of the victims and the community” 
(p.317). Hence, whilst diverting victims from the traditional criminal process and 
improving the ‘efficiency’ of the justice system may find favour with the tax paying 
‘public’, these are not necessarily the kinds of reforms victims need or expect from the
43 And in other policy areas too (Ryan, 1999).
44 Young (1996) discusses how ‘victimhood’ has been overtaken by notions o f ‘citizenship’, 
meaning ‘victimhood’ is now equated with ‘all of us’ (Walklate, 2007: p.21).
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system. In short, we might speculate along with Elias that victims are being used as 
political vote-catchers, but as the majority of voters are probably not victims of crime 
(or at least would not see themselves as such)45 what matters to governments is to give 
this wider public the impression that victims are being helped rather than actually 
following through with providing (and financing) such help themselves.
We might also look to government goals outside the confines of criminal justice per se. 
For example, Ashworth (1986) has noted that the creation of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme was based not on the government’s acceptance that it had an 
obligation towards victims, but rather as a measure to align welfare provision to crime 
victims with victims of other misfortunes. Successive governments down the policy 
chain have continued to maintain that the state is not liable for the criminal injuries of 
victims (Home Office, 2005d).
In addition, one strand of the No Witness No Justice strategy (Home Office, 2004g) 
envisioned the normalisation of reporting crime as part of a wider citizenship and ‘rights 
and responsibilities’ agenda. On a related issue, Rock (2005) observes that issues of 
race and dissemination played their part in the development of victim policy following 
the publication of the Macpherson Report into the death of Stephen Lawrence, which 
never focused specifically on witnesses or victims.
The new deal places the government’s work on victims and witnesses within the context 
of two of its Public Service Agreement targets; which were outlined above in our earlier 
quotation from the 2003 Witness Order consultation document. The first revolves 
around bringing more offenders to justice and the second requires the government to 
increase public confidence in the criminal justice system. These two PSA targets feature 
in many of the policy documents, and interviews with policy-makers reinforced their 
importance:
“We’re very much focused around the PSA targets” (representative of the OCJR).
“This has been one of the main pieces of work over the summer, and it’s literally
about driving satisfaction, how we’re going to meet that PSA target”
(representative of the OCJR).
45 In any event, the 2003/2004 suggests that the largest proportion o f adult males (50%) believe 
bringing offenders to justice was the highest priority for the criminal justice system, as opposed 
to the 5% who though it was meeting victims’ needs (Allen et al., 2005).
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Policy-makers were particularly concerned with the ‘confidence in the criminal justice 
system’ PSA target and were open about the fact that helping victims and witnesses 
would bring benefits to the system though increased confidence passed on by word of 
mouth to future potential witnesses (representative of the DCA). One policy-maker 
from the OCJR told me:
“I think what’s been driving a lot of this is jve’ve got evidence that the public feel 
our criminal justice system is very good at reflecting the rights of defendants but 
its not good at all at reflecting the rights of victims and witnesses, and I think the 
statistics show that whilst three quarters of people feel that it’s fair and it’s good 
for the defendants, only a third think it’s the same for victims and witnesses. I 
think it’s those sorts of statistics that have been driving things” (representative of 
the OCJR).
Here, this respondent is referring to British Crime Survey data indicating that whilst 
80% of adults are very or fairly confident that the criminal justice respects the rights of 
those accused of crimes, only 36% believe it meets the needs of victims (Walker et. al., 
2006). Both figures have risen slightly in recent years from 77% and 33% respectively 
in the 2003/04 sweep (Allen et al., 2005) and 78% and 34% respectively in 2004/05 
(Allen et al., 2006).
General public confidence was also a particularly important factor underlying policy 
reforms related to the police in the new era of ‘citizen-focused policing’:
“Our focus is not just on victims, it’s about putting citizens and the users of 
policing services centrally...one of the drivers that led to this programme of work 
being developed was the government’s priorities for reform of the public service 
which are about making it a customer-focused service” (representative of the 
Police Reform Unit).'
These extracts again suggest that the true focus of these reforms is on the ‘law-abiding 
public’ rather than victims. The emphasis on public perceptions of criminal justice had 
also filtered down to local actors in the area under review:
“I think it’s as things have become more customer oriented, there’s been such an 
outcry in the press and even murmurings in the general public that, noticeably, 
what we had was not of this day and age” (a court clerk at Court C).
On a related point, a number of respondents raised the issue of media coverage of 
criminal justice and suggested this was the true (politically-motivated) driving force
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behind the government’s policies, which for one solicitor had greatly influenced 
domestic violence policies:
“Because it’s topical, because it’s so much in the public eye, and I blame 
newspapers, because newspapers build it up into this bloody thing!” (a defence 
solicitor appearing at Court B).
Indeed, one interviewee felt sure that the government encouraged reporting of certain
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crimes in order to justify repressive measures:
“[Politicians] are making our communities feel victimised, th e ' extent of 
lawlessness, of feral wild-beyond-control children prowling our streets...isn’t the 
horrific problem -  necessarily -  it is portrayed as” (a youth offending team 
manager).
43.6.4 -  A ‘target culture ’
The proliferation of the PSA targets has led to the present government receiving 
criticism for establishing a ‘target culture’ across many areas of policy-making 
including education (Gorard et al., 2002), health (Greener, 2004) and the economy 
(Dorey, 2004). One court representative described the change in largely positive tones:
“[There has been] much more of a performance focus in the last 5/7 years, focus 
on performance, focus on measurement of performance, setting clear aims and 
objectives, having a strategic plan; that was something that was unheard of in the 
public sector until the early 90’s, in courts till the mid 90’s” (the Clerk to the 
Justices at Court B).
Other interviewees expressed unease at such developments. One court clerk simply told 
me:
“Figures mean everything these days” (a court clerk at Court C).
Such disgruntlement was usually based on respondents’ scepticism that numbers could 
accurately convey the complexities of real-life court operation. Here, we might recall 
the words of one district judge (a self-confessed hater of statistics) at Court B 
concerning trials, which we noted in Chapter 2:
“It’s a human process, you can’t dehumanise it” (a district judge sitting at Court B).
Nevertheless, targets can often be useful in the context of a policy chain as a way of 
measuring success or justifying current measures. In addition, setting targets -  even
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targets that are ‘broad brush’ and difficult to apply in individual areas -  can compel 
agencies to take action:
“There needed to be a head of steam about it to get these things moving, unless 
there was that big push [on national minimum standards concerning witness care] 
then I don’t think [police] forces and CPS areas would have got on with it at the 
rate they have, so I think it has been needed” (a police chief inspector).
Conversely, the lack of targets can cause measures to stagnate. A good example of this 
is the early low take-up rates of victim personal statements, which were explained by 
one policy-maker in the following way:
“Informal information we had was that this was a fairly common situation, that a 
lot of areas just weren’t making much of a thing of victims’ statements and 
weren’t taking them...The reasons were felt to be that it was a time when there 
were a lot of other initiatives going on and a lot of things being 
measured...agencies concentrate on things where there’s a target and they’re 
going to be measured. Because there was no target to achieve a particular take up 
of victim statements it was felt that the police weren’t really pushing them” 
(representative of Research Development Statistics and OCJR).
We have already noted the lack of interest in cracked trial rates based on the absence of 
specific targets. On a more positive note, however, one case progression officer46 at 
Court C noted that targets did make it easier to acquire central and local funding to 
achieve these goals, albeit we have already seen how central funding is extremely hard 
to come by in this area. As such, targets can be useful in order to drive the 
implementation of new policies in the early stages before they become culturally 
accepted and ‘automatic’. This certainly appears to have been the case in the area under 
review regarding ineffective trials:
“From our perspective it’s clearly the government focus, and quite rightly 
so...you can’t have the sort of inefficiencies that we had up until recently...you 
can’t have situations where you’ve got a massive ineffective trial rate, it’s 
unacceptable...we’re constantly filling out statistics about why trials were cracked 
or if they were effective or why they were ineffective, so inevitably it’s at the 
forefront of your mind” (a legal adviser at Court B).
46 Case Progression Officers (CPOs) were introduced as part o f the new Case Management 
Framework and are intended to facilitate effective pre-trial review hearings in order to resolve 
any outstanding difficulties or issues before the day o f a trial (Home Office, 2004d). See 
Chapter 6.
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Of course, just because a target has been set does not necessarily mean it will be 
particularly difficult to achieve, as noted by one Youth Offending Team Manager in 
relation to victim contact work:
“I honestly don’t know what sort of take up she gets -  what percentage it is -  we 
meet our national standard I know that, but our national standard is pretty easy to 
beat to be honest” (a youth offending team manager).
The ease by which this particular respondent felt his agency could meet national targets 
may again reflect the fact that the centre prefers to ‘wash its hands’ of responsibility for 
victims, as opposed to reacting if targets cannot be met. Of course, this is always 
assuming that different targets are viewed as compatible, and are a realistic measure of 
performance in the local context. On the latter point, one Justices’ Chief Executive 
described a perceived conflict between the targets of reducing witness waiting times and 
ensuring the court’s time is not wasted:
“There are many performance measures and standards that are to some extent 
inconsistent. For example, the courts that perform best in having low witness 
waiting times...are the courts with very poor effective trial rates. So, the witnesses 
are coming to court...and they aren’t waiting very long, but they are very 
frustrated because they didn’t need to be there at all...The victim has got the 
biggest (the longest, the most detailed) story to tell so it’s almost always the case 
that they’re in the witness box an hour in anything like a meaningful trial. 
Therefore every other witness falls outside the criteria,.which is the percentage of 
witnesses that wait for an hour or less. It’s an unrealistic measure unfortunately 
because the only way to perform well is for your trials to crack” (the Clerk to the 
Justices at Court B).
A similar point was raised by a magistrates’ legal adviser:
“I certainly don’t think witness waiting times are [a good way of monitoring court 
efficiency]...If you know within ten minutes the trial is going to be adjourned 
then on the witness waiting times that’s a positive thing -  the witness has only 
waited ten minutes -  but then of course they’ve got to come back another 
day...one [indicator] says the service is great -  they’re all out in ten minutes -  the 
other one will say, well, they’ve got to come back on another day” (a legal adviser 
at court A).
This all implies that targets themselves are the product of complex political interactions, 
which need to be mapped and understood before the measures carried out in their name 
can be placed in their proper context. By using the PSA targets as the context, the new 
deal cements the (probably false) impression that this is indeed one all-encompassing 
‘strategy’ driven over time by unified and consistent goals.
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4,3.6.5 -  The multi-agency approach
Moves to assist victims have also all been tied up with the development of the 
governments’ wider multi-agency approach to public sector services, including health 
and education (Milboume et al., 2003). Indeed the Home Office’s (2003e) Tackling 
Witness Intimidation -  An Outline Strategy is interesting because it reveals as much
t Gabout the multi-agency approach as it does about intimidated witnesses. Some policy­
makers interviewed for this research pointed out how a ‘joined-up’ approach to criminal 
justice in which different agencies readily communicate is far more logical from the 
victim’s perspective:
“From the perspective of the person [civilian] who’s entering into the system, they 
see it all as one, it’s all happening as one thing” (representative of the Police 
Reform Unit).
“Even though people use the term ‘criminal justice system ’, I’m not sure that for a 
long time it has been...and of course victims and witnesses are the people who do 
go through that system end to end” (representative of the OCJR).
That said, at the local level interviewees pointed out that a great deal of less formal 
communication between agencies was already going on prior to the arrival of this 
policy:
“I think if I’m honest it’s rather naïve of the policy-makers to suggest that they’ve 
come up with this good idea and no one spoke to each other previously, because 
that just simply isn’t the case...in terms of the [Local Criminal Justice] Board, 
there was a very effective group in [this area] pre-Criminal Justice Board, which 
dealt with very much the same issues as the Board look at; and I think for six to 
nine months whilst the Board was starting to form we very much regretted the 
demise of that other group, because it was felt to be much more effective than the 
Board was at that time” (the District Legal Director at Court A).
“Has the LCJB had a big impact on the work of the YOT? No. I think it has quite 
a big impact upon those members who are the Board members in terms of the 
amount of stuff that we have to do. Whether any of that stuff adds value to the 
work of your independent agency -  I guess -  no. What it does do is make 
important contacts, but a good agency would have already established those kinds 
of contacts anyway” (a youth offending team manager).
In many cases the continuation of such ‘unofficial’ multi-agency ambitions relied on the 
work of individuals, which made them for the most part ad hoc arrangements:
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“I already had lots of contacts...it was then reliant on individual enthusiasm, to 
some extent, and you’d have certain bits folding because that individual would 
leave” (representative of the probation service).
It is also the case that not all multi-agency endeavours were functioning as efficiently as 
local actors would wish. For example, this probation service representative clearly 
believed the police were not forwarding key information necessary for their victim 
contact work: 0
“You still have some people who are like ‘this is our work, we know how to do 
things properly’...In terms of the victim contact work we now get names and 
addresses of victims without a problem; they’re not always that accurate because 
people aren’t always that good with the files. But we don’t get the additional bits 
of information; we don’t for example get ethnicity -  which the police do monitor 
-  which we could do with because when you’re going out to see a victim who is 
still very distraught you don’t in the middle of that whip suddenly out a form and 
say ‘can you actually tell me how you’d like to call yourself?’ We don’t always 
get information in terms of vulnerability or disability or issues that would make us 
more sensitive in how we approach people, for example that someone has learning 
difficulties, that somebody has a regular social worker” (ibid).
Such concerns reflect Crawford and Enterkin’s (2001) view that, practically, victim 
contact work in the Probation Service presents “significant challenges” (p.722). There 
were also administrative tensions apparent between the police and CPS in their joint 
witness care unit:
“It’s never been proven as a concept that we must all adhere to because it works. I 
think it’s a noble concept of having joint PC/CPS clerical and I think it would be 
even better if we had joint administrative systems -  and we’re getting a witness 
management system that’s coming -  if we shared our admin for example, which 
we still don’t. We’re still two separate bodies joined for certain functions” (a 
police chief inspector).
One particular example given was that of the CPS Victim Information Bureau, which 
was still separate from the witness care unit, meaning that if the WCU -  which just dealt 
with witnesses -  needed to contact victims, they would need to go through this separate 
body.
It is nevertheless clear that victims and witnesses as policy areas are once again 
becoming entwined with wider issues and strategies. Not only do these encompass the 
development of a multi-agency approach within the criminal justice system, but also a 
much wider approach outside it. Of course, the current government has championed the 
‘strategic’ or multi-agency approach in many areas (Milboume et al., 2003). This again
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raises questions regarding the political influences guiding this approach and how they 
interact with the issues of criminal justice, witnesses and victims. Even with the creation 
of a victims minister in 2005, the government does not appear to have abandoned its 
philosophy of victims as a ‘shared’ priority between agencies and departments and -  
based on experience so far -  it seems the minister is largely being used as a 
spokesperson on ‘victim policy’ rather than the driving force behind renewed reform, 
which again implies responsibility for such reform still rests away from the centre.
4.3.7 -  Punitiveness and expanding state control
The policy chain also reveals many examples of victim reform being packaged with 
reforms of a more punitive nature. For example, certainly at the time of its 
implementation, some commentators (Haines, 2000) argued that the system of referral 
orders orchestrated through Youth offending Panels under the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (which also introduced special measures) would only 
exclude defendants from the process, and was therefore punitive.47 Even if one rejects 
this interpretation, one might still see Youth Offending Panels primarily as a 
diversionary tactic, diverting offenders away from the main CJS rather than assisting 
victims of crime.
We can draw upon several other examples. The 2001 criminal justice review (Home 
Office, 2001b) accepted broader notions of ‘victims’ but packaged such concessions 
alongside provisions to tackle organised and international crime and a pledge to create 
2,660 more prison places. Later, in the Justice for All White Paper (Home Office, 2002) 
reforms relating to victims and witnesses were combined with measures relating to the 
admission of hearsay, the partial abolition of double jeopardy and the possibility of trial 
without jury.48 Justice for All also introduced proposals later enacted in the Courts Act 
2003 to increase courthouse security by creating a court security service with powers of 
arrest and detention; thus constituting a further extension of state power (see Jackson 
2003,2004).
Another particularly revealing example was the proposed réintroduction in October 
2003 of witness orders, which we discussed above and seems to reflect Elias’ (1986)
47 Although, subsequent evaluation seems to avert these fears (Newbum et al., 2001; Crawford
and Newbum, 2003). •
48 The government had difficulty getting its Criminal Justice Bill though the House o f Lords due 
to this provision (BBC, 2003).
155
assertion that ‘victim reforms’ may be intended to increase state power. In this case, 
state power is extended by eroding the principle currently applied in England and Wales 
(but not in Scotland) that the criminal justice system is based on the voluntary 
attendance of witnesses.
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 also contained punitive provisions. In the accompanying 
guidance document the Home Office (2004f) said the Act would ‘put victims first’, 
chiefly by encompassing broader definitions of sexual victimisation, as we saw earlier. 
Nevertheless, elsewhere in the Act a conditional discharge was now to be considered a 
‘conviction’ for the purposes of the sex offenders register; meaning people can be put 
on the register without being convicted of any sexual offence. It therefore seems once 
again that reforms offering greater recognition to victims (witnesses) are being 
combined with more restrictive measures. The argument again is that ‘victims’ provide 
a ‘liberal smokescreen’ that dilutes the impact of repressive measures.
a
In the same way, from a defendant’s perspective the Criminal Justice Act 2003 brought 
radical reforms such as abolishing the double-jeopardy rule in serious cases where ‘new 
and compelling evidence’ is available49 and the wider admissibility of hearsay and 
evidence of bad character (often a criminal record). The former is clearly of benefit to 
victims and witnesses, removing in some circumstances a complex component of giving 
evidence. Nevertheless, from the defence position one might argue that this prejudices 
the fairness of proceedings, with second-hand information being considered as 
evidence.50 Whilst non-defendants (victims and other witnesses) may also have 
evidence of bad character adduced, the Act makes this easier in the case of defendants 
by providing more circumstances (seven ‘gateways’ in s.l01(l)(a-g)) by which the 
prosecution can argue a case for this information being admissible.
Furthermore, under s.l01(l)(g) a defendant’s bad character can be adduced following 
his or her ‘attack on another person’s character’, whilst no comparable provision is 
present for non-defendants. The new deal (Home Office, 2003a) cites this as a provision 
that can “limit the scope for gratuitous attacks on witnesses’ character” (p.19) but this 
will only be so if defendants are given clear guidance on the issue from advocates. The 
observation sessions conducted for this research suggest witnesses (including victims) 
are just as capable of attacking defendants’ characters from the witness box as vice-
49 Part 10.
50 Defence solicitors seemed to believe this, see Chapter 6.
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versa51, but under the 2003 Act this would not necessarily lead to their own bad 
characters being adduced.
Following on from this, in the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act of the 
following year, benefits to victims (especially the statutory Code) were once again 
balanced by punitive provisions. Of particular note are the new (up to five-year) jail 
sentences for breaching non-molestation orders and also the court’s new power to 
impose restraining orders even when defendants are acquitted.
More recently, we have seen further indications of a dual purpose behind victim reform. 
The Home Office has given its pledge to “toughen up every aspect of the criminal 
justice system to take on the criminal and support the victim” (Home Office, 2004c: 
p.6). Indeed, throughout this 2004 strategy document the promise to ‘support’ victims is 
almost always preceded by a pledge to catch, punish and stop more offenders from 
committing crime. In some areas of the strategy these goals seem to be directly 
associated with ‘providing justice’ to victims, with supporting them constituting a 
separate endeavour (p.26).
Finally, in July 2006 we can note the publication of another CJS review document 
(Home Office, 2006c). This publication reaffirmed that:
“[T]he needs of victims must be at the heart of what the criminal justice system 
does” (p.6).
Nevertheless, the choice to run “increased prison places” as the headline in the press 
release accompanying this review is indicative of underlying punitiveness; including an 
end to automatic one-third reductions in sentences for early guilty pleas, parental 
compensation orders, increased use of anti-social behaviour legislation and tougher 
penalties for carrying knives and “tougher new action on alcohol”. The strategy also 
seems greatly concerned with speeding up the criminal justice system, a point returned 
to in the subsequent document Delivering Simple, Speedy, Summary Justice (Home 
Office, 2006a) which proposes further streamlining in case management systems and 
addresses cases with very high costs. Once again, we see the combination of ‘victim 
measures’ with more punitive and economic reforms.
31 See Chapter 6.
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Brownlee (1998) notes a significant contradiction between recent trends towards 
‘populist punitiveness’ on the one hand, and moves to increase efficiency in criminal 
justice on the other. Whilst the latter implies diverting offenders from the main criminal 
justice system, the former demands expensive punishments. Hence, once again the 
different aspects of the policy-making process are not all working in the same direction.
Some might argue that in terms of the criminal justice system as a whole, this is a case 
of the government giving with one hand (to victims) so it can take with another (from 
defendants) or, following Elias’ reasoning, employing victims as a way of extending 
state power (Elias, 1986). Crucially, however, my point here relates to the policy, not 
the practice. Thus, my argument is not that some zero sum-game exists between the 
needs and interests of victims and defendants in the operational criminal justice system 
after all, but rather that -  at the policy stage -  such a ‘balancing act’ is more apparent.
4.3.8 -  International influences
On one level, we can understand the international influence on victim ‘policy’ in 
England and Wales purely in terms of the increasing number of international 
instruments and documents appearing in the policy chain related to the issue of victims 
and witnesses. As such, it is evident that specific international pressures -  from the EU, 
Council of Europe and UN amongst others -  are another .factor complicating our larger 
framework of interconnected politics. On another level, we might view this as a broad 
international growth in our understandings of victimhood and victims’ needs, reflecting 
even wider ‘macro’ developments. I will return to the latter possibility below.
The most prominent ( ‘specific’) development of the recent period has been the EU 
Council’s 2001 Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. 
This document arguably spurred the recent revival of ‘rights’ language (and policy 
movement) associated with victims in the UK because, unlike' the various 
recommendations made by the Council of Europe, a decision from the Council of the 
European Union is binding on all those to whom it is addressed and, therefore, highly 
significant politically in the domestic context. As such, this is an example of what is 
generally now being referred to as ‘multi level governance’ with national and 
international (and other) levels (Smith, 2004).
Victim Support points out that whilst the UK and Ireland have two of the best records 
on victims in Europe, both countries still have things to learn before they are fully
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implementing the Decision (Victim Support, 2002b). Member states had until 22nd 
March 2002 to introduce the necessary laws giving effect to most of the provisions and 
until March 2006 to implement Article 5 (Communication Safeguards), Article 6 
(Specific Assistance to Victims52) and Article 10 (Penal mediation in the course of 
criminal proceedings).53 Consequently, the Framework Decision delayed the 
introduction of what was then the Victims and Witness Bill in parliament and prompted 
the introduction of the statutory Code of Practice. Hence, the return of ‘rights language’ 
to UK policy discourse (following its removal in the second Victim’s Charter) can be 
directly attributed to the international scene.
The proliferation of rights language in the 2001 Framework Decision is an example of a 
general growth in ‘human rights’ discourse internationally, especially in Europe 
following the introduction of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrined into 
British law by the Human Rights Act 2000. We saw in Chapter 3 how -  thus far -  such 
rights as may be present for victims under the Convention are still the topic of 
considerable debate, within and beyond the European Court of Human Rights. 
Nonetheless the Convention has arguably provided rights for victims domestically in 
England and Wales indirectly though the very culture of rights it instilled.54
International developments can (and have) led to whole new dimensions of a given 
issue being incorporated within the domestic framework.* Thus, we know from the new 
deal that earlier conceptions of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act did not 
place such emphasis on victims of domestic violence.55 Domestic violence was (and 
remains) very high on the international agenda at the time and the latest 
recommendation from the Council of Europe had been on the protection of women 
against violence.56
A similar effect is discemable regarding victims of human trafficking, which is 
becoming a major international concern (see Konrad, 2006). Certainly 2002 saw the
52 Including free legal aid where warranted.
53 It is questionable whether relevant reforms have been put in place to meet these latter 
requirements, especially on the issue of mediation.
54 Although, it is maintained that the ‘rights’ attributed to victims under the Code are still better 
understood as ‘legitimate expectations’ owing to the lack o f internally enforceable complaints or 
appeal mechanisms.
55 We therefore know that the change took place sometime between July and December 2003.
56 Recommendation 1450 (2000).
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publication of the EU proposal for a Council Directive on short-term residence permit 
issues in relation to victims of action to facilitate illegal immigration or trafficking in 
human beings. The following year, the Home Office funded the pilot ‘Poppy projects’ 
to provide shelter and basic services to such victims. The chain of causation actually 
becomes cyclical, as following this the UK made human trafficking a priority during its 
tenure as president of the G8 and the EU, driving forward the adoption of an EU action 
plan on this issue in December 2005 (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006) and then consulting on a 
domestic action plan in early 2006 (Home Office and Scottish Executive, 2006).
More recently, the Crown Prosecution Service’s proposed ‘Children’s Charter’ (CPS, 
2005a) refers to the UK’s 1991 adoption of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child57; specifically the obligation to “consider the best interests and 
views of a child” and to afford them “the right to legal help and fair treatment in a 
justice system that respects their rights” (Articles 3 and 12). This again indicates how 
international developments have impacted on the development of victim policies, as 
well as the abundance of ‘rights’ language internationally.
It was noted expressly by at least one interviewee that international influences were 
responsible for the piloting of new measures in England and Wales:
“Internationally, the idea of domestic violence courts has grown out of the drug 
courts model -  in terms of drug courts were developed in the late 80’s/early 90’s 
in the US -  and they’ve grown into a sort of problem-solving approach” 
(representative of the DCA).
What these examples demonstrate is that the international and domestic contexts are not 
easy to separate. Here, this obviously relates to victims issues, but the point probably 
applies to modem policy-making in general (Smith, 2004). From the perspective of the 
present thesis, what is interesting is how the international ‘victims movement’ broadens 
our narrower conceptions of victimisation and often promotes swift government action. 
The international sphere also provides policy-makers, academics and others with useful 
comparators for the situation in England and Wales. For example, following the 
publication of the 2001 EU Framework Decision, Victim Support (2002b) called for 
more comparisons with inquisitorial criminal justice systems to temper the excesses of 
intimidatory cross-examination. This has also been suggested by Ellison (2001).
57 Para. 1.3.
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To develop a point made in the last section, the language of ‘rights’ has clearly 
expanded internationally in recent years. Since the Human Rights Act of 2000, we have 
seen the domestic emergence of a ‘human rights culture’ in England and Wales applied 
to victims, whereby policy-makers and governments have felt more able to depart from 
the ‘service standards’ approach. As such, we saw in the last chapter that it is only 
relatively recently in the policy chain that victims of crime have been consistently 
endowed with the language of rights by policy-makers.58 This is clearly reflected in the 
more recent policy documents, which often speak in terms of ‘creating’ victim rights for 
the first time. For example, the consultation on the Victim’s Code of Practice expressed 
a desire “to finalise the Code and introduce victims’ rights as soon as possible” (Home 
Office, 2005h: p.5).
As the policy chain progressed, government policy in the UK fluctuated from the 
language of ‘rights’ in the first Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 1990) -  following the 
UN in its preamble to the 1985 Declaration -  to that of ‘service standards’59 in the 
second Charter of 1995, and subsequently reverted back to ‘rights’ after the 2001 EU 
Framework Decision, and certainly by the publication of the 2002 White Paper Justice 
for All (Home Office, 2002). Since then, the policy discourse of rights for victims of 
crime has accelerated such that Doak (2003, 2005) now identifies a widespread call for 
some form of procedural right of participation (for victims) within the system.
This general policy shift -  from measures like the service-based Victim’s Charter of 
1995 to the statutory (and allegedly ‘rights-based’) Victim’s Code of Practice in 2005 -  
may indicate the pending emergence of more robust (internally enforceable) rights for 
victims. Alternatively, however, we might argue that this is all just political rhetoric 
because -  as noted in the previous chapter -  there are still many questions regarding the 
practical enforceability of such ‘rights’, which presently comes from outside the 
criminal justice process. In terms of ‘rights rhetoric’, it is interesting to note that when 
the review of the second Victim’s Charter first suggested legislating for victims’ needs, 
the rationale given still utilised the language of ‘services’ rather than ‘rights’:
4.3.9 -  Rights language generally
58 Notwithstanding the initial ‘rights approach’ adopted by the first Victim’s Charter, discussed
in Chapter 3. •
59 Thus reflecting the now popular conception o f victims as the customers or consumers of 
criminal justice (Zauberman, 2000; Tapley, 2002). See Chapter 3.
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“[I]n the light of the growth of services for victims, the Government believes that 
this is the right time to define at least the key services in legislation” (Home 
Office, 2001a: para.27).60
It is also interesting that, whilst later policy documents have increasingly drawn upon 
‘rights language’ since 2001, the eventual culmination of this -  the Victim’s Code of 
Practice -  seems to downplay the language of rights in its substantive text; albeit the
. .i °
preamble does refer generally to a ‘right to receive Code services’. Nevertheless, from 
around 2003/2004 it was clear that the language of ‘victim rights’ had reasserted itself. 
Hence, the final version of the Code was hailed as a pronouncement of the ‘rights’ now 
enjoyed by victims.
Rights language is also prominent in the 2005 consultation on victims’ advocates 
(Home Office, 2005b). Furthermore, the Home Office’s (2004c) strategy document goes 
so far as to indicate that a ‘robust and effective’ criminal justice system “acts on behalf 
of the victim and supports victims and witnesses through the justice process” (p.69). In 
the context of other reforms we have seen, we can be sure this does not literally mean 
the system or its prosecutors now represent victims rather than the state (a fundamental 
reform), but the use of what would have been quite radical language twenty years ago 
still indicates a change in policy (or, at least, rhetoric) over time. By 2008, the strategy 
aims to make victims “feel they are central to the system” (p.97). The government gave 
more specific details about its plans for the criminal justice system in its CJS strategy 
document Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice (Home Office, 2004e). It is again 
interesting how the language (if not the substance) of this document appears to cast 
victims as quasi parties in the case, pitting the victim directly against the defendant:
“Criminal justice will be organised to support the victim and thwart the offender”
(p.26)61.
Of course, such remarks again instil notions of the zero sum-game. Nevertheless, 
policy-makers are clearly now willing to speak in terms of giving some victims their 
own representation in court; which is important because those with representation 
usually also have rights to be represented, and are usually called ‘parties’. We have also
60 Victim Support had also' called for ‘statutory rights’ for victims earlier that year (Victim 
Support, 2001).
61 Walklate (2007) discusses how this is a reflection o f the relationship between the state and the 
law.
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noted in recent years discussion of victims being given a ‘voice’ (cjsonline, 2006d), 
which was clearly an important issue to one policy-maker interviewed for this research:
“I want the Victims’ Advisory Panel to play a very important role...it’s made up 
of victims themselves whereas most of the other boards and panels we’ve got, 
they’re actually policy boards...this Panel is actually victims themselves getting a 
direct voice to ministers...it’s actually quite incredible62 that members of the 
public -  and people who have been victims of crime directly -  get to speak to the 
three criminal justice ministers to tell them their concerns. I think that’s just 
incredibly valuable, amazingly valuable from a policy point of view” 
(representative of the OCJR).
The question throughout is whether the ‘radical’ nature of these and other reforms is 
confined to the rhetoric used to describe them; that is whether calling these ‘rights’ and 
not ‘service standards’ reflects a development of language -  precipitated by 
international developments like the 2001 Framework Decision -  rather than policy.63 
The answer to this of course brings us back to the definition of ‘rights’. When 
questioning policy-makers on the exact nature of such ‘rights’ under the Code this 
rhetoric can slip:
“It depends on what you mean by ‘rights’, we think there are certain minimum 
standards that anyone ought to be able to expect and we set those out very very 
clearly and we do expect agencies to comply to them. So I suppose it’s more 
about minimum service standards” (representative of the OCJR).
\
Certainly, looking at the reforms that have occurred, if we take the view that ‘rights’ 
should be enforceable from within the criminal justice process, then the ‘rhetoric’ 
interpretation seems to carry greater weight.
4.3.10 -  ‘Macro’ influences
The more macro-level influences on victim reform as suggested by Boutellier (2000) 
and Garland (2001) have been described in Chapter 3. At this stage, however, we can 
identify a number of features of the policy chain that seem to back up their conclusions.
Rhetorically at least, victims do seem to be taking a more prominent position in criminal 
justice policy. Both commentators argue that this is because the system has become
62 Arguably it is even more incredible that this policy-maker found it so amazing that victims, or 
lay people generally, should be allowed to talk to politicians.
63 The notion of introducing specialist victims’ advocates first appeared in Labour’s 2005 
manifesto (New Labour, 2005), which makes no mention o f victims having ‘rights’.
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defined by its treatment of victims and the addressing of their suffering. Under this 
construction, it is not surprising that the criminal justice system, policy-makers and 
other outside agencies have sought to identify a wider range of ‘victims’, hence the 
expansion of our conception of ‘victimhood’. This has involved not only identifying 
different categories of victim (survivors of homicide, victims of domestic violence) but 
also different types of suffering (intimidation, secondary victimisation, anti-social 
behaviour). Thus, having excluded the victim for so long, one might argue that in this 
new era of moral pluralism and loss of faith in penal-welfarism, the system ironically 
now needs more victims in order to legitimise itself.
Hence, we noted above the wider definitions of victimhood found in the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, which were based on the argument that other forms of sexual 
victimisation were just as distressing to victims as the legal definition of ‘rape’. This 
may reflect the wider point that victims have indeed become more prominent in 
criminal justice policy with particular reference to those whose suffering seems to be 
the greatest. So, whilst the present limitations of the victim personal statement scheme 
must be acknowledged (especially as it excludes the consideration of victims’ opinions), 
we can again view these developments as reflecting a new ethos of the system to 
address the suffering of crime victims. Similar arguments can be made regarding special 
measures, the Witness Service and the provision of information generally. Thus, we 
may be moving closer to defining victims by the suffering they endure. Of course, this 
has negative implications if it leads to policies focusing only on Christie’s (1977) ‘ideal 
victim’.
Garland (2001) also argues that governments deny the failure of the criminal justice 
system to solve the problem of crime by turning to ever more punitive policies, thus 
appealing to victims’ ‘need’ to be protected and to have their voices heard. As such, 
notions of a ‘zero sum game’ develop between the needs of victims and offenders, 
which sustains and intensifies the punitive ethos. As already discussed in this chapter, 
we have seen clear examples throughout the policy chain of victim reform being 
combined with more punitive measures.
Another clear indictment of the ‘macro’ perspective is the fact that these developments 
have been international in nature, especially in relation to human rights. Again this hints 
that victim measures are ultimately the result of broad social trends, and perhaps even 
inevitable in the broadest sociological context.
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In this Chapter I have discussed various alternative goals and explanations that might be 
attributed to measures that overtly appear to assist victims and witnesses. These were 
derived in accordance with the basic principles of grounded theory whereby themes and 
signs -  and later ‘categories’ -  are drawn from interview and document data (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Nevertheless,*! want to emphasise that all the policy-makers I spoke to 
seemed genuinely concerned and committed to relieving the plight of victims and 
witnesses as a problem in itself. To pick out one of many such examples, one 
respondent from the DCA said the criminal justice system owed a “duty of care” to 
these people to ensure they feel “safe, confident, informed, valued and appreciated” 
(representative of the DCA).
As such, I am certainly not suggesting that policy-makers consciously or maliciously 
‘disguise’ policies. After all, Goddard (1997) notes that policies usually reflect the ideas 
of policy-makers. Rather, I am arguing that it is an intrinsic characteristic of this set of 
policies -  and by extension perhaps policies in other areas of official interest -  that due 
to the substantial overlap with other concerns not directly related to victims and 
witnesses, victims themselves were never and could never be the only relevant issue.
4.4 -  A ‘POLICY CHAIN’?
At the start of this Chapter I provided three possible explanations for the acceptance of 
victims into criminal justice policy-making. At this stage it seems justifiable to state a 
conclusion as to these three possibilities and, in so doing, confirm my original 
hypothesis from Chapter 1 regarding the second research question. It is therefore 
submitted that victims of crime have become prominent in policy-making over recent 
years because actions that, incidentally, assist victims and witnesses have frequently 
been grounded in a quite different set of political concerns, and because -  now that 
victims and witnesses have achieved rhetorical acceptance in the political system -  new 
policies are being packaged as the continuation of work for these groups but which are 
in fact intended to achieve other aims.
It therefore seems logical to return to my original contention that, in reality, all the 
developments related to victims and witnesses are not actually part of t h e ‘same thing’ 
at all. No single actor (like Victim Support) or even a small group of actors are
4.3.11 -  One extra point
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responsible for driving this ‘policy’. The reality is far more complex. In truth, this is 
probably not a single policy ‘about victims and witnesses’ at all but one comprised of, 
as Rock suggests, numerous ‘other politics’ and grounded in wider policy-making 
developments. Indeed, these ‘other politics’ may encompass far wider notions than 
‘victims of crime’ to include the public in general.
It is by now clear that, whilst out of convenience I have continued describing this as a 
‘policy chain’, this label implies a degree of linearity and consistency which is simply 
not present and must therefore be dropped. Recently, Rock (2005) has described these 
policies as more of a ‘web’ of developments and with this observation one can scarcely 
disagree. For Rock, there are eight main influencing focal points to this web: the 
structure of the Home Office64; the nature of policy-making; the growth of the victim as 
a consumer of criminal justice; the development of human rights; compensation 
developments; developments in reparation provision; the identification of vulnerable 
and intimidated witnesses and race issues (specifically, the aftermath of the Stephen 
Lawrence enquiry)65.
The present analysis completely supports these views, although I would seek to 
emphasise different aspects of this ‘web’ and different interrelations within it. For 
example, it seems clear that this is a group of policies based on multi-levelled 
governance rather than government66. It also seems that many of the influences in this 
‘policy community’ (Bache, 2003) can be placed in the context of the wider social 
changes described by Boutellier (2000) and Garland (2001). Furthermore -  whilst Rock 
(1998) has talked about the growth in recognition of homicide survivors as secondary 
victims of crime -  I would seek to emphasise the growth in our conceptions of 
‘victimhood’ and ‘suffering’ more generally, and would cite the identification and 
support offered to vulnerable and intimidated witnesses as reflecting these wider 
developments.
Indeed, perhaps here lies one possible explanation for the often confusing truncation of 
victims and witnesses into a single group. Recognising the problems witnesses face 
when coming to court or giving evidence brings them within the ambit of ‘victimhood’,
64 On which see also Egeberg (1999).
65 Walklate (2007) adds the development o f research linking gender with victimisation.
66 Whereas Rock (2004) was purely concerned with national policy processes rather than 
international, local or regional policy-making.
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meaning witnesses are the new victims. Finding ‘new victims’ is important because, as 
the macro theorists have argued, criminal justice is now legitimised by the treatment of 
victims and what little common ground remains within a generally secularised morality 
is maintained by reference to the acceptance and recognition of their suffering. This 
feeds into victims’ acceptance as consumers of the criminal justice system.
I also wish to draw attention to the wider international context and, in particular, its *
.. .» «
influence on the recognition of ‘new’ forms of victimisation and suffering including 
domestic violence and human trafficking. Going back to the 1986 UN Declaration, this 
was amongst the first documents to draw attention to victims in criminal proceedings in 
the first place, and was also concerned about the abuse of (state) power. Human rights 
have been an important international influence on domestic victim policy. Again, these 
international developments reflect macro-level trends.
The above (grounded) analysis also lends weight to the proposition that, at numerous 
stages, the development of victim measures have been influenced by a number of other 
policy aims or goals for the criminal justice process. Here Rock has discussed the 
development of reparation schemes. In addition, the need to promote the efficient 
running of the criminal justice process appears to be a constant theme, to an extent that 
it has sometimes overtaken the goal of promoting witness satisfaction.67 68We see the goal 
of efficiency expressed through the aim of reducing ineffective (not cracked) trials and 
promoting effective case management. We might also note that many victim proposals 
have arisen in the context of reports designed to streamline the criminal justice process 
and extend the government’s wider multi-agency, professionalised, approach to the 
provision of services.
In this category I would also include the (proposed) developments and reforms of state 
compensation, the burden of which were originally to be shared between employers and 
the insurance industry. Whilst assurances have been given that the more recent 
proposals to only compensate ‘serious injury’ will not lead to a reduction in funding for 
state compensation , it is hoped that the new system will reduce administrative costs; 
another streamlining measure which also has a financial incentive for the system.
67 For example, the proposal to reintroduce witness orders.
68 At the joint Office for Criminal justice Refom W ictim  Support ‘Victims and Witnesses 
conference’ held in Westminster, Central Hall, February 2006.
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This streamlining of how crime is dealt with by a number of criminal justice and other 
agencies may once again reflect Boutellier’s (2000) wider construction, which suggests 
governments will engage in a process of rationalising the law in order to promote its 
legitimacy; a process we have seen in England and Wales (and elsewhere) since the 
1980s. All this suggests that we should be wary of the underlying influences behind 
reforms which assist victims and witnesses, particularly when they are presented as part 
of a wider package, as was thp case in 1999, 2001 and most occasions thereafter.
The overarching point here is that the ‘victim policy chain’ is a retrospective 
construction, achieved by concentrating on specific elements of much wider strategies, 
processes and influences over time. Academics have had their role to play here, as their 
tendency is to compartmentalise such developments, placing them in order and treating 
them as a unified whole. We have also seen, however, that the policy-making process 
itself requires new initiatives to be billed as the continuation of old ones. Hence, policy 
documents like the new deal are designed to suggest a unified and consistent ‘strategy’ 
to assist victims and witnesses when in fact there is none. For example, because its 
recommendations had resonance with the contemporary ‘victim theme’, the outcomes of 
the Stephen Lawrence enquiry were cited as part of the ‘background’ to the 
government’s response to Speaking Up For Justice (Interdepartmental Working Group 
on the Treatment of Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses in the Criminal Justice 
System, 1998; Home Office, 1999). This amalgamation of the Macpherson 
recommendations into a policy document primarily concerned with vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses shows that sources which are grounded in different issues at their 
conception can be later brought together to give the appearance of a unified strategy.
We have previously noted Van Dijk’s (1983) arguments that much of the ‘victim 
movement’ is action-orientated, meaning that ‘doing something for victims’ is often 
more important than constructing long-term policies based on victims’ expressed needs. 
Of course, this supports the argument that the ‘victims’ policy has arisen out of a variety 
of different politics rather than any long-term plan. So, for example, one may take the 
view that periodically increasing Victim Support’s grant so the charity can implement 
some new scheme is little more than an action-oriented measure to intermittently ‘do 
something for victims’.
Thus, as priorities change, so too does the funding for new projects, like the expansion 
of the Witness Service. For example, a recent announcement guaranteed £lmillion of
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central funds to pilot the new victim care units (cjsonline, 2006b). It was noted in 
Chapter 3 however that such units were proposed in the context of a consultation paper 
intended to reduce the costs of state compensation by instead offering ‘practical 
support’ to victims of ‘non-serious’ injuries; a cost-cutting measure (Home Office, 
2005d). As we have already noted, the fact that the majority of funding for localised 
victim care must come from local resources not only distances the centre from 
responsibility for such measures, but also ensures that the continued funding of victim 
care is reliant on victims retaining their present status as a key political issue.
Overall, it may be futile to try and derive consistent meanings or definitions from a 
policy that is actually not one policy at all (unified and driven by identifiable aims and 
actors) but is instead constituted by a wide range of political influences and objectives. 
Many of these individual ‘other politics’ uncovered in this chapter were not in fact 
primarily aimed at addressing the needs of victims themselves. In other words, this 
seems to be a case of the whole being more than the sum of its parts.
4.4.1 -  A ‘victims’ policy?
These are important observations because, if accurate, they suggest that the government 
and policy-makers might not have undergone a wholesale conversion to victim and 
witness issues. Instead, this would suggest that benefits brought to victims and 
witnesses are more properly understood as the bi-products of other agenda(s). I would 
suggest that the strongest evidence for this position lies in the reality exposed in this and 
the last chapter that many of these policy developments are open to critique, or at least 
have not served victims directly as well as they might.
For example, the argument has already been made in Chapter 3 that victims still lack 
what are considered by this thesis genuine ‘internally enforceable’ rights. Hence we 
noted that recent developments like the Victim’s Code of Practice (and therefore the 
European Framework Decision it is supposed to implement) have not taken the issue 
much further from the second Victim’s Charter introduced by the Conservatives in 
1990. In any event, we have seen that the ‘rights’ victims have been afforded are mainly 
restricted to ‘service rights’, coupled with limited forms of participation.
This is partly because -  as confirmed earlier in this chapter -  the government has 
subscribed to a strategy of preserving the existing justice system rather than adapting it 
with fundamental reform to suit the needs of victims, and it certainly has not asked the
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victims themselves whether they require more fundamental changes. I have suggested 
that non-fundamental reform as defined in Chapter 3 is a legitimate mechanism to 
achieve victim-centeredness. Nevertheless, the government’s view is far more 
restrictive than this, excluding victims’ participation (especially consultation) within the 
system essentially on the grounds of a zero sum game. So, we have seen the confused 
introduction of victim personal statements, replete with a practice directive to ensure the 
views of victims on sentence, are not considered (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2001; 
Hoyle et al., 1999; Morgan and Sanders, 1999). We have also seen the introduction of 
special measures, which do seem to assist victims (giving evidence in the guise of 
witnesses) but fail to address the arguably more fundamental problem of questioning 
techniques and the occupational practices of lawyers and judges.69 In addition, it is 
worrying if indeed -  as discussed in the last chapter -  young victims are being given no 
choice over whether or not to give evidence this way.
Furthermore, we have seen numerous indications in this chapter that the government has 
no clear or consistent ‘plan’ for implementing reform. Hence we note the awkward 
introduction of two completely separate means of reducing administrative costs in state 
compensation in short succession, which we have argued may reflect financial concerns 
more than anything else (Home Office, 2004a; Home Office, 2005d). We have also seen 
the unstructured, unplanned manner in which Victim Support must permanently 
compete for extra funding as its role expands.
The issue of funding is key to this debate, because the lack of central money to finance 
the support offered to victims by local agencies strongly suggests that the government is 
unwilling to take responsibility for this area. Instead, local agencies must find resources 
from existing allocations. Again this means that the continuation of support for victims 
is dependent on them remaining important political figures. This is particularly so given 
that the bodies charged with implementing such policies -  the Local Criminal Justice 
Boards -  are comprised of criminal justice administrators who are more concerned with 
system efficiency than victims needs per se. Where the government have provided 
funding, it has usually been in the name of getting witnesses to court to give evidence -  
under the No Witness No Justice Scheme -  which boosts system efficiency (and 
ultimately cuts the cost to the central purse). In addition, we note that whilst victims are 
given information about the system -  such as the presence of special measures, facilities
69 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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and so on -  this is all information that would compel them to come to give evidence, 
rather than a full and realistic overview of the highs and lows of being a witness.
At the centre, after many years victims now finally have their own (Home Office) 
minister, but this position seems to be one of spokesperson rather than agent of reform 
and therefore the appointment is sparse indication of the government taking 
responsibility for victims. Indeed, there is a real question as to whether the true ' 
‘audience’ for these reforms are the victims at all, but may instead be the wider (and 
rather mystical) ‘law-abiding community’. The majority of this community apparently 
do not have to deal with the criminal justice system (on any kind of regular basis) but 
they do appreciate the suffering of victims who must do so, especially if these victims 
meet with stereotypical notions of vulnerability and need. On the latter issue, we can 
note again the latest suggestion to reduce state compensation for ‘non serious’ injury, 
based on alleged BCS findings that such victims would prefer services. In fact, no BCS 
sweep has ever asked victims to choose directly between the two, and we might ask -  in 
a ‘victim-centred system’ -  why should they? As such, the appearance of assisting 
victims may be all this ‘policy’ needs to achieve from the government’s perspective, 
hence the limitations of some of the reforms noted above. It has to be said that ‘the 
public’ also appreciate cost-cutting, hence some very clear statements in more recent 
policy documents that government is attempting to reduce costs and boost efficiency in 
criminal justice (Home Office, 2006a).
Whilst many of the measures intended to help victims have therefore had questionable 
results -  and their implementation raises many questions as to the government’s real 
intentions -  other reforms linked with improving victims’ lot in criminal justice seem to 
have little to do with victims (or even the narrower notion of ‘victim witnesses’) at all. I 
refer in particular to the punitive reforms we have seen, such as the hearsay and bad 
character provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Indeed, more recently we 
have seen ‘clamping down on offenders’ linked directly with supporting victims, as if 
the former necessarily implies the latter (Home Office, 2004e). This is surely nothing 
more than a political strategy to appease perceived punitive values amongst victims. 
Nevertheless, we have already argued in the last chapter that victims may well not be as 
punitive or vindictive as this implies (Erez, 2004). Hence, once again the audience for 
such measures are not the victims, but the public at large in an era of populist 
punitiveness.
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Of course, notwithstanding the above points, the positive views expressed by victims 
and vulnerable and intimidated witnesses regarding court facilities and special measures 
clearly indicates that some victims have indeed benefited from some aspects of these 
‘policies’; including the advent of special measures, the extension of the Witness 
Service and even the efficiency-driven Effective Trial Management structure. In 
addition, with the introduction of victims’ advocates we may be seeing a small 
percentage of (possibly ideal) yictims afforded some measure of party status.
There remains much doubt, however, as to whether the victims themselves have been 
the true focus of this policy, especially as most of these measures only benefit victims 
as witnesses. There is also much evidence to suggest that other politics had a big part to 
play. Whilst we have noted from the early policy history how new governments can 
inherit the position of old ones -  such as the ‘service standards’ approach adopted by 
the Conservative and continued by New Labour -  it was confirmed explicitly by one 
interviewee that <• policy units are heavily influenced by changes in ministerial 
appointments (representative of the OCJR). Hence, whilst many victims have been 
helped, this may sometimes have been more by accident or happy coincidence rather 
than specific design. For this reason -  as argued in the last chapter and above -  the 
government has really not gone far enough in any of its reforms to genuinely bring 
victims ‘to the heart’ of this system. In the next chapter we will begin discussing one 
possible mechanism by which this could be achieved.
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CHAPTER 5:
AN ACCOUNTS-BASED MODEL OF 
VICTIM-CENTEREDNESS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
■ -> *
Having now compiled and assessed the policy and political background behind the 
government’s pledge to put victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice system, the 
purpose of this chapter is to put forward one possible model (or an important 
component of a model) of victim-centred criminal justice. The features of this proposed 
system will then be contrasted with empirical findings from the system as it presently 
operates in England and Wales in the next chapter, and subsequently expanded and 
incorporated into a wider ‘victim-centred’ criminal justice model in Chapter 7.
5.1 -  ACCOUNT-MAKING
As already noted, few recent studies have directly questioned what a genuinely ‘victim- 
centred’ criminal justice system might look like, specifically in relation to the criminal 
trial procedure. As such, this chapter will draw upon developments in our understanding 
of account-making -  from the sociological and psychological literatures -  to suggest 
that putting victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice necessitates a more detailed 
appreciation of the roles victims’ ‘accounts’ and ‘account-making’ might play within 
the substantive trial process. Examples are given from the literature to illustrate the 
social functions and therapeutic benefit of ‘story telling’ for sufferers of many traumas, 
and for crime victims in particular. Under the proposed model, criminal trials 
themselves are viewed in terms of a collection of stories and interpretations of stories.
5.1.1 -  ‘Story telling’ and ‘account-making’
It has often been suggested that people are natural storytellers and that all human beings 
share this fundamental capacity (Coles, 1989). Recent years have witnessed an 
explosion of academic interest in the way human beings interpret and ascribe meaning 
to life experiences by recounting them in the form of stories (Maines, 1993; Orbuch, 
1997). With the realisation that stories play such a key role in people’s lives has come 
the widespread application of concepts like ‘story telling’, ‘account-making’ and 
‘narrative’ to a vast array of issues from across the social sciences, humanities, and even
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the physical sciences (Maines, 1993). Pioneering the use of life stories in social 
research, Ken Plummer describes these developments in the following terms:
“Recently, from all kinds of different theoretical perspectives in the human 
studies...there has been a convergence on the power of the metaphor of the story.
It has become recognised as one of the central roots we have into the continuing 
quest for understanding human meaning” (1995: p.5).
Given such endorsement, applying this ‘metaphor of the story’ to victims in criminal 
trials might well prove advantageous when attempting to identify features of a ‘victim- 
centred’ system. As such, this chapter is chiefly concerned with the place and roles of 
story telling or -  as I will term it here -  ‘account-making’ within the substantive 
criminal trial procedure.
Orbuch et al. provide one concise definition of ‘account-making’:
“[P]eople’s story-like constructions of events that include explanations, 
descriptions, predictions about relevant future events, and effective reaction” 
(1994: p.250).
Whilst the breadth of this definition must be conceded, it does illustrate that account­
making goes beyond the simple retelling of events in a ‘story like’ way. Account­
making is thought to have important psychological and social implications for 
storytellers. In particular, it is argued that account-making improves a person’s 
understanding and acceptance of the specific events being recounted and can also help 
one cope with future life-challenges (White and Epston, 1990). Indeed, one 
understanding of the concept of ‘trauma’ is that it represents discontinuity.in a person’s 
life story and is damaging precisely because it robs sufferers of the ability to story their 
ongoing experiences in a coherent way (Sewell and Williams, 2002). Such ideas have 
been most developed in the medical field, where Bury (1982) argues that chronic illness 
represents a ‘biographical disruption’ in a person’s life that causes them to rethink their 
self-concept. Williams (1984) develops this idea further to describe the conceptual 
strategies people employ to create a sense of stability and order in their lives following 
such disruption. In a similar vein, Giddens (1979) has argued that major events -  such 
as war -  undermine taken-for-granted aspects of the social fabric.
So far, the term ‘narrative’ has been avoided. Whilst there is a clear overlap in the 
literature between ‘narrative’ and ‘account-making’ Orbuch (1997) draws two main 
distinctions between the two. Firstly, he argues that ‘narrative’ implies a public
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recounting of events, usually delivered orally to an audience. Account-making, on the
other hand, can include private activities like writing diaries or self-reflection. As a
second distinction, Orbuch emphasises that account-makers are usually troubled by
specific ‘stressful or imposing’ events, whereas such events do not necessary feature in
narratives. An additional distinction is made by Kellas and Manusov (2003), who view
accounts as a subgroup of narratives which set out to make sense of or explain life^ 
1  ^.1 0
events.
At first glance, the stories communicated by victims of crime during English trials seem 
to have more in common with narrative, as they are usually delivered orally before a 
court’s public and professional audience. Nevertheless, in the present discussion the 
term ‘account-making’ is preferred because it corresponds more specifically to the 
perceived expectations of crime victims participating in criminal trials. For example, it 
is submitted that most victims do not anticipate presenting a complete ‘life-narrative’ 
per se, but attend court rather to tell a story which revolves around a specific (troubling) 
event or events. This is true even in cases where victims themselves believe that a far 
wider range of issues have relevance to the story than are conventionally accepted by 
the courts. Victims may subsequently incorporate these accounts into a wider life- 
narrative, but probably do not anticipate engaging in such an exercise during the course 
of a criminal proceedings. Indeed -  practically -  this is probably too big a task to 
achieve during a criminal trial. Nonetheless, the building blocks of this exercise may 
begin with the formulations of less wide-ranging accounts.
Literature on the impacts crime can have on victims confirms that victimisation can 
indeed represent a ‘stressful or imposing’ event (Shapland and Hall, forthcoming). 
Leading on from this, the argument to be developed in this chapter is that effective story 
telling through the trial process could bring significant therapeutic advantages to 
victims; aiding them in the understanding and acceptance of their victimisation. As 
such, and following Kellas and Manusov’s (2003) interpretation given above, this 
position again seems more in-keeping with the goals of account-making -  in terms of 
coping with specific troubling events -  as opposed to the wider goal of constructing (or 
reconstructing) a life-narrative in the wake of such events.
1 In this case, the dissolution of relationships.
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The final reason the term ‘account-making’ is preferred here is because the evidence 
seems to suggest that writing one’s account can be particularly therapeutic (Harber and 
Pennebaker, 1992) whereas the criminal trial process presently emphasises the orality 
principle (Ellison, 2001), as does Orbuch’s (1997) understanding of narrative.
5.1.2 -  The benefits of account-making
> ■» 0
I am hypothesising in this chapter that victims would benefit from the opportunity to 
construct story-like accounts through the criminal trial procedure. As such, before 
drawing specific connections between account-making and trials it is first necessary to 
illustrate the apparent benefits of account-making in a general sense.
If human beings are indeed natural storytellers then it perhaps comes as no surprise that 
account-making seems to bring therapeutic benefits. This view is often prefaced on the 
notion introduced above; that traumatic events interrupt the ongoing process of ordering 
and presenting one’s experiences as a story. As such, a trip to any health services library 
will uncover a whole host of therapeutic texts -  written by and for practitioners -  
emphasising the benefits of patients ‘externalising’ such experiences and helping the 
individuals who experience them to tell their stories (Kleinman, 1988; White and 
Epston, 1990)
The clinical observations of practitioners have been substantiated by researchers (and 
vice-versa). For example, Harber and Pennebaker (1992) refer to developments in 
‘schema’ theory to illustrate how traumatic events represent a disparity between the 
learned schemas people develop over the course of their lifetimes in order to live and 
operate in their environment, and new (traumatic) experiences. As such, victimisation 
can affect a person’s underlying assumptions concerning, for example, orderliness and 
justice in the world (Herman, 2003; Shapland and Hall, forthcoming). Harber and 
Pennebaker suggest that, in order to resolve such “significant disparities between 
expectations and events” (1992: p.362) trauma victims must confront the troubling 
memories and that:
“This confrontation is best accomplished by translating the chaotic swirl of
traumatic ideation and feelings into coherent language” (p.360).
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According to the authors, the therapeutic benefit of such narratives (to use their 
terminology) will be enhanced when these narratives are organised and have a clear 
beginning, middle and end.
Harber and Pennebaker (1992) back up their assertions with their own detailed review 
of practical experiments conducted in this area. One category are the so-called ‘writing 
experiments’ in which a group of respondents are asked to write about emotions and 
facts surrounding traumatic events in their lives over a number of days, and are then 
compared to a control group (Pennebaker and Beall, 1986; Pennebaker et al., 1988; 
Pennebaker et al., 1990). In their review of the findings of these projects, Harber and 
Pennebaker (1992) note that writing such stories seems to bring genuine (if temporary) 
health benefits to the participants as well as ‘self-perceptual’ and ‘moral-enhancing’ 
advantages. It should be noted that the research participants in some of these 
experiments were university students (as is quite common in psychological studies). 
This of course leaves the work open to criticism that the results should not be applied to 
society in general. It is also clear that these authors are largely reviewing their own 
research, which always raises questions of objectivity. Nevertheless, the findings do 
seem indicative of wider trends and at least on the first point it is worth bearing in mind 
that student victimisation rates are unusually high -  especially in relation to burglary 
(Barberet et al., 2003) -  compared to the general population.
The fact that such benefits are accrued from writing about traumatic incidents is 
particularly interesting for the purposes of the present discussion, which is based on a 
criminal trial procedure still firmly grounded in the orality principle (Ellison, 2001). 
Indeed, Harber and Pennebaker (1992) go on to suggest that the act of writing may itself 
bring extra therapeutic benefits to victims of trauma, because it is a constructive activity 
that yields a tangible product.
In another excellent review of the wider evidence, Orbuch (1997) discusses how 
communicating accounts can help people cope with major life events, whilst failure to 
engage in an account-making process can lead to chronic problems. The notion that an 
absence of successful account-making is actually detrimental to health is a consistent 
theme running through the literature (Pennebaker and Beall, 1986; Harber and 
Pennebaker, 1992; Sewell and Williams, 2002).
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Kellas and Manusov (2003) studied the effect of account-making on people’s 
adjustment to relationship dissolutions2 and, once again, this involved respondents 
providing written accounts. Whilst accepting some methodological limitations (again 
including the use of student respondents) their results nevertheless confirm that the 
coherence of an account and the maker’s ability to put it in episodic or sequential order 
are positively related to their adjustment to relationship dissolution. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that people \Vho can communicate complete accounts may have a greater 
sense of self worth compared to those who are unable to do so.
Notions of account-making also appear in the literature on victims of crime; although 
sometimes only by implication. For example, Kenney (2003) argues that homicide 
survivors3 have a greater sense of ‘coping’ when they engage in activities enabling them 
to “compartmentalize their thoughts and deal with them one at a time” (p.25). In a 
subsequent paper, Kenney expresses another telling point:
“Subjects [homicide survivors] were very clear that coping is not recovering 
completely, returning to ‘normality’, or going back to the way they were before 
the murder. Instead, subjects referred to the ability to live their lives ‘around it’ 
and ‘go on’” (2004: p.244).
This seems closely akin to the view that victims must find ways to resolve traumatic 
events from their pasts through ongoing coping strategies or schemas, which allow such 
events to be successfully incorporated into their wider life narratives (Harber and 
Pennebaker, 1992).
Criminal victimisation has been linked more specifically with account-making in 
relation to sexual abuse. Dalgleish and Morant (1992) suggest that the manner in which 
people tell their stories shapes their claims concerning their own positions and lives. 
Linking this with accounts of sexual abuse, Riessman (1992) emphasises the value of 
account-making4 in the transitional process from ‘victim’ to ‘survivor’ of rape. As such, 
Riessman argues that victims of sexual abuse can construct a ‘surviving self’ through 
telling their story. The findings of Orbuch et al. (1994) also demonstrate the value of
2 Although, as noted earlier, they prefer to think of account-making as a specific form of 
narrative.
3 That is, the secondary victims of homicide.
4 She also speaks in terms o f ‘narratives’.
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account-making activities in the context of sexual abuse, the authors summarising the 
forms and benefits of account-making as:
“[Expressing emotions about the assault; cognitively clarifying aspects of the 
assault; resolving some of the resultant anger, fear, and paralysis of action; and 
actually moving on with one’s life constructively” (p.261).
This construction illustrates both short- and long-term benefits derived from successful 
account-making.
Of course, much of the above literature does not focus on victims of crime specifically 
and none of it draws links with the criminal trial process. We have also seen certain 
methodological limitations to these studies, and it is also clear that a relatively small 
group of researchers are working in this area. Nevertheless, there seems to be evidence 
enough to support the basic proposition that account-making can be beneficial, which 
means we must consider its place (or lack thereof) in a victim-centred system.
5.2 -  STORIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
Given the apparent therapeutic benefits of account-making the next logical question is 
whether, in the context of the government’s pledge to put victims at the heart of the 
criminal justice system, it might be desirable to apply some of these benefits to victims 
in criminal trials and how this could be achieved. Thus, to begin addressing the issues of 
primary interest here, we will first investigate the role of stories and account-making in 
criminal trials.
The preceding paragraphs have concerned themselves with stories told by victims of 
crime and other traumas in isolation or, at most, communicated to specific researchers 
and/or therapists. When examining the implications of account-making for criminal 
trials, however, it is vital to consider the impact of multiple accounts. The adversarial 
justice model of England and Wales revolves around a competition between the 
prosecution and the defence. In a contested trial both sides therefore have their own 
version or versions of events to convey, their own stories to tell. Nevertheless, Van 
Duyne’s (1981) psychological analysis of sentencing differences suggests that the 
picture is actually far more complex.
Amongst numerous important issues raised by Van Duyne is the author’s contention 
that information presented in court during a criminal trial (whether in oral or written
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form) is far from objective. In fact, such information always allows a certain leeway for 
differing interpretations by different actors involved in the process. As such:
“We may regard the total information in a case as a ‘story’ concerning one or 
more criminal offences in which the reporting officers, defendants and witnesses 
express their findings and views, and which may contain contradictions and points 
which are unclear; this can result in different interpretations of one and the same 
file” (Van Duyne, 1981: p.15).
Effectively then, these differing interpretations create a whole collection of stories. For 
example, as Van Duyne illustrates, a prosecutor’s professional experience (amongst 
other factors) will shape the case files he or she produces for the court. Indeed 
McConville et al. (1991) have emphasised the role of the police and prosecution 
working together in the construction of cases (stories) before they even reach court, to 
the extent that:
“The reality of Crime Control (in which, whatever their public postures to the 
contrary, police and Crown Prosecutors join hands) means that courts do little 
more than endorse constructions according to the quality of workmanship, the 
combativeness of the defence lawyer and the hand of Fate” (p.172).
Indeed, to draw a parallel with the defence side of the equation, we might refer to 
McConville et al.’s (1994) study of the work of defence solicitors and how they adopt a 
confrontational attitude to clients as a means of enforcing ‘standardised case theories’ in 
individual cases:
“Certainly at the magistrates’ court stage, if not beforehand, solicitors and their 
staff adopt a confrontational approach to clients, challenging them to deny the 
police evidence against them and virtually to prove their own innocence” (p.276).
As such, defence solicitors effectively compel defendants to accept a version of their 
story that corresponds to lawyers’ stereotypical impressions:
“Like the police, defence solicitors and their staff frequently work on the basis of 
standardised case theories and stereotypes of the kinds of people who become 
involved in events leading to arrest and criminal charge, whether these be fights 
outside pubs, domestic burglaries or car thefts, or incidents of shop-lifting. These 
people are commonly seen by their ‘legal advisers’ as feckless and dishonest, and 
such images are allowed to structure the way in which their cases will be handled 
from the outset” (p.277).
Hence, it seems that by the time a case has reached the court, the stories involved will 
already have gone through a substantial process of interpretation by both sides. Of
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course, such stories will then be reinterpreted by judges based on their own experience 
and ‘knowledge of the world’ (Van Duyne, 1981). Judges, juries, clerks and magistrates 
will likewise interpret the oral or written evidence of victims, witnesses and police 
officers -  who similarly develop their own versions of the story. Thus, in addition to the 
two versions presented by the opposing sides in the adversarial process, a criminal trial 
will typically involve a whole host of other stories, including those stories participating 
actors tell themselves in interpreting the ^  information. Thus, a criminal trial can be 
understood in terms of a collection of stories.
5.3 -  VICTIMS’ ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNT-MAKING ‘AT THE HEART’ OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Having discussed the therapeutic benefits of account-making and the conception of 
trials as a collection of stories, I will now elaborate on how I believe incorporating 
victims’ account-making within criminal trials appears consistent with the government’s 
pledge to place victims ‘at the heart’ of criminal justice.
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the criminal justice system revolves around the criminal 
trial. As such, if trials are typified by a collection of stories, it makes sense to suggest 
that in a victim-centred system the accounts made by victims would be afforded 
particular distinction within the trial process. It is not the specific goal of this chapter 
(or this thesis) to argue for or against the instrumental impact of such accounts on 
criminal procedure, either before or during the sentencing stage. Whilst such effects 
might well prove a significant feature of a victim-centred system overall, the contention 
here is simply that incorporating victims’ accounts within trials is an important feature 
of such a system. In other words, a normative argument is submitted based on the view 
that the trial procedure is equally or more important to members of the public compared 
with instrumental outcomes.
We saw in Chapter 3 that this focus on procedure rather than outcomes is well grounded 
in established literature, with Ashworth (1993) Erez (1994) and Tyler (1990) all 
emphasising the view that “normative issues matter” (Tyler, 1990: p.178). So, for 
example, the 2002 Witness Satisfaction Survey indicates that witnesses’ feelings that 
they have been ‘taken for granted’ is a strong predicator of overall dissatisfaction with 
their experience (Angle et ah, 2003). .
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Aside from these purely normative concerns, however, the above discussion implies that 
incorporating victims’ account-making within criminal trials will bring more tangible 
benefits in the form of therapeutic effects. It is not being suggested that these benefits 
could replace the benefits derived from professional counselling5 or even the less 
structured reflection and re-telling of stories in the longer-term. It might however 
constitute a means by which victims take something positive away from the criminal 
justice system; and it is > submitted that this is an important goal for any victim- 
orientated process.
In fact, the notion that criminal justice can and should afford participants therapeutic 
outcomes is the subject of a growing literature (Wexler and Winick, 1996; Stolle, 2000). 
Rottman and Casey (1999) introduce the notion of ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ in the 
following terms:
“Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and 
judges) constitute social forces that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or 
antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that we ask 
whether the law’s antitherapeutic consequences can be reduced, and its 
therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating due process and other 
justice values” (p. 14).
So far, therapeutic jurisprudence has been associated mainly with restorative and 
community justice initiatives, as well as with wider ‘problem-solving’ strategies, often 
adopted through the creation of specialist courts (such as domestic violence or drug 
courts) (Rottman and Casey 1999; Rottman 2000). Nevertheless, it is clear that provided 
‘other justice values’ are not infringed (a point I return to in Chapter 7), therapeutic 
account-making as part of the criminal trial process would be commensurate with the 
goals of this approach.
To summarise, the argument here is based on the idea (or ideal) of a criminal justice 
system which genuinely holds victims at its heart. Whilst accepting the existence of 
other attributes, two desirable features of such a system are submitted. Firstly, because 
the system revolves around a process constituted by multiple stories, to put the victim at 
the heart of that system implies that the victim’s story should be highlighted within that 
process, not excluded, marginalized or reinterpreted to the extent that it is no longer the
5 Although joint CPS, Home Office and Department of Health guidelines indicate that child 
witnesses should not receive any form of therapy which involves the detailed recounting of 
experiences prior to giving evidence at trial, as a guard against witness coaching (CPS, 2001).
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victim’s own account. Secondly, the notion of a victim-centred system implies some 
form of benefit will be accrued to victim participants. The relevant literature suggests 
that account-making is one way to inject such benefits -  achieving a more therapeutic 
jurisprudence -  whilst this would also be consistent with the first feature.
5.3.1 -  Victims’ accounts in criminal trials
••iN
I
Having set out its main arguments, this chapter next turns to the roles currently played 
by victims’ accounts amongst the multitude of stories and interpretations of stories 
found in criminal trials.
Within the current system in England and Wales, victims contribute to the trial process 
in three main ways: witness statements, victim personal statements and the process of 
giving evidence. Each of these will be taken in turn with a view to establishing why -  in 
principle and based on guideline documents and literature -  all three fail to produce true 
accounts or account-making from the perspective of the victim. These arguments will 
then be backed up by reference to the empirical findings of the present research in the 
next chapter. This section also demonstrates how account-making can be used as a tool 
in assessing the victim-centeredness of the criminal justice system.
5.3.1.1 -  Witness statements
The taking of witness statements is usually one of the first steps in the process 
culminating in a criminal trial. It is largely based on such statements that lawyers from 
the Crown Prosecution Service make their decisions on whether to pursue a prosecution, 
guided by public interest and evidential criteria (CPS, 2004). Witness statements 
therefore form the core of the case file assembled by a prosecutor and subsequently 
presented to the court.
The witness statements of crime victims contain what is purported to be their own 
version of events or, from the lawyers’ perspective, their evidence. There has been little 
investigation into the manner in which witness statements are taken, but generally it 
appears that they are not usually written out by the victims themselves, but are instead 
compiled by police officers based on an interview. Certainly the 2004 edition of the 
Prosecution Team Manual of Guidance seems to envision the police filling in most of 
the relevant (MG11) form and the language employed is always one of police ‘taking’ 
witness statement rather than victims ‘giving’ their evidence (Home Office, 2004h).
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Graham et al. (2004) also note that this police-led method is the traditional way of 
gathering witness statements.6 Victims are of course given the opportunity to read their 
statements and make corrections before signing each page. Subsequently, a typed 
version of the statement is produced and the victim is again asked to sign each page to 
confirm its accuracy (Home Office, 2004h).
Two main distinctions can be drawn between genuine account-making on the one hand 
and this process of victims making witness statements on the other. Firstly, the fact that 
witnesses statements are apparently compiled by police officers means the victims 
themselves will be somewhat removed from the process. This seems to detract from the 
established norms of therapeutic account-making -  as described in the literature above -  
in which respondents are usually asked to physically write about ‘stressful or imposing 
events’ themselves. Hence, in the case of witness statements victims miss out on any 
benefits derived from engaging in the constructive exercise of physically writing out 
their accounts.
The second distinction between witness statements and account-making lies in the fact 
that police officers are under pressure to take statements from victims as soon as 
possible after an alleged offence (Home Office, 2004h). Account-making, on the other 
hand, is usually conceived in terms of a story being told sometime after the events and 
following reflection and interpretation. Indeed, according to Orbuch et al.’s (1994) 
definition, this is largely the point of any account-making exercise. Of course, giving 
the victim time to ‘reflect and interpret’ events is precisely what the police, the courts 
and lawyers are seeking to avoid by taking statements as soon as possible, because from 
their perspective the statements are taken for evidential purposes. The issue then is 
whether victims themselves have this same purpose in mind when they give their 
statements, or whether they view the procedure more in terms of account-making. It is 
submitted that the latter possibility is more likely considering that everyone is to some 
extent a ‘story teller’ whereas few civilian victims are likely to think in terms of 
evidential rules.
Of course it could be argued that -  regardless of what the officer actually writes down -  
the victim is in fact participating in an account-making exercise just by reporting the 
information. That said, the lack of time to reflect on the events in most cases, coupled
6 Evidence from the present research also supports this view, see Chapter 6.
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with victims not actually writing the accounts physically and in their own words, seems 
to distance this process from true account-making. Furthermore, even if providing 
statements did afford victims some of the therapeutic benefits associated with account­
making, if such accounts are not fully recorded they will never form part of the trial 
procedure. It is submitted that, given the evidential priorities of police officers, it is 
unlikely that victims’ full and unedited accounts are in fact recorded in witness 
statements, and we will .examine ethnographic evidence for such a proposition in the 
next chapter. If this hypothesis proves correct, then considerable doubt would be cast on 
the notion that victims are presently being brought ‘to the heart’ of the criminal justice 
system. On the contrary, this would suggest victims’ stories are kept very much at the 
periphery.
Even if victims did write out their witness statements themselves -  based on account­
making rather than evidential criteria -  following Van Duyne (1981) this would still be 
subject to the prosecutor’s interpretation of that statement. Such interpretation will 
clearly influence the presentation of the information by prosecutors; in their opening 
speeches and also in the way they conduct a trial generally.
5.3.1.2 -  Victim personal statements
We have seen that victim personal statements were rolled out as a national initiative in 
October 2001, following two major evaluations of pilot schemes (Hoyle et al., 1999; 
Morgan and Sanders, 1999). Their apparent purpose is to give victims of crime the 
opportunity to submit another statement in addition to their regular witness statements. 
Within such statements, victims are invited to comment on how a crime has affected 
them “physically, emotionally, psychologically, financially or in any other way” (Home 
Office, 2001e: p.2).
In terms of providing victims with a vehicle for account-making, victim personal 
statements boast a number of advantages over traditional witness statements. Firstly, it 
seems that victim personal statements are intended to be written in the victim’s own 
words, and, perhaps in the victim’s own hand. Some qualification is necessary here 
because the language used in the relevant guidance note for practitioners (Home Office, 
2001c) is somewhat vague, again referring to police officers “taking the statement” but 
also clearly maintaining that victims “will be free to say what they wish”. The Manual
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of Guidance is similarly vague on this point (Home Office, 2004h). The leaflet 
produced for the victims themselves is more consistent, advising victims:
“The police will ask if you want to fill in a victim personal statement when they
have finished filling in the witness statement” (Home Office, 2001c: p.5).
In practice, qualitative analysis has suggested that VPS statements are completed in a 
number of ways. These can be placed on a continuum ranging from ‘self-completion’ 
methods -  where victims write out their own statements with a low level of police 
control -  to ‘police checklist’ methods, where the police elicit victim personal 
statements in a similar way to witness statement (Graham et al., 2004). The lack of any 
quantitative data7 makes it impossible to know which methods are most commonly 
utilised by the police, but techniques which involve victims writing their own VPS 
statements obviously seem more consistent with account-making principles. As such, if 
the system is to become truly victim-centred, it is submitted that clearer guidelines to 
this effect would be required. In addition, victims’ awareness of the existence and 
purpose of the scheme needs to be increased, as Graham et al. found both to be very 
low.
The above extract refers to so-called ‘stage one’ victim personal statements, which are 
taken at the same time as the traditional witness statement. According to the guidance 
note and the Manual of Guidance, stage one victim personal statements should be taken 
on the same form (form MG11) as the main witness statement, “with a clear separation 
between the evidential part of the statement and the VPS” (Home Office, 2004b: p. 138). 
This is a puzzling definition, as a victim personal statement is itself evidence, a point we 
will return to in a moment. What is perhaps more interesting for present purposes is that 
victims can also make subsequent ‘stage two’ victim personal statements on separate 
MG11 forms. A stage two VPS can be used to record the more long-term effects of 
crime or simply update/supplement a previous personal statement. The VPS guidance 
for victims assures them they can update their personal statements “at any stage before 
the case gets to court” (Home Office, 2001b: p.9).
This is clearly significant from an account-making perspective, as it seems to give 
victims the freedom to develop the information initially presented; allowing time for the 
reflection and interpretation associated with genuine account-making. As such, it seems
7 Which was rendered unviable by low take-up rates, see Chapter 4.
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likely that stage two victim personal statements have the greatest potential to elicit 
therapeutic benefits for victims compared with witness statements, or even the stage one 
VPS. Once more, however, the accrual of such benefits is reliant on victims actually 
being informed about the scheme, an issue on which Graham et al.’s findings are again 
telling:
■S'.
“There was low or no awareness of, the option of making a later VPS” (2004:
P-54).
Of course, even if stage one or two VPS statements are made, at this stage the victim 
personal statement encounters the same limitations as the traditional witness statements 
discussed above. Whilst producing such a statement (or statements) through methods 
involving low levels of police control might constitute account-making, the question 
becomes whether -  in the context of the government’s pledge on victims -  these 
accounts are being readily incorporated within the trial process itself.
This is a question for Chapter 6, but the difficulty here is clearly that -  just like the 
stories presented in witness statements -  the use and interpretation of victim personal 
statements are in the hands of the prosecutor presenting the case. Unlike the equivalent 
schemes in several US states (Erez, 2000) the English and Welsh version of victim 
personal statements does not allow the victims themselves to read a VPS orally in court 
(JUSTICE, 1998).8 Thus, the victim must rely on the prosecutor presenting the 
statement to the court, referring to it in a speech, eliciting information contained within 
it during the victim’s examination in chief or simply handing it in to the judge, who is 
under no obligation to refer to it. Roberts and Erez (2004) therefore argue that the 
communicative function of a victim impact statement is curtailed by prosecutors, who 
take away the uniqueness of victim’s story and emphasise different aspects of it than the 
victim would. Once again, therefore, the victim’s own interpretation of the story may 
easily be subjugated by that of the prosecutor and judge.
Even assuming the full text of a VPS was faithfully reproduced during a trial in a 
manner true to the victim’s own interpretation, meaning and understanding, in such a 
case the victim’s story is still subject to the interpretation of those who hear it. In the 
trial context such interpretation may well involve the exclusion of a lot of the
8 And even if they could -  as might be possible under the victims’ advocate proposals (Home 
Office, 2005b) -  the statements themselves would still be subject to the same limitations as the 
existing VPS.
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information due to restrictive interpretations of how victim personal statements can be 
used. So, at the pilot stage Morgan and Sanders (1999) concluded that' victim statements 
were seen primarily as an aid to sentencing by criminal justice professionals but that in 
practice they still had little to no impact on most sentencing decisions. This is because 
the vast majority of cases were -  from the court’s perspective -  unremarkable as 
opposed to novel, and therefore sentencers felt they do not require the VPS, because it 
did not tell them anything they didn’t already know about the impact of the crime.
As we have already seen, soon after the national rollout of victim personal statements 
the then Lord Chancellor’s Department published a Practice Directive that drew 
attention to the VPS scheme, but also set out some fairly restrictive limitations. The text 
of that Directive is worth repeating here:
“The court must pass what it judges to be the appropriate sentence having regard 
to the circumstances of the offence taking into account, so far as the court 
considers it appropriate, the consequences to the victim. The opinions of the 
victim or the victim’s close relatives as to what the sentence should be are 
therefore not relevant...[if] opinions as to sentence are included in a statement, 
the court should pay no attention to it” (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2001).
This statement firstly confirms that the court’s consideration of victim personal 
statements should be confined to the sentencing stage following conviction. More 
significantly, however, the directive suggests that if criminal justice actors consider a 
victim’s ‘VPS made’ account to be ‘inappropriate’ or contain ‘irrelevant’ elements then 
the account should be wholly or partly excluded. Either way, this results in a brand new 
interpretation of the victim’s story.
5.3.1.3 -  Giving evidence
Giving evidence in court is still the most visible and obvious contribution made by 
victims of crime during the trial procedure. Unlike witness statements or victim 
personal statements, the process of giving evidence represents victims’ sole opportunity 
to communicate information to the court firsthand. Further to this, the evidence itself 
can often sound very much like a ‘story’ being told by the victim. Nevertheless, a 
number of significant features seem to distinguish the evidence-giving procedure from 
true account-making. These will be discussed now and illustrated with practical 
examples in Chapter 6.
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The main difference between accounts and court-based evidence is that whilst the 
former are ‘made’ the latter is elicited by questioning lawyers. Of course, counsellors 
might also elicit accounts from clients by prompting them to participate in an account­
making exercise. In such cases, however, the counsellor is not attempting to actively 
control the information provided (as is arguably the case with lawyers) but is instead 
acting in the capacity of a receptive audience (Sewell and Williams, 2002).
. . .  0
To make the point concisely, in the present system victims giving evidence in 
courtrooms are not there to tell stories, but to answer questions. This immediately 
renders the victims subservient to the procedure because the stories they tell are thereby 
constrained by the logical scope and reasonable interpretation of the questions being 
asked, with lawyers/judges possessing the exclusive right to determine what such 
‘logical and reasonable interpretations’ entail. Thus, if victims’ answers stray beyond 
the scope of the information lawyers intended to elicit from a question, they are likely to 
be halted. Even when questioning lawyers employ relatively open language -  ‘tell the 
court what happened’ -  there is still an implicit limitation to the scope of the answer 
being called for beyond which victims are not permitted to stray. The consequence of 
this is that, once again, the victim’s own account is distorted in favour of an alterative 
version of the story.
The notion that questioning lawyers effectively control the evidence presented by 
witnesses is supported by established literature. Luchjenbroers (1996) has provided a 
detailed content analysis of barrister-witness dialogue during a six-day Supreme Court 
murder trial in Australia. Although based on a single trial, the results clearly illustrate 
the questioning strategies employed by barristers to effectively control the information 
provided by witnesses. The wording of Luchjenbroers’ conclusion makes it particularly 
suitable for inclusion here:
“[W itnesses can hardly be thought to tell their own stories in their own words”
(Luchjenbroers, 1996: p.501).
Indeed, in direct contrast to notions of account-making as rewarding and therapeutic, the 
wider literature is almost unanimous in its portrayal of the evidence-giving process as a 
difficult and uncomfortable experience (Carlen, 1976; Shapland et al., 1985; Jackson et 
al., 1991; Rock, 1993; Ellison, 2001).
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This last observation pre-empts another important distinction between account-making 
and evidence, which reflects a contrast between natural and unnatural modes of 
expression. As noted already, account-making usually involves account-makers telling 
their stories in their own way, based on personal reflection on past events. Aside from 
the specific experiments that have been carried out in this area, this can often be 
achieved privately through notes and diaries (Orbuch, 1997). Even when account­
making is carried out in the context of an experiment or therapy -  where 
respondents/clients may be specifically asked to present their accounts in written form -  
there are usually few further stipulations as to how exactly this must be done. For 
example, in some written experiments, respondents are told not to concern themselves 
with spelling, punctuation or grammar (Harber and Pennebaker, 1992). Hence, as 
pointed out at the beginning of this paper, genuine account-making seems to reflect a 
very natural way of imparting information though stories.
The contrast referred to above lies in the fact that, when victims give evidence during 
criminal trials, they are asked to relay information in a very unnatural, unfamiliar way. 
A courtroom is an unfamiliar environment for most people and can be frightening and 
intimidating (Hamlyn et al., 2004a). The evidence is itself elicited from witnesses in a 
very unnatural manner, with witnesses usually being told to present their answers 
towards the bench or jury whilst simultaneously receiving the questions from a lawyer 
standing in another direction (Rock, 1993). In addition, the fact that notes of a witness’ 
evidence must be taken by hand by more than one person in the room means that 
witnesses are required to present the information at an unnatural speed and volume; 
persistently being interrupted in their flow and asked to slow down or speed up or speak 
more loudly. In summary, Jackson (2004) points out:
“It is seldom appreciated just what a wide array of cognitive, social and emotional
skills the legal system demands of witnesses” (p.73).
Furthermore, it is not just the procedure of giving evidence that may be difficult to 
victims and other witnesses. In many cases victims will be asked to cope with some 
very unfamiliar concepts, hearsay being a prime example and one on which witnesses of 
all kinds receive no information or guidance in published materials.
Of course, as with written statements, witnesses giving evidence may be asked to 
elaborate on what they consider to be very small details whilst passing over what they 
view as important ones. Not only is this all highly frustrating, it is also likely to
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compromise witnesses’ ability to present their accounts in what they consider a logical 
and consecutive order; another important characteristic of account-making emphasised 
earlier (Kellas and Manusov, 2003). In addition, and particularly during cross- 
examination, questions may be confusing, coercive or insulting (Temkin, 1987). Overall 
then, the evidence-giving procedure seems far removed from the very natural process of 
therapeutic account-making.
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Ellison (2001) places some of the blame for the problems faced by witnesses 
(specifically vulnerable and intimidated witnesses) on the system’s continued reliance 
on the orality principle (the notion that evidence should typically be presented out loud). 
Certainly this seems at odds with our understanding of account-making, which 
embraces written accounts. Of course, even if the orality principal were not so dominant 
in current legal thinking, the preceding discussion of witness statements and victim 
personal statements suggests that presently it would still be difficult to ensure a written 
version of the victim’s account was incorporated within the trial procedure.
The final distinction I wish to draw between account-making and evidence is that the 
latter is not necessarily a voluntary exercise.9 It has already been noted that therapists 
might try to convince their clients to engage in an account-making process. Such 
persuasion is however far removed from the position of some victims in criminal trials; 
summoned to give evidence on pain of arrest and imprisonment. At present, the clearest 
examples can be drawn from cases of domestic violence.
Traditionally, it has been very difficult to prosecute cases of violence in the home. 
Some blame for this can be attributed to the prevailing police professional culture that 
was to a large extent uninterested in such crimes, dismissing them in favour of ‘real’ 
police work (Reiner, 2000). More specifically, however, the difficulty of attaining 
prosecutions for domestic violence lies in the fact that many of its victims are unwilling 
to report the matter or provide evidence (Cretney, and Davis, 1997; Temkin, 1999). 
When such cases are reported, it is still very common for victims to subsequently 
withdraw their complaints and submit so-called ‘retraction statements’.
The reaction of the Crown Prosecution Service to poor conviction rates for domestic 
violence has been to initiate a policy of driving forward these prosecutions. The full
9 Although, unlike Scotland, the general theory in England and Wales is that a witnesses’ 
evidence is based on their voluntary attendance at court.
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details will be reviewed in Chapter 6 but, essentially, this policy involves treating 
domestic violence victims as parties with reduced capacity who -  unable to make 
‘rational’ decisions as to supporting a prosecution and giving evidence by reason of 
their relationship with the defendant -  need to be ‘saved from themselves’.10 
Effectively, this often removes any influence the victim might exert over whether or not 
a case is proceeded with (albeit this influence is generally quite minor to begin with). 
The consequence is that if a case of domestic violence is brought to court against 
victims’ wishes, it is open for prosecutors to summon them to attend or -  if a summons 
has failed to secure attendance -  to request a warrant. One can see this as a strange 
reversal; where from the victim’s perspective there is no story to tell but the system 
itself demands one. Of course, such a ‘forced’ account would be limited by the factors 
already discussed whilst -  most likely -  any remaining benefits to the victim would be 
further eroded by the mandatory nature of the exercise.
5.3.2 -  Victims’ accounts in criminal trials: a summary
The limitations placed on victims’ capacity to tell their stories through the criminal trial 
procedure can be broadly summarised by reference to the disparity alluded to earlier 
between the system’s evidential criteria and the account-making requirements (or 
natural expectations) of the victims themselves. The implications of this can be 
illustrated diagrammatically on a timeline:
Figure 1: Timeline of victims’ accounts
T1 T2 T3
Time
T1 = time of victimisation T2 = time of giving witness statement 
T3 = time of giving evidence at trial
On Figure 1, the horizontal line represents time, running from point T1 (the point of 
victimisation) through point T2 (when a victim gives evidence to the police in the form
10 Based on various interviews conducted for this research with legal practitioners and the Chief 
Crown Prosecutor in the area under review. Chapter 6 reproduces the relevant quotations, see 
pages 243-243.
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of a statement) and ending at T3 (the trial, when a victim gives evidence in court). As 
has already been observed, the police usually take a victim’s witness statement as soon 
as possible after the initial incident. Subsequently, however, many victims will face a 
prolonged wait between stages T2 and T3 whilst the case is brought to trial. This 
waiting period (T2-T3) can be anything from a year to eighteen months for offences of 
violence, and possibly even longer in complex cases (Bari, 2006).
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The question raised by this is whether victims’ stories remain static in their own minds 
during this prolonged waiting period. The use people make of stories to bring order and 
ascribe meaning to past experiences (especially troubling experiences) has already been 
discussed. Taking this into account, it seems fairly unlikely that many victims arrive at 
court at stage T3 prepared to tell exactly the same story they told at stage T2. This is 
because, in the intervening period, the victim’s ongoing attempts to ‘story’ the 
experience of victimisation will result in extensive thought, reinterpretation and 
development of that story.
Hence, the stories victims are prepared to tell when they arrive at court at stage T3 may 
be quite different from those given at stage T2. Such differences might include new 
details occurring to the victim in the intervening period, links drawn with other 
experiences prior to or following stage T1 and variation in the language used to relay 
these events. In a more general sense, different aspects of the story may -  by stage T3 -  
seem important to the victim and worthy of inclusion, exclusion or emphasis. It is 
crucial to appreciate that this is not a case of victims ‘carelessly’ allowing their minds to 
slip, but is instead representative of the natural way people deal with these kinds of 
experiences; Plummer’s root to understanding human meaning (1995: p.6).
The problem faced by victims at trials, however, is that the process restricts them to the 
version of the story given in their witness statements at point T2, because this is the 
version the lawyers are expecting and which they will be seeking to elicit. The difficulty 
here may lie in the fact that the system presently has no way of making any version of 
the story between T2 and T3 available to prosecutors, as the CPS usually only has the 
T2 statement to work with. This is because ‘later’ witness statements are generally not 
taken (as they would be considered unreliable) whilst we have seen that stage two 
victim personal statements are still rare. Hence, what prosecutors are left with is the T2 
story that -  as we noted earlier -  is largely constructed by the police. This implies that
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the accounts victims are allowed to make though the criminal justice are effectively set 
in stone at the earliest stage of the justice process.
In sum, criminal trials effectively restrict victims to the T2 version of their stories that -  
in their own minds -  might well constitute an outdated account. This of course suggests 
that the accounts victims are permitted to make will have less relevance to them than the 
more reasoned and considered (T3) version, which is bom from a prolonged period of
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self-reflection, interpretation and developments in understanding (T2-T3). The victims 
themselves can hardly be blamed for engaging in such activities -  given our 
understanding of the natural ways people use stories -  nor can they be criticised for 
wishing to give what they view as the most up to date and relevant account. In contrast, 
the system compels victims to cast their minds back many months to a version of the 
story from which they themselves may now derive little meaning; effectively excluding 
the fruit of the prolonged period of self-reflection and development.
Fundamentally, therefore, the argument submitted by this chapter is that a genuinely 
victim-centred trial procedure would be capable of incorporating more developments 
between points T2 and T3, thus allowing victims to tell their full stories and derive 
therapeutic benefits from so doing. Many questions are raised by this proposition; 
including how it would operate, whether it would be legitimate to impose any limits on 
victims’ accounts in a victim-centred system, and whether this model would necessitate 
‘fundamental reform’ after all.
Clearly these questions overlap with issues raised in previous chapters, especially the 
notion of victim rights and the incessant objections of the due process perspective. In 
Chapter 3 it was argued that a victim-centred system might afford victims the (internally 
enforceable) right to present a wider category of evidence and to avoid -  for example -  
being interrupted or having the course of their evidence dictated to them through 
questioning strategies. In this thesis I have argued consistently against notions of a zero 
sum game between victim and defendant rights, but before moving on to address how 
the ‘accounts-based’ model would operate we first need to substantiate what role (if 
any) victims’ accounts play (or could potentially play) in existing criminal procedures. 
This will be achieved by examining in the next chapter the empirical evidence gathered 
for this project. We will then be in a position to conclude whether or not ‘accounts’ 
could be incorporated into the existing justice model (without fundamental reform) and 
thus into our overall model of victim-centeredness to be presented in Chapter 7.
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